DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Wednesday, November 8, 2017
SC96210
Amie Wieland v. Owner-Operator Services Inc.
Jackson County
Challenge to jury instruction, argument in case involving specific harm exception
Listen to the oral argument: SC96210 MP3 file
Owner-Operator was represented during arguments by Edwin H. Smith of Polsinelli PC in St. Joseph; Wieland was represented by Scott S. Bethune of Davis Bethune & Jones LLC in Kansas City.
Owner-Operator was represented during arguments by Edwin H. Smith of Polsinelli PC in St. Joseph; Wieland was represented by Scott S. Bethune of Davis Bethune & Jones LLC in Kansas City.
Owner-Operator Services Inc. employee Amie Wieland was shot in the back of the head in November 2012 in the company’s employee parking lot in Grain Valley by her estranged boyfriend, Alan Lovelace. He had been lying in wait in her minivan, armed with a loaded handgun. She saw him as she was opening the minivan after leaving work, then turned to walk away. He shot her about 20 seconds later. Wieland was severely injured but survived. She sued Owner-Operator for negligence, and the case was tried to a jury. As a general rule, a business owner owes no duty to protect an individual invited onto its premises from the criminal acts of third parties. Wieland proceeded under a “specific harm exception,” arguing the company was negligent in failing to follow its domestic violence protocol or monitor its security cameras, which she argued would have given the company sufficient time to discover Lovelace on its premises and to notify law enforcement authorities in time to prevent the shooting. At trial, Owner-Operator twice moved for a directed verdict, arguing Wieland had not presented sufficient evidence for the jury to decide the case. The circuit court overruled the motions and ultimately submitted the case to the jury using a verdict-directing instruction Wieland had offered. The jury found in Wieland’s favor, awarding her $3.25 million in damages. The circuit court overruled the company’s motion for a new trial. The company appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One is whether there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find the requisite elements of the specific harm exception or whether, given the circumstances, Owner-Operator knew or could have known Lovelace was in the parking lot before Wieland was shot. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have allowed Wieland to argue the company failed to follow its protocol. Related issues involve whether the failure to follow protocol was relevant to the exception under which Wieland submitted the case or in helping the jury determine whether the company was negligent in not protecting Wieland in the parking lot or in failing to notify law enforcement authorities.
SC96210_Owner-Operator_amended_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96210_Wieland_amended_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96210_Owner-Operator_reply_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96228
Colby L. Sanders v. State of Missouri
Christian County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief from molestation conviction
Note: By order dated November 2, 2017, the Court ordered this case retransferred to the Missouri Court of Appeals. See Case.net for text of the order.
SC96315
David Glenn Latham v. State of Missouri
Jasper County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief from trafficking conviction
Listen to the oral argument: SC96315 MP3 file
Latham was represented during arguments by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged David Latham with second-degree trafficking, alleging he possessed 6 grams or more of a substance containing a cocaine base. At a January 2012 hearing, Latham pleaded guilty to this charge and agreed to be sentenced to probation, with a “backup sentence” of 15 years in prison. In August 2013, the circuit court revoked Latham’s probation and executed his sentence. Latham sought postconviction relief, alleging his plea counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty when, he alleges, he never should have been prosecuted for trafficking under a statute requiring at least 150 grams of cocaine salt to be a felony. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief, concluding he provided no evidence he was prejudiced or would have received a more favorable or different outcome. Latham appeals.
This appeal presents one primary question for this Court – whether Latham’s plea counsel was ineffective in allowing Latham to plead guilty to trafficking. A related issue involves whether Latham’s amended motion for postconviction relief was timely or pleaded sufficiently and whether the claim asserted on appeal differs from the one raised in the amended motion.
SC96315_Latham_brief
SC96315_State_brief
SC96315_Latham_reply_brief
SC96118
Christopher Collings v. State of Missouri
Phelps County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief in death penalty case
Listen to the oral argument: SC96118 MP3 file
Collings was represented during arguments by Amy M. Bartholow of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Richard A. Starnes of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Following a jury trial, Christopher Collings was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for his actions in the November 2007 kidnapping, rape and strangulation of a 9-year-old stepdaughter of a friend in Stella. During the guilt phase of the trial, Collings presented evidence he had been drinking heavily and smoking marijuana before taking the girl from her home. During the penalty phase of the trial, he presented evidence of his childhood development, including evidence he was neglected emotionally and sexually molested as a child, but his trial counsel did not present evidence of substance-abuse addiction or whether his capacity to understand the criminal nature of his conduct was impaired. On appeal, this Court affirmed Collings’ conviction and sentence. He then sought postconviction relief, challenging the constitutional validity of the voluntary intoxication statute and jury instruction, raising multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and challenging the constitutional validity of the time limits in Rule 29.15. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief. Collings appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves whether Collings’ trial counsel should have challenged whether the involuntary intoxication statute and corresponding jury instruction unconstitutionally prevented Collings from presenting a defense that his ability to form the requisite mental state to commit the charged crimes was affected by intoxication. Another question involves whether trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence of the stepfather’s computer use and Internet history, of cadaver dogs alerting handlers to the scent of human remains at the stepfather’s vehicle, and of neighbors’ accounts of activity at the stepfather’s home before, during and after the time of the crime, all of which Collings argues would have cast doubt on his own guilt and implicated the girl’s stepfather. Additional questions involve whether trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence of contradictory statements by the girl’s stepfather that Collings argues are irreconcilable with his own confession and prevented the jury from evaluating the credibility of Collings’ confession or in not challenging DNA evidence from hair found in the back of Collings’ pickup truck to cast doubt on whether he transported the girl in his truck. A further question involves whether trial counsel was ineffective in not calling an expert psychiatrist and two of Collings’ family members to present mitigating evidence of addiction and childhood trauma and whether they substantially impaired his ability to understand the criminal nature of his conduct. As to Collings’ direct appeal, questions involve whether appellate counsel should have challenged the circuit court’s exclusion of educational, medical, treatment and other historical records supporting an expert’s penalty phase testimony as well as whether the jury instruction describing the “torture” aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague.
SC96118_Collings_brief
SC96118_State_brief