The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Tuesday, February 27, 2018
Note: The Court on February 26 modified the order in which it expects to hear these cases.
SC96718
State ex rel. Abbott Laboratories Inc. v. The Honorable Steven R. Ohmer
St. Louis city
Venue, joinder challenges to personal injury suit filed in St. Louis city
Listen to the oral argument: SC96718 MP3 file
Abbott Laboratories was represented during arguments by William Ray Price Jr. of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; Lopez was represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
Georgia resident Mariah Lopez was born in Georgia, allegedly with birth defects after her mother took, in Georgia and pursuant to a Georgia doctor’s prescription, the anti-seizure drug Depakote, sold by Abbott Laboratories Inc., which has headquarters in Illinois and a registered agent in St. Louis County. Lopez joined with other out of state Missouri plaintiffs and several Missouri plaintiffs – including twins living in St. Louis city – in filing a single personal injury case against Abbott in May 2012 in the St. Louis circuit court. Abbott filed motions to sever the claims into individual cases, alleging they were joined improperly, and to dismiss the claims of all out of state plaintiffs or to transfer the plaintiffs’ claims for improper venue. The circuit court overruled the motions and ordered the parties to nominate plaintiffs for individual trials. The Lopez claims were scheduled for the second separate trial. In affirming the judgment in the first case tried – Barron v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. – this Court did not decide the issues of joinder and venue. Following that September 2017 decision, Abbott renewed its motion to sever and transfer Lopez’s claims. The circuit court overruled the motion. Abbot seeks this Court’s relief.
This case presents two primary questions for this Court. One is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in determining Lopez’s claims should be tried separately but then refusing to sever her claims into a separate lawsuit. The other question involves the impact, if any, of joinder under Rule 51.01 on the determination of proper venue under section 508.010, RSMo; whether severance of claims requires a redetermination of venue under section 508.012, RSMo; and whether St. Louis city is a proper venue for the claims Lopez raises. Related issues involve whether there is a legal distinction between severance of improperly joined claims and separate trials of claims joined in a single action; whether the circuit court has determined to try each plaintiff’s claims separately; whether Abbott has proven severance is proper and, if so, whether it has demonstrated it is proper to transfer venue.
Listen to the oral argument: SC96718 MP3 file
Abbott Laboratories was represented during arguments by William Ray Price Jr. of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; Lopez was represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
Georgia resident Mariah Lopez was born in Georgia, allegedly with birth defects after her mother took, in Georgia and pursuant to a Georgia doctor’s prescription, the anti-seizure drug Depakote, sold by Abbott Laboratories Inc., which has headquarters in Illinois and a registered agent in St. Louis County. Lopez joined with other out of state Missouri plaintiffs and several Missouri plaintiffs – including twins living in St. Louis city – in filing a single personal injury case against Abbott in May 2012 in the St. Louis circuit court. Abbott filed motions to sever the claims into individual cases, alleging they were joined improperly, and to dismiss the claims of all out of state plaintiffs or to transfer the plaintiffs’ claims for improper venue. The circuit court overruled the motions and ordered the parties to nominate plaintiffs for individual trials. The Lopez claims were scheduled for the second separate trial. In affirming the judgment in the first case tried – Barron v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. – this Court did not decide the issues of joinder and venue. Following that September 2017 decision, Abbott renewed its motion to sever and transfer Lopez’s claims. The circuit court overruled the motion. Abbot seeks this Court’s relief.
This case presents two primary questions for this Court. One is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in determining Lopez’s claims should be tried separately but then refusing to sever her claims into a separate lawsuit. The other question involves the impact, if any, of joinder under Rule 51.01 on the determination of proper venue under section 508.010, RSMo; whether severance of claims requires a redetermination of venue under section 508.012, RSMo; and whether St. Louis city is a proper venue for the claims Lopez raises. Related issues involve whether there is a legal distinction between severance of improperly joined claims and separate trials of claims joined in a single action; whether the circuit court has determined to try each plaintiff’s claims separately; whether Abbott has proven severance is proper and, if so, whether it has demonstrated it is proper to transfer venue.
Note: Because the next two cases arise out of the same factual and
procedural background, they are summarized together.
procedural background, they are summarized together.
SC96710
State ex rel. Imerys Talc America Inc. v. The Honorable Rex M. Burlison
St. Louis city
Proper venue over claims filed by St. Louis County resident against out-of-state companies
Listen to the oral argument: SC96710 MP3 file
Imerys Talc was represented during arguments by Susan Ford Robertson of The Robertson Law Group LLC in Kansas City; the plaintiffs were represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
SC96710_Plaintiffs_briefListen to the oral argument: SC96710 MP3 file
Imerys Talc was represented during arguments by Susan Ford Robertson of The Robertson Law Group LLC in Kansas City; the plaintiffs were represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
SC96710_Imerys_Talc_reply_brief
SC96704
State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. v. The Honorable Rex M. Burlison
St. Louis city
Proper venue over claims filed by St. Louis County resident against out-of-state companies
Listen to the oral argument: SC96704 MP3 file
Johnson & Johnson was represented during arguments by Thomas Weaver of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; the plaintiffs were represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
Listen to the oral argument: SC96704 MP3 file
Johnson & Johnson was represented during arguments by Thomas Weaver of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; the plaintiffs were represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City.
St. Louis County resident Michael Blaes sued out-of-state companies
Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
(collectively, Johnson & Johnson) and Imerys Talc America Inc. in
St. Louis County, alleging his wife purchased and used their talcum
powder products in St. Louis County and later died of ovarian cancer as a
result of that use. The companies removed the case to a federal
district court, which granted Blaes’ motion to dismiss approximately two
years later. Blaes then joined his claims with those of a number of
other plaintiffs, including many from outside Missouri, in suing Johnson
& Johnson and Imerys in St. Louis city. Johnson & Johnson moved
to sever the claims of all plaintiffs from outside St. Louis city,
including Blaes. Imerys moved to sever the claims of all the plaintiffs
and to transfer venue, which it alleged was improper in St. Louis city
as to all the plaintiffs. The circuit court overruled the companies’
motions, and a jury trial involving Blaes’ claims began in June 2017.
Two weeks later, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision
regarding jurisdiction over claims similar to those involved in the
trial. The circuit court granted Johnson & Johnson’s motion for a
mistrial and set a new trial date in October 2017, when the plaintiffs
indicated they would proceed with Blaes’ claims. In September 2017, this
Court issued its decision in Barron v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.,
another case involving motions to transfer venue or sever claims of
multiple plaintiffs. Imerys and Johnson & Johnson renewed their
motions to sever Blaes’ claims and to transfer venue over Blaes’ claims
to St. Louis County. The circuit court overruled those motions, as well
as a subsequent motion to stay the trial. The companies seek this
Court’s relief.
These cases generally involve one primary question for this Court – the impact, if any, of the venue provisions of sections 508.010 and 508.012, RSMo, on the circuit court’s decision to permit Blaes to try his claims separately in St. Louis city. Related issues involve whether there is a legal distinction between severance of improperly joined claims and separate trials of claims joined in a single action; whether the claims of the plaintiffs in the underlying case are joined properly into a single action; whether the circuit court has determined to try each plaintiff’s claims separately; whether the trial of Blaes’ claims is a “test” or “bellwether” case to help the circuit court manage later trials of other plaintiffs’ claims; whether the companies have proven severance is proper, and, if so, whether they have demonstrated it is proper to transfer venue.
These cases generally involve one primary question for this Court – the impact, if any, of the venue provisions of sections 508.010 and 508.012, RSMo, on the circuit court’s decision to permit Blaes to try his claims separately in St. Louis city. Related issues involve whether there is a legal distinction between severance of improperly joined claims and separate trials of claims joined in a single action; whether the claims of the plaintiffs in the underlying case are joined properly into a single action; whether the circuit court has determined to try each plaintiff’s claims separately; whether the trial of Blaes’ claims is a “test” or “bellwether” case to help the circuit court manage later trials of other plaintiffs’ claims; whether the companies have proven severance is proper, and, if so, whether they have demonstrated it is proper to transfer venue.
SC96453
Vincent McFadden v. State of Missouri
St. Louis County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief in death penalty case
Listen to the oral argument: SC96453 MP3 file
McFadden was represented during arguments by William Swift of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel N. McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Vincent McFadden for the May 2003 shooting death of his son’s mother’s sister in Pine Lawn. On appeal, this Court reversed McFadden’s first conviction and death sentence in that case due to problems in selecting the jury. Following a 2008 retrial, a jury found McFadden guilty of first-degree murder, armed criminal action and witness tampering. During the penalty phase of the trial, in presenting six statutory aggravators in support of the death penalty, the state presented certified copies of McFadden’s prior convictions for first-degree murder and armed criminal action for a man’s death as well as for first degree assault and armed criminal action for shooting two other men. Both the state and McFadden presented testimony from various witnesses. The jury found the state proved all six statutory aggravators and recommended the death penalty. The circuit court sentenced McFadden accordingly, and this Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. McFadden subsequently sought postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied following an evidentiary hearing. McFadden appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. Two involve McFadden’s desire to interview jurors to determine whether any of them failed to disclose familiarity with his prior convictions – whether his counsel in the postconviction proceeding had adequate opportunity to investigate alleged juror nondisclosure and whether the judge who took over the proceeding after the first judge recused should have granted McFadden’s renewed motions for juror contact. Another question involves whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not pressing one juror during jury selection about the juror’s familiarity with or bias because of McFadden’s prior convictions. Additional questions involve whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting expert or lay witness testimony about cultural conditions in Pine Lawn or other expert testimony in mitigation of the death penalty; in not presenting a scan of McFadden’s brain or related expert testimony regarding functional limitations; and in not calling certain witnesses or otherwise presenting evidence to impeach the testimony of his son’s mother regarding her sister’s death or her identification of him as the shooter. Other questions involve whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to portions of the certified copies of his prior convictions; in not presenting evidence to rebut certain facts regarding his prior assault convictions; and in not objecting to certain statements the prosecutor made during penalty phase arguments. A further question involves whether McFadden has shown, had his counsel acted differently, the jury would not have sentenced McFadden to death.
Listen to the oral argument: SC96453 MP3 file
McFadden was represented during arguments by William Swift of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel N. McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Vincent McFadden for the May 2003 shooting death of his son’s mother’s sister in Pine Lawn. On appeal, this Court reversed McFadden’s first conviction and death sentence in that case due to problems in selecting the jury. Following a 2008 retrial, a jury found McFadden guilty of first-degree murder, armed criminal action and witness tampering. During the penalty phase of the trial, in presenting six statutory aggravators in support of the death penalty, the state presented certified copies of McFadden’s prior convictions for first-degree murder and armed criminal action for a man’s death as well as for first degree assault and armed criminal action for shooting two other men. Both the state and McFadden presented testimony from various witnesses. The jury found the state proved all six statutory aggravators and recommended the death penalty. The circuit court sentenced McFadden accordingly, and this Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. McFadden subsequently sought postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied following an evidentiary hearing. McFadden appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. Two involve McFadden’s desire to interview jurors to determine whether any of them failed to disclose familiarity with his prior convictions – whether his counsel in the postconviction proceeding had adequate opportunity to investigate alleged juror nondisclosure and whether the judge who took over the proceeding after the first judge recused should have granted McFadden’s renewed motions for juror contact. Another question involves whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not pressing one juror during jury selection about the juror’s familiarity with or bias because of McFadden’s prior convictions. Additional questions involve whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting expert or lay witness testimony about cultural conditions in Pine Lawn or other expert testimony in mitigation of the death penalty; in not presenting a scan of McFadden’s brain or related expert testimony regarding functional limitations; and in not calling certain witnesses or otherwise presenting evidence to impeach the testimony of his son’s mother regarding her sister’s death or her identification of him as the shooter. Other questions involve whether McFadden’s trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to portions of the certified copies of his prior convictions; in not presenting evidence to rebut certain facts regarding his prior assault convictions; and in not objecting to certain statements the prosecutor made during penalty phase arguments. A further question involves whether McFadden has shown, had his counsel acted differently, the jury would not have sentenced McFadden to death.