Case Summaries for March 14, 2018


The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, March 14, 2018
 

 
SC96754
Richard Miller v. State of Missouri
Pulaski County

Challenge to timeliness of probation revocation hearing
Listen to the oral argument: SC96754 MP3 file
The state was represented during arguments by Christine K. Lesicko of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Miller was represented by Jedd C. Schneider of the public defender’s office in Columbia.

The state charged Richard Miller with two counts of first-degree manslaughter for an automobile collision in which two people died. Following a September 2007 trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Miller on probation for five years. The state moved to revoke probation in June 2012, later amending its motion. At the December 2012 revocation hearing, Miller challenged jurisdiction, arguing his probation had expired in August 2012. The trial court determined it had jurisdiction, Miller admitted he had violated the terms of his probation, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive five-year prison terms. The appeals court affirmed the judgment and sentences on appeal. Approximately three months later, Miller moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence, alleging the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation after his probation ended. Following an evidentiary hearing, his motion was granted on the ground the trial court did not make every reasonable effort to hold the revocation hearing during the probationary period and, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to revoke Miller’s probation. His sentences were vacated, and he was ordered released from custody. The state appeals.

This appeal presents two primary questions for the Court. One involves whether Miller’s claim alleging error in his probation revocation could or should have been raised on appeal and, if so, whether it can be considered in a postconviction relief proceeding. The other involves whether the trial court made every reasonable effort to hold the revocation hearing during the probationary period and the extent to which the continuations of the revocation hearing beyond the expiration of Miller’s probation occurred with his consent or on his counsel’s motion.

SC96754_State_brief
SC96754_Miller_brief
SC96754_State_reply_brief

 
 
SC96899
Accident Fund Insurance Company; E.J. Cody Company Inc. v. Robert Casey, Dolores Murphy
Jackson County

Challenges to award of enhanced workers’ compensation benefits
Listen to the oral argument: SC96899 MP3 file
The survivors were represented during arguments by Scott W. Mach of The Popham Law Firm PC in Kansas City. Cody was represented by James B. Kennedy of Evans & Dixon LLC in St. Louis; the insurance company was represented by Jeffrey T. McPherson of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis.

Floor tile installer Robert Casey worked for Kansas City contractor E.J. Cody Company Inc. from 1984 until he retired in 1990. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in October 2014; a board-certified pulmonologist labeled Casey’s occupational exposure to asbestos as “the prevailing cause” of his mesothelioma. Casey sought workers’ compensation benefits in February 2015, alleging toxic exposure resulting in mesothelioma. At the time of his death eight months later, he was married to Dolores Murphy and had eight children. The surviving family members subsequently filed amended workers’ compensation claims under an amended version of section 287.200.4, RSMo, effective in January 2014, which created additional benefits for occupational diseases due to toxic exposure, including mesothelioma. Following an evidentiary hearing, a workers’ compensation administrative law judge awarded “enhanced” mesothelioma benefits for Casey’s death to the survivors under section 287.200.4(3). The administrative law judge found Cody’s workers’ compensation insurer, Accident Fund Insurance Company, liable for the award under a mesothelioma endorsement in the insurance policy. Cody and the insurance company sought review from the labor and industrial relations commission, which upheld the award but determined the enhanced benefit should be paid only to Casey’s widow and not to Casey’s children. The survivors, Cody and the insurance company all appeal.

The survivors’ appeal presents one primary question for this Court – whether the amended version of section 287.200.4(5) permits the surviving spouse and children to receive workers’ compensation benefits and whether the surviving children made a formal claim for benefits.

Cody’s appeal presents one primary questions for this Court – whether the award of benefits was supported by sufficient evidence to show Casey died of mesothelioma and was “last exposed to the hazard” as a result of being exposed to asbestos while working for Cody.

The insurance company’s appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the mesothelioma benefit in Cody’s policy covers the claim brought by Casey’s survivors and whether the “last exposure rule” applies to exclude coverage for their claim. A related issue is whether the policy provided enhanced mesothelioma coverage only after Casey retired from the company. Another question is whether the insurance company can raise a constitutional challenge to section 287.200.4 or whether it waived any due process or equal protection claims by not raising them as affirmative defenses. A related issue is whether the provision of the statute giving “enhanced” benefits for a mesothelioma victim is unconstitutional on its face or whether the commission unconstitutionally applied the provision retroactively. An additional question involves whether the commission properly awarded benefits to Casey’s widow. Related issues include whether Cody and the insurance company were notified of Casey’s death, whether the widow and Casey’s children timely filed an amended claim, whether either Cody or the insurance company were prejudiced by the administrative law judge substituting the widow in place of Casey, and whether the statute allows benefits not paid at the time of an employee’s death to go to the employee’s widow or children.

The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys, which filed a brief as a friend of the Court, focuses its argument on whether an insurance policy providing coverage at the time an employee last was exposed to the hazard of an occupational disease such as mesothelioma also provides coverage for enhanced benefits under the amended section 287.200.4.

SC96899_Family_Members_first_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_EJ_Cody_first_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_Insurance_Company_first_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_Family_Members_second_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_EJ_Cody_second_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_Insurance_Company_second_brief_filed_in_WD

SC96899_MATA_amicus_brief_filed_in_WD

SC96899_Family_Members_letter_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_EJ_Cody_letter_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96899_Insurance_Company_letter_brief_filed_in_WD



SC96740
Ricky Griffitts v. Old Republic Insurance Company, BNSF Railway Company and James M. Campbell
Greene County

Whether an employee who caused an accident while driving under the influence was a “permissive user” under his employer’s insurance policy
Listen to the oral argument: SC96740 MP3 file
Griffitts was represented during arguments by Daniel P. Molloy of Corbett Law Firm PC in Springfield; the insurance company was represented by Laurel E. Stevenson of Haden, Cowherd & Bullock LLC in Springfield.

BNSF Railway Company employee James Campbell typically drove a company vehicle while he was working away from his home in Tennessee. In March 2009, he was driving a vehicle leased on his company’s behalf in Springfield, where he was staying for work. He consumed alcohol at a barbecue and in his hotel room and, several hours later, became hungry and drove to a nearby restaurant. On his way, he collided with the back of a vehicle driven by Ricky Griffitts. Campbell was arrested for driving while intoxicated and convicted of two felonies as a result of the collision. The railway fired Campbell for violating its rules prohibiting its employees from driving a company provided vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Griffitts ultimately sued Campbell, the railway and its insurer, Old Republic Insurance Company. In January 2013, Griffitts and Campbell entered into an agreement to resolve their litigation under section 537.065, RSMo, allowing them to seek recovery against the railway and its insurer. The circuit court entered a judgment in Griffitts’ favor for $1.475 million, which included a $25,000 credit paid by the vehicle’s rental company. Griffitts then filed an equitable garnishment proceeding against Campbell, the railway and its insurer, alleging Campbell was a permissive user under the insurance policy and, therefore, the two companies were liable for the $1.475 million judgment against Campbell. Campbell admitted the allegations, but the companies denied Campbell had been a permissive user and, therefore, denied they were liable for the judgment. Following a trial, the circuit court entered its judgment in favor of the railway and its insurer. The circuit court found Campbell had not been a permissive user under the policy because he had been driving the railway-provided vehicle in violation of the railway’s rules prohibiting its employees from consuming or possessing alcohol while operating a work vehicle. Griffitts appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Missouri law allows a violation of a company’s operational rule to terminate an employee’s permission to use a company vehicle under an insurance policy and, if so, whether violating the railway’s rule terminated Campbell’s status as a permissive user of the railway-provided rental vehicle at the time of the accident. Another question involves whether the circuit court granted an improper application for change of judge, and, if so, whether this prevented the circuit court from proceeding. A related issue is whether Griffitts waived this issue or otherwise failed to preserve it properly for appeal. Additional questions involve whether the circuit court was estopped from finding Campbell was traveling to a restaurant for dinner at the time of the accident.

Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys argues Missouri law consistently and purposely has focused on whether a person driving a vehicle has permission to use the vehicle, not whether the person has permission to operate the vehicle in a certain condition or manner. The Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers argues, in contrast, a “use versus operate” test is not supported by the relevant statute, as the word “operate” plays no role in the application of the statute or the insurance contract.

SC96740_Griffitts_brief
SC96740_Old_Republic_and_BNSF_brief
SC96740_Griffitts_reply_brief

SC96740_MODL_amicus_brief
SC96740_MATA_amicus_brief


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