SC96672
A-1 Premium Acceptance Inc. v. Meeka Hunter
Jackson County
Challenge to order denying arbitration
Listen to the oral argument: SC96672 MP3 file
A-1 was represented during arguments by Mark D. Murphy of The Murphy Law Firm in Overland Park, Kansas; Hunter was represented by F. Paul Bland of Public Justice in Washington, D.C. Judge Lisa Page – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Chief Justice Zel M. Fischer.

Meeka Hunter applied for loans from A-1 Premium Acceptance Inc., a consumer installment lender. In January 2015, A-1 filed a petition alleging Hunter had defaulted on the loans and owed $275 in principal plus nearly $7,000 in interest. Hunter responded and also filed counterclaims alleging the loan documents violate the state’s merchandising practices act by not providing for any interest rate, alleging breach of contract and seeking to certify the case as a class action. In September 2015, A-1 moved to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the loan documents. In its memorandum in support of the motion, A-1 indicated the arbitrator designated in the loan documents – the National Arbitration Forum – no longer was available to conduct consumer arbitrations and asked the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act. The circuit court overruled A-1’s motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. A-1 appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court relating to whether the circuit court should have stayed the judicial proceedings and compelled arbitration. One involves whether the federal arbitration act requires a circuit court to designate an arbitrator when there is any lapse in naming an arbitrator. A related issue involves whether the unavailability of the arbitrator designated in the arbitration agreement constitutes a missing “integral term” or otherwise renders the arbitration agreement invalid or unenforceable. Another question is whether the state’s uniform arbitration act requires the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator and to compel arbitration. A further question is whether the arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to the parties’ intent to arbitrate in the absence of the designated arbitrator. Additional questions involve whether A-1 waived any right to arbitration or otherwise failed to preserve its issues for appeal and whether the arbitration provision is unconscionable.

SC96672_Premium_Acceptance_brief
SC96672_Hunter_brief
SC96672_Premium_Acceptance_reply_brief



SC96779
State ex rel. Cynthia Chaparro v. The Honorable J. Dale Youngs
Jackson County
Challenge to order compelling arbitration
Listen to the oral argument: SC96779 MP3 file
Chaparro was represented during arguments by Robert A. Bruce of Doyle & Associates LLC in Kansas City, Kansas; U-Haul was represented by Michael L. Blumenthal of Seyferth Blumenthal & Harris LLC in Kansas City.

Cynthia Chaparro began working in 2014 at a U-Haul Company of Missouri warehouse, first through a staffing agency and later as a U-Haul employee. When she transitioned to working directly for U-Haul, she electronically signed certain documents, including one giving up any right to a jury trial for any intentional torts committed by the company. After Chaparro sustained a work-related injury in December 2014, she filed a claim for workers’ compensation and began treatment for her injury. In August 2016, after informing her supervisor the pain from her injury was preventing her from performing assigned tasks, U-Haul discharged Chaparro from employment. She sued U-Haul, which filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel arbitration. Following briefing by both parties, the circuit court issued its amended order staying the judicial proceedings and compelling Chaparro to arbitrate both her claims against U-Haul. Chaparro seeks to make permanent this Court’s writ mandating the circuit court to set aside that portion of its amended order compelling arbitration of her workers’ compensation claim and to modify its order to allow her workers’ compensation claim to proceed in the circuit court.

This case presents one primary question for this Court – whether an employment agreement requiring an employee to waive any right to a jury trial before any discrimination occurs is valid under the state workers’ compensation law. Related issues involve the extent to which Chaparro validly waived her right to a jury trial and the extent to which the federal arbitration act preempts state law.

SC96779_Chaparro_brief
SC96779_U-Haul_brief



SC96683
R.M.A. (a Minor Child), by his Next Friend: Rachelle Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV School District and Blue Springs School District Board of Education
Jackson County
Challenge to dismissal of lawsuit alleging sex discrimination on basis of gender identity
Listen to the oral argument: SC96683 MP3 file
R.M.A. was represented during arguments by Alexander Edelman of Edelman, Liesen & Myers LLP in Kansas City; the school district was represented by Mark D. Katz of Coronado Katz LLC in Kansas City.

R.M.A. was born female but transitioned to living as male in September 2009, when R.M.A. was a fourth grader in the Blue Springs school district. The district changed its records to reflect R.M.A.’s traditionally male first name and has permitted R.M.A. to participate with boys in sex segregated physical education and athletic activities. Since R.M.A. entered middle school, however, the district has denied R.M.A.’s requests to use the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms because of R.M.A.’s female genitalia, instead directing R.M.A. to use a unisex bathroom outside the boys’ locker room. The state of Missouri, pursuant to a court order, since has issued a new birth certificate reflecting the change in R.M.A.’s name and gender. In October 2014, R.M.A. filed a charge of discrimination with the state human rights commission, alleging sex discrimination by the school district and its board of education. The commission issued a right to sue letter in July 2015, and R.M.A. filed a petition for damages against the district and the board in October 2015. The next month, the district and board moved to dismiss. In June 2016, the circuit court entered its order dismissing R.M.A.’s claims. R.M.A. appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court should have dismissed R.M.A.’s petition. One involves whether the state act includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity, transgender status or other gender related traits or stereotypes in public accommodation and, if so, whether R.M.A.’s petition stated a claim for which relief can be granted on this basis. Another question involves whether the school district and its education board constitute “persons” under the act and, if so, whether R.M.A. stated a claim against each of these defendants on which relief can be granted. A related issue is the extent to which the act prohibits the government from discriminating in the provision of public accommodations. Additional questions involve the extent, if any, to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to an interpretation of law rather than fact. Related issues involve whether the district and its board properly raised or have proven collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense and whether the prior decision addressed the issue of whether the act covers sex discrimination in cases implicating gender identity.

A number of organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court.

Arguing on behalf of R.M.A.

The American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Missouri and the Transgender Law Center urge this Court to look to federal case law construing parallel prohibitions against discrimination “because of sex,” argue federal courts recognize discrimination because a person is transgender constitutes sex discrimination and argue R.M.A. has stated a claim for sex discrimination under even a narrow interpretation of that term. They assert many school districts avoid discrimination against students who are transgender in restrooms and locker rooms without problems and argue discrimination against such students causes the type of harm the state act was meant to prevent.

The American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics and other health care organizations focus on what it means to be transgender and to experience gender dysphoria and argue excluding individuals who are transgender from facilities consistent with their gender identities endangers their health, safety and well-being.

Lambda Legal and GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders argue R.M.A. has stated a claim for sex discrimination under the state’s human rights act by alleging disparate treatment because R.M.A. does not conform to sex stereotypes, because of an inherently sex-based characteristic and because R.M.A. has transitioned from female to male.

PFLAG Inc., the Trans Youth Equality Foundation, Gender Spectrum and Gender Diversity argue treating students who are transgender in a manner inconsistent with their gender identities constitutes discrimination and causes serious harm, describing experiences of various parents raising children who are transgender.

PROMO argues evolving understandings of equality render differential treatment based on gender identity actionable under the state’s human rights act, and interpreting the act to include discrimination based on gender identity is in the public interest.

The National Women’s Law Center argues discrimination against individuals who are transgender is inherently sex discrimination and constitutes a form of sex stereotyping prohibited under both federal and Missouri law, noting the state act is a broad remedial statute sharing a common history with federal civil rights protections. The center also argues courts historically have rejected arguments based on protective pretexts, such as discriminatory rules for bathrooms and other similarly sex-segregated environments.

Arguing on behalf of the district and its education board

The state argues the state human rights act’s proscription relating to public accommodation applies only to “persons,” which the state argues is defined to exclude the government. The state argues the government only is prohibited from sex discrimination in its capacity as an employer, not in other capacities.

The Alliance Defending Freedom argues “sex” should be defined objectively by human reproductive nature, the differences between male and female merit privacy protections in restrooms and locker rooms, and “sex” and “gender” are not reasonably comparable.

SC96683_R.M.A._brief
SC96683_School_District_brief
SC96683_R.M.A._reply_brief

SC96683_ACLU_and_Transgender_Law_Center_amici_brief
SC96683_American_Medical_Association_et_al._amici_brief
SC96683_Lambda_Legal_and_GLAD_amici_brief
SC96683_PFLAG_et_al._amici_brief
SC96683_PROMO_amicus_brief
SC96683_Women's_Law_Center_amicus_brief
 
SC96683_State_amicus_brief
SC96683_Alliance_Defending_Freedom_amicus_brief



SC96828
Harold Lampley and Rene Frost, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights and Alisa Warren, Executive Director, Missouri Commission on Human Rights
Cole and Howell counties
Challenge to judgment in lawsuit alleging sex discrimination on basis of sexual orientation
Listen to the oral argument: SC96828 MP3 file
Lampley and Frost were represented during arguments by Jill A. Silverstein of Sowers & Wolf LLC in St. Louis; the commission was represented by Deputy Solicitor Julie Marie Blake of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Harold Lampley and Rene Frost worked for the state’s department of social services. They filed charges with the state’s human rights commission, alleging the department and two supervisors sexually discriminated against them and retaliated after they filed discrimination complaints under the state’s human rights act. Lampley alleged he was discriminated and retaliated against because he is gay and “does not exhibit the stereotypical attributes of how a male should appear and behave.” Frost alleged discrimination and retaliation because of her association with Lampley. The commission concluded both were alleging discrimination and subsequent retaliation on the basis of sexual orientation, which it concluded is not a category protected by the human rights act. The commission terminated both administrative proceedings. Lampley and Frost subsequently filed petitions in the circuit court seeking review or, alternatively, writs of mandamus directing the commission to issue notices of rights to sue for their respective charges. The commission opposed their petitions, alleging it lacked jurisdiction over the charges because the human rights act does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial). The circuit court granted summary judgment to the commission. Lampley and Frost appeal.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court should have granted summary judgment. One involves whether the state human rights act includes discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping or sexual orientation and, if so, whether Lampley and Frost stated claims on which relief can be granted. Another question involves whether the commission abused its discretion in finding it lacked jurisdiction over their claims.

The American Civil Liberties Union and a number of other organizations filed a brief, as a friend of the Court, urging this Court to look to federal case law construing parallel prohibitions against discrimination “because of sex;” assert federal courts recognize sex discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and argue federal law prohibits sex discrimination against all employees, including those who are lesbian, gay and bisexual.

SC96828_Lampley_and_Frost_brief
SC96828_MO_Comm'n_on_Human_Rights_brief
SC96828_Lampley_and_Frost_reply_brief

SC96828_ACLU_et_al._amici_brief

Note: On July 27, 2018, the Court ordered supplemental briefing in this case:

SC96828_Lampley_and_Frost_supplemental_reply_brief