The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Wednesday, December 5, 2018
SC97287
David and Jill Kehlenbrink v. Director of Revenue
St. Louis County
Challenge to the refund of sales tax paid on the purchase of a replacement vehicle
Listen to the oral argument: SC97287 MP3 file
The director was represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor Joshua Divine of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the Kehlenbrinks were represented by Scott D. Kehlembrink of Reinoehl Kehlenbrink LLC in Arnold.
David and Jill Kehlenbrink sold two vehicles and then purchased a replacement vehicle. When they applied to register the replacement vehicle, they claimed a statutory credit for the combined value of the two vehicles they had sold against the purchase price of the replacement vehicle. The department of revenue accepted their application and assessed sales tax on the net difference, and the Kehlenbrinks paid the sales tax. Several months later, the Kehlenbrinks sold another two vehicles and applied for a tax refund based on their belief they could credit the value of the latter two vehicles sold against the purchase price of the replacement vehicle they already had registered. Because the combined value of the four vehicles sold exceeded the purchase price of the replacement vehicle, they sought a complete refund of the sales tax they had paid. The department denied their request, and the Kehlenbrinks sought review in the administrative hearing commission. The commission determined the statute governing the tax credit was ambiguous as to the timing of the purchase of a replacement vehicle and the extent to which the purchase price of the replacement vehicle can be offset. The commission noted a department regulation describes an offset of the replacement vehicle’s purchase price by the sale of one “or more” vehicles and noted the department already had permitted the Kehlenbrinks to apply multiple credits in determining sales tax due on the purchase price of the replacement vehicle. As a result, the commission reversed the department’s decision and ordered the director of revenue to refund all the sales tax the Kehlenbrinks had paid, with interest. The director appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the Kehlenbrinks showed they were entitled to a tax refund. Related issues include whether the tax credit statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether it must be construed strictly against the taxpayer; whether the regulation and statute are inconsistent and, if so, the extent to which the regulation has legal effect; and whether the statute’s plain language allows taxpayers to credit only one sale against the purchase price of a replacement vehicle.
SC97287_Director_brief
SC97287_Kehlenbrinks_brief
David and Jill Kehlenbrink v. Director of Revenue
St. Louis County
Challenge to the refund of sales tax paid on the purchase of a replacement vehicle
Listen to the oral argument: SC97287 MP3 file
The director was represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor Joshua Divine of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the Kehlenbrinks were represented by Scott D. Kehlembrink of Reinoehl Kehlenbrink LLC in Arnold.
David and Jill Kehlenbrink sold two vehicles and then purchased a replacement vehicle. When they applied to register the replacement vehicle, they claimed a statutory credit for the combined value of the two vehicles they had sold against the purchase price of the replacement vehicle. The department of revenue accepted their application and assessed sales tax on the net difference, and the Kehlenbrinks paid the sales tax. Several months later, the Kehlenbrinks sold another two vehicles and applied for a tax refund based on their belief they could credit the value of the latter two vehicles sold against the purchase price of the replacement vehicle they already had registered. Because the combined value of the four vehicles sold exceeded the purchase price of the replacement vehicle, they sought a complete refund of the sales tax they had paid. The department denied their request, and the Kehlenbrinks sought review in the administrative hearing commission. The commission determined the statute governing the tax credit was ambiguous as to the timing of the purchase of a replacement vehicle and the extent to which the purchase price of the replacement vehicle can be offset. The commission noted a department regulation describes an offset of the replacement vehicle’s purchase price by the sale of one “or more” vehicles and noted the department already had permitted the Kehlenbrinks to apply multiple credits in determining sales tax due on the purchase price of the replacement vehicle. As a result, the commission reversed the department’s decision and ordered the director of revenue to refund all the sales tax the Kehlenbrinks had paid, with interest. The director appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the Kehlenbrinks showed they were entitled to a tax refund. Related issues include whether the tax credit statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether it must be construed strictly against the taxpayer; whether the regulation and statute are inconsistent and, if so, the extent to which the regulation has legal effect; and whether the statute’s plain language allows taxpayers to credit only one sale against the purchase price of a replacement vehicle.
SC97287_Director_brief
SC97287_Kehlenbrinks_brief
SC97272
Michael E. Williams v. State of Missouri
Warren County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief for man deemed ineligible for long-term treatment program in prison
Listen to the oral argument: SC97272 MP3 file
Williams was represented during arguments by Ellen Flottman of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Robert Bartholomew of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Michael Williams pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated as a chronic offender. The circuit court sentenced him to eight years in prison with long-term treatment. The department of corrections determined he was not eligible for long-term treatment. Williams sought postconviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel advised him he would get long-term treatment and be eligible for discharge after completing treatment when, in fact, he was not eligible for such treatment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief. Williams appeals.
This appeal presents one primary question for this Court – whether the circuit court should have granted Williams postconviction relief. Related issues include whether the circuit court violated Williams’ constitutional rights to due process of law when it accepted his plea and sentenced him to long-term treatment without verifying his eligibility for the program; whether Williams’ counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when she advised him to plead guilty without verifying he was eligible for the treatment program; whether Williams’ plea rested on a guarantee he would be sentenced to long-term treatment; whether his ineligibility for the treatment program rendered his guilty plea involuntary; and whether Williams proved he was prejudiced as a result, entitling him to postconviction relief.
SC97272_Williams_brief
SC97200
State ex rel. HeplerBroom LLC and Glenn E. Davis v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
St. Louis city
Challenge to venue over legal malpractice case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97200 MP3 file
HeplerBroom was represented during arguments by Robert Haar of Haar & Woods LLP in St. Louis; the Twillmans were represented by Larry A. Bagsby of The Bagsby Law Firm in St. Charles.
Donald, Dolores and Michael Twillman live in St. Charles County. They signed a franchise agreement with a Florida company to establish a franchise in St. Charles County to sell and service hydraulic equipment. Shortly thereafter, they decided they no longer wanted the franchise and retained law firm HeplerBroom LLC and its attorney Glenn E. Davis (collectively, HeplerBroom) to advise them how to cancel the franchise agreement. After cancelling the agreement, the Twillmans formed American Hydraulic Services LLC in St. Charles County to offer hydraulic products and services. The Florida company then sued them in federal district court in Florida, arguing the confidentiality and non-compete provisions in the franchise agreement still were in effect and the Twillmans had violated these provisions by operating their business. The federal district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the Twillmans to cease their St. Charles County operations and to refrain from using confidential information in those operations; the parties ultimately settled the lawsuit. The Twillmans sued HeplerBroom for legal malpractice in St. Louis city, where its offices and registered agent are located. The Twillmans alleged HeplerBroom negligently advised them with respect to cancelling the franchise agreement and they suffered nearly $4 million in damages as a result. HeplerBroom moved to change venue, alleging venue was improper in St. Louis and should be transferred to St. Charles County. The Twillmans filed a reply more than 30 days later. The circuit court overruled the motion seven months after it was filed. HeplerBroom seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to transfer venue.
This case presents several questions for this Court regarding whether HeplerBroom has shown the circuit court is required to transfer venue to St. Charles County. One involves whether the statute governing venue in a legal malpractice case requires the case to be filed where the plaintiff first was subjected to economic loss and, if so, whether the Twillmans first were subjected to financial loss as a result of the alleged malpractice in Florida or in St. Charles County. Another involves whether the Twillmans failed to file a timely reply to HeplerBroom’s motion to transfer venue or showed good cause why they could not, whether HeplerBroom showed venue was improper in St. Louis city, and whether Rule 51.045 applies and requires transfer to the county specified in the motion. An additional question involves whether the statute or rule required the circuit court to rule on the venue motion within 90 days, whether the circuit court overruled HeplerBroom’s motion within that time frame or the parties waived the requirement, and, if so, whether the motion must be deemed granted as a result.
SC97200_HeplerBroom_brief
SC97200_Twillmans_brief
SC97306
Timothy Hill v. SSM Health Care St. Louis
St. Louis County
Challenge to evidentiary and instructional issues during wrongful death trial
Listen to the oral argument: SC97306 MP3 file
Hill was represented during arguments by Doug Dowd of Dowd & Dowd PC in St. Louis; SSM was represented by Jeffery McPherson of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis.
While entering SSM Health Care St. Louis’ procedure center at St. Clare Hospital in Fenton, Timothy Hill’s father fell and struck his head. A security guard took photographs of the area, which included two concrete slabs, and viewed video from a security camera system. The security guard apparently did not save the video or take steps to ensure it was saved. The father was admitted to the hospital, suffered an intracranial bleed that night, fell into a coma and died the next month. The day after the fall, Hill took photographs of the area where his father fell, appearing to depict the concrete slabs were raised. Hill’s mother asked to watch the security video, but staff could not locate it; questions later arose as to whether the computer system automatically overwrote the video footage. The concrete slabs later were removed and the walkway to the procedure center’s entrance was leveled. Hill filed a wrongful death lawsuit against SSM. The parties disputed whether Hill’s father lost his balance or tripped over the slabs as well as why the security video no longer existed. Before trial, Hill filed a motion for application of the “spoliation doctrine,” asking the circuit court to find SSM intentionally or in bad faith failed to preserve the video evidence and to instruct the jury the video would have shown the father tripped on an uneven walkway, causing his fall. The circuit court overruled the motion but permitted Hill to present testimony from the security guard. Hill also moved to exclude photographs of the area where his father fell apparently taken the day of a doctor’s deposition, apparently after the slabs had been removed and the walkway leveled. The circuit court overruled Hill’s motion. Following a trial, the jury returned its verdict in SSM’s favor. Hill sought a new trial, which the circuit denied. Hill appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the spoliation doctrine applies in this case, whether Hill preserved his claims regarding spoliation and, if so, whether the circuit court should have applied the doctrine. Related issues include whether Hill presented evidence showing SSM failed to preserve the video; whether Hill presented evidence showing SSM destroyed the video under circumstances manifesting deceit and bad faith; and, if so, whether the circuit court should have required SSM to admit the specific facts the video would have shown. Other related issues involve whether SSM intentionally or knowingly made misstatements to the jury during closing arguments about the instructions or what the law required or prohibited or otherwise prejudiced Hill and, if so, whether the circuit court should have sustained Hill’s objection to the statements. An additional question involves whether the circuit court erred in giving the jury an instruction permitting jurors to draw adverse inferences and whether Hill preserved any claim to a partial directed verdict or partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have sanctioned SSM for seeking to exclude a doctor’s video deposition. Related issues involve whether the evidence showed SSM’s counsel intentionally concealed the fact they took the doctor to the scene and took photographs the morning of the deposition but did not tell Hill’s counsel and, if so, whether this deprived Hill’s counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor during the deposition about the walkway being leveled. A further question involves whether the circuit court should have excluded a doctor’s testimony that Hill’s fall likely resulted from dehydration as the cause of Hill’s fall was the central issue in the case.
SC97306_Hill_brief
SC97306_SSM_Health_Care_brief
Listen to the oral argument: SC97306 MP3 file
Hill was represented during arguments by Doug Dowd of Dowd & Dowd PC in St. Louis; SSM was represented by Jeffery McPherson of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis.
While entering SSM Health Care St. Louis’ procedure center at St. Clare Hospital in Fenton, Timothy Hill’s father fell and struck his head. A security guard took photographs of the area, which included two concrete slabs, and viewed video from a security camera system. The security guard apparently did not save the video or take steps to ensure it was saved. The father was admitted to the hospital, suffered an intracranial bleed that night, fell into a coma and died the next month. The day after the fall, Hill took photographs of the area where his father fell, appearing to depict the concrete slabs were raised. Hill’s mother asked to watch the security video, but staff could not locate it; questions later arose as to whether the computer system automatically overwrote the video footage. The concrete slabs later were removed and the walkway to the procedure center’s entrance was leveled. Hill filed a wrongful death lawsuit against SSM. The parties disputed whether Hill’s father lost his balance or tripped over the slabs as well as why the security video no longer existed. Before trial, Hill filed a motion for application of the “spoliation doctrine,” asking the circuit court to find SSM intentionally or in bad faith failed to preserve the video evidence and to instruct the jury the video would have shown the father tripped on an uneven walkway, causing his fall. The circuit court overruled the motion but permitted Hill to present testimony from the security guard. Hill also moved to exclude photographs of the area where his father fell apparently taken the day of a doctor’s deposition, apparently after the slabs had been removed and the walkway leveled. The circuit court overruled Hill’s motion. Following a trial, the jury returned its verdict in SSM’s favor. Hill sought a new trial, which the circuit denied. Hill appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the spoliation doctrine applies in this case, whether Hill preserved his claims regarding spoliation and, if so, whether the circuit court should have applied the doctrine. Related issues include whether Hill presented evidence showing SSM failed to preserve the video; whether Hill presented evidence showing SSM destroyed the video under circumstances manifesting deceit and bad faith; and, if so, whether the circuit court should have required SSM to admit the specific facts the video would have shown. Other related issues involve whether SSM intentionally or knowingly made misstatements to the jury during closing arguments about the instructions or what the law required or prohibited or otherwise prejudiced Hill and, if so, whether the circuit court should have sustained Hill’s objection to the statements. An additional question involves whether the circuit court erred in giving the jury an instruction permitting jurors to draw adverse inferences and whether Hill preserved any claim to a partial directed verdict or partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have sanctioned SSM for seeking to exclude a doctor’s video deposition. Related issues involve whether the evidence showed SSM’s counsel intentionally concealed the fact they took the doctor to the scene and took photographs the morning of the deposition but did not tell Hill’s counsel and, if so, whether this deprived Hill’s counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor during the deposition about the walkway being leveled. A further question involves whether the circuit court should have excluded a doctor’s testimony that Hill’s fall likely resulted from dehydration as the cause of Hill’s fall was the central issue in the case.
SC97306_Hill_brief
SC97306_SSM_Health_Care_brief