The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Wednesday, January 23, 2019
SC97345
Incline Village Board of Trustees v. Matthew F. Edler and Andrea Edler
St. Charles County
Whether property owners have rights to adjacent subdivision lake
Listen to the oral argument: SC97345 MP3 file
The Edlers were represented during arguments by Jess Ullom of Doster, Ullom & Boyle LLC in Chesterfield; Incline Village was represented by Martin Daesch of OnderLaw LLC in St. Louis.
Incline Village was developed as a subdivision with a man-made lake for the recreational enjoyment of Incline Village lot owners. The lake is owned by the Incline Village board of trustees and is maintained with assessments paid by the subdivision’s lot owners. The board has spent more than $2.86 million to maintain the lake, reconstruct its dam and improve its shoreline. The board permits Incline Village lot owners to build boat docks or slips on the lake. Another developer purchased property adjacent to the lake and developed it into the Sumac Ridge subdivision. Matthew and Andrea Edler purchased a Sumac Ridge lot abutting the lake and built a dock extending from their property into the lake. The parties dispute the extent to which the Edlers sought the trustees’ permission to build the dock. Through its board, Incline Village sued the Edlers. Following a trial, the circuit court entered its judgment in favor of Incline Village. The Edlers appeal.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One is whether the Edlers have riparian rights to the lake. The second is whether equitable or special circumstances support the circuit court’s award of attorney fees to Incline Village.
SC97345_Edlers_brief_filed_in_ED
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97376 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel’s office was represented during arguments by Marc Lapp, a special representative of the office and an attorney in St. Louis; Schuessler was represented by Justin Gelfand of Margulis Gelfand LLC in St. Louis.
While working as an assistant circuit attorney, Ambry Schuessler became friends with other attorneys in the St. Louis circuit attorney’s office, including Bliss Worrell and Katherine Dierdorf. As a result, Schuessler was aware Worrell had a close, personal relationship with a St. Louis metropolitan police detective. One morning, Schuessler and Worrell overheard the detective admit he had assaulted a detained suspect the night before. In response, Schuessler made a comment about the suspect; the parties dispute whether the comment was a tasteless joke or could be construed as a racist and homophobic slur. Schuessler later learned Worrell falsely charged the suspect with attempted escape to try to cover up the detective’s assault on the suspect. Schuessler reported Worrell’s actions to a supervisor but, when interviewed by the supervisor and the police department’s internal affair officers, Schuessler withheld information about the detective’s admission and her comment. The circuit attorney referred the matter to federal authorities. In her first interview with the authorities, Schuessler attributed the comment she had made about the suspect to the detective; she later admitted to federal authorities she had made the comment and not the detective. She then testified before a federal grand jury and was a key government witness in the detective’s sentencing hearing. Ultimately, the detective and Worrell were convicted of certain federal crimes; the detective was sentenced to prison and Worrell to probation. This Court subsequently disbarred Worrell. Schuessler resigned from the circuit attorney’s office. She self-reported her conduct, and the chief disciplinary counsel began disciplinary proceedings against her. Following an evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision finding Schuessler violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by initially failing to disclose to her supervisors and federal authorities her full knowledge of the detective’s conduct and by initially attributing her comment to the detective. The panel found a racial and homophobic slur is not itself a violation of Rule 4-8.4(c) and (g). It also found, because Schuessler was a whistle blower as to the detective’s and Worrell’s conduct, she did not violate Rule 4-8.4(d). The panel found Schuessler’s lack of disciplinary history and remorsefulness were mitigating factors and recommended she be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Schuessler with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years.
This case presents two issues for this Court – whether Schuessler violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97376_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
Listen to the oral argument: SC97376 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel’s office was represented during arguments by Marc Lapp, a special representative of the office and an attorney in St. Louis; Schuessler was represented by Justin Gelfand of Margulis Gelfand LLC in St. Louis.
While working as an assistant circuit attorney, Ambry Schuessler became friends with other attorneys in the St. Louis circuit attorney’s office, including Bliss Worrell and Katherine Dierdorf. As a result, Schuessler was aware Worrell had a close, personal relationship with a St. Louis metropolitan police detective. One morning, Schuessler and Worrell overheard the detective admit he had assaulted a detained suspect the night before. In response, Schuessler made a comment about the suspect; the parties dispute whether the comment was a tasteless joke or could be construed as a racist and homophobic slur. Schuessler later learned Worrell falsely charged the suspect with attempted escape to try to cover up the detective’s assault on the suspect. Schuessler reported Worrell’s actions to a supervisor but, when interviewed by the supervisor and the police department’s internal affair officers, Schuessler withheld information about the detective’s admission and her comment. The circuit attorney referred the matter to federal authorities. In her first interview with the authorities, Schuessler attributed the comment she had made about the suspect to the detective; she later admitted to federal authorities she had made the comment and not the detective. She then testified before a federal grand jury and was a key government witness in the detective’s sentencing hearing. Ultimately, the detective and Worrell were convicted of certain federal crimes; the detective was sentenced to prison and Worrell to probation. This Court subsequently disbarred Worrell. Schuessler resigned from the circuit attorney’s office. She self-reported her conduct, and the chief disciplinary counsel began disciplinary proceedings against her. Following an evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision finding Schuessler violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by initially failing to disclose to her supervisors and federal authorities her full knowledge of the detective’s conduct and by initially attributing her comment to the detective. The panel found a racial and homophobic slur is not itself a violation of Rule 4-8.4(c) and (g). It also found, because Schuessler was a whistle blower as to the detective’s and Worrell’s conduct, she did not violate Rule 4-8.4(d). The panel found Schuessler’s lack of disciplinary history and remorsefulness were mitigating factors and recommended she be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Schuessler with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years.
This case presents two issues for this Court – whether Schuessler violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97376_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC97377
In re: Katherine Anne Dierdorf
St. Louis city
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97377 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Dierdorf was represented by Michael Downey of Downey Law Group LLC in St. Louis.
This case arises from the same facts as in SC97376, summarized above. Katherine Dierdorf admits she initially was not forthcoming with her supervisors or the police department’s internal affairs officers about what she knew about the assault against a suspect and Bliss Worrell’s filing of criminal charges against that suspect. The circuit attorney’s office gave her the choice to resign or be fired; she elected to resign. The parties dispute whether Dierdorf lied to federal authorities, instructed Ambry Schuessler to lie, or knew the charge Worrell had filed was false. The parties agree Dierdorf ultimately gave full and truthful answers to the federal authorities’ questions and later testified truthfully before a federal grand jury. The chief disciplinary counsel began disciplinary proceedings against Dierdorf. Following an evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision finding Dierdorf violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by initially failing to disclose her full knowledge of Worrell’s conduct. The panel found Dierdorf’s lack of disciplinary history, remorsefulness and continued appropriate practice of law were mitigating factors. After initially recommending an admonition, the panel ultimately recommended Dierdorf be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Dierdorf with no leave to apply for reinstatement for three years.
This case presents two issues for this Court – whether Dierdorf violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
Listen to the oral argument: SC97377 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Dierdorf was represented by Michael Downey of Downey Law Group LLC in St. Louis.
This case arises from the same facts as in SC97376, summarized above. Katherine Dierdorf admits she initially was not forthcoming with her supervisors or the police department’s internal affairs officers about what she knew about the assault against a suspect and Bliss Worrell’s filing of criminal charges against that suspect. The circuit attorney’s office gave her the choice to resign or be fired; she elected to resign. The parties dispute whether Dierdorf lied to federal authorities, instructed Ambry Schuessler to lie, or knew the charge Worrell had filed was false. The parties agree Dierdorf ultimately gave full and truthful answers to the federal authorities’ questions and later testified truthfully before a federal grand jury. The chief disciplinary counsel began disciplinary proceedings against Dierdorf. Following an evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision finding Dierdorf violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by initially failing to disclose her full knowledge of Worrell’s conduct. The panel found Dierdorf’s lack of disciplinary history, remorsefulness and continued appropriate practice of law were mitigating factors. After initially recommending an admonition, the panel ultimately recommended Dierdorf be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Dierdorf with no leave to apply for reinstatement for three years.
This case presents two issues for this Court – whether Dierdorf violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC96737
State of Missouri v. Marvin D. Rice
State of Missouri v. Marvin D. Rice
Dent and St. Charles counties
Challenge to death sentence imposed after jury deadlocked as to punishment
Listen to the oral argument: SC96737 MP3 file
Rice was represented during arguments by Craig Johnston of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Nathan Aquino of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
While working as a deputy sheriff in Dent County, Marvin Rice had an affair with Annette Durham. Durham struggled with drug addiction and had been incarcerated several times. Rice was fired as a result of the affair, and Durham gave birth to Rice’s child while in prison. Rice permitted Durham occasional supervised visits with their child after her release. Durham ultimately entered into a romantic relationship with Steven Strotkamp and moved in with him. In December 2011, Rice allowed Durham to have her first unsupervised visit with their child but would not let her keep the child overnight. At some point, she apparently called Rice and told him she would not return the child. Rice became upset, found Durham at Strotkamp’s home, and shot Durham and Strotkamp. Both died. Following a high-speed chase and a shootout in which Rice was wounded, law enforcement officers ultimately arrested him. A sergeant interviewed Rice at the hospital. He said he was suffering from a tumor and depression, did not intend to kill anyone and only shot at Durham and Strotkamp after Durham became aggressive toward him, and believed he only shot at law enforcement officers after someone shot at him first. The state charged Rice with two counts of first-degree murder. The trial was held in St. Charles County on a change of venue; Rice did not testify. Following the guilt phase, the jury found Rice guilty of first-degree murder for Durham’s death and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for Strotkamp’s death. Following the sentencing phase, the jury recommended life in prison for Strotkamp’s murder but was unable to agree on punishment for Durham’s murder, reporting an 11-1 vote. On its verdict form, the jury said it unanimously found one statutory aggravating circumstance but was not able to find unanimously there were mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances. In subsequent signed statements, two jurors said 11 jurors favored imposing life in prison rather than death. The circuit court imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder conviction and life in prison for the second-degree murder conviction. Rice appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves whether Rice invoked or waived his constitutional right to remain silent and whether the circuit court should have allowed the state to present evidence of statements Rice made to law enforcement officers. A second question involves whether there was a basis in the evidence showing Rice caused Strotkamp’s death under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause sufficient to support his proffered instruction for voluntary manslaughter. A third question involves whether a statement the prosecutor made during closing argument in the penalty phase violated Rice’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, due process and a fair trial and, if so, whether Rice should receive a new penalty phase trial. A fourth question involves the extent to which the jury is required to be unanimous in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, if so, whether the circuit court violated Rice’s constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury when it sentenced him to death after the jury was unable to agree on his punishment. A final question involves whether Rice has shown the state’s death penalty scheme clearly and undoubtedly is unconstitutional.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, the ACLU Foundation Capital Punishment Project and Missourians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty filed a brief as friends of the Court. They argue Missouri’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional in allowing a judge rather than the jury to make factual findings supporting a death sentence and then sentence the defendant to death when the jury is unable to agree unanimously on punishment.
SC96737_Rice_brief
Listen to the oral argument: SC96737 MP3 file
Rice was represented during arguments by Craig Johnston of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Nathan Aquino of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
While working as a deputy sheriff in Dent County, Marvin Rice had an affair with Annette Durham. Durham struggled with drug addiction and had been incarcerated several times. Rice was fired as a result of the affair, and Durham gave birth to Rice’s child while in prison. Rice permitted Durham occasional supervised visits with their child after her release. Durham ultimately entered into a romantic relationship with Steven Strotkamp and moved in with him. In December 2011, Rice allowed Durham to have her first unsupervised visit with their child but would not let her keep the child overnight. At some point, she apparently called Rice and told him she would not return the child. Rice became upset, found Durham at Strotkamp’s home, and shot Durham and Strotkamp. Both died. Following a high-speed chase and a shootout in which Rice was wounded, law enforcement officers ultimately arrested him. A sergeant interviewed Rice at the hospital. He said he was suffering from a tumor and depression, did not intend to kill anyone and only shot at Durham and Strotkamp after Durham became aggressive toward him, and believed he only shot at law enforcement officers after someone shot at him first. The state charged Rice with two counts of first-degree murder. The trial was held in St. Charles County on a change of venue; Rice did not testify. Following the guilt phase, the jury found Rice guilty of first-degree murder for Durham’s death and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for Strotkamp’s death. Following the sentencing phase, the jury recommended life in prison for Strotkamp’s murder but was unable to agree on punishment for Durham’s murder, reporting an 11-1 vote. On its verdict form, the jury said it unanimously found one statutory aggravating circumstance but was not able to find unanimously there were mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances. In subsequent signed statements, two jurors said 11 jurors favored imposing life in prison rather than death. The circuit court imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder conviction and life in prison for the second-degree murder conviction. Rice appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves whether Rice invoked or waived his constitutional right to remain silent and whether the circuit court should have allowed the state to present evidence of statements Rice made to law enforcement officers. A second question involves whether there was a basis in the evidence showing Rice caused Strotkamp’s death under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause sufficient to support his proffered instruction for voluntary manslaughter. A third question involves whether a statement the prosecutor made during closing argument in the penalty phase violated Rice’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, due process and a fair trial and, if so, whether Rice should receive a new penalty phase trial. A fourth question involves the extent to which the jury is required to be unanimous in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, if so, whether the circuit court violated Rice’s constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury when it sentenced him to death after the jury was unable to agree on his punishment. A final question involves whether Rice has shown the state’s death penalty scheme clearly and undoubtedly is unconstitutional.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, the ACLU Foundation Capital Punishment Project and Missourians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty filed a brief as friends of the Court. They argue Missouri’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional in allowing a judge rather than the jury to make factual findings supporting a death sentence and then sentence the defendant to death when the jury is unable to agree unanimously on punishment.
SC96737_Rice_brief