The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Tuesday, February 5, 2019
SC97288
State ex rel. Brad Halsey v. The Honorable Jennifer M. Phillips
Jackson County
Whether statute of limitations bars claims in civil lawsuit
Listen to the oral argument: SC97288 MP3 file
Halsey was represented during arguments by Nichole Caldwell of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith LLP in Overland Park, Kansas; Dachenhausen was represented by Mark Nasteff of Nasteff & Quinn in Liberty.
Judge Daniel E. Scott – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge W. Brent Powell.
Jennifer Dachanhausen sued Brad Halsey in May 2018, asserting one claim for assault and battery, another for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a third for negligent infliction of emotional distress, for incidents she alleged occurred in 2012 and May 2013 when Halsey was her supervisor. She further alleged she did not appreciate the full extent of the alleged assault and battery when it occurred. Halsey moved to dismiss the amended petition. The circuit court overruled the motion. Halsey seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than sustaining his motion to dismiss.
This case presents a question for this Court of whether Dachanhausen’s claims are time-barred. Related issues include the extent to which her claims are independent of one another and when the statute of limitations begins running on the claims.
SC97288_Halsey_brief
SC97288_Dachenhausen_brief
SC97288_Halsey_reply_brief
SC97417
State ex rel. Travis Jones v. The Honorable Tony Williams
Taney County
Challenge to circuit court’s authority to hold probation revocation hearing
Listen to the oral argument: SC97417 MP3 file
Jones was represented during arguments by James Egan of the public defender’s office in Springfield; the state was represented by Thomas Kondro of the Taney County prosecutor’s office in Forsyth.
Travis Jones pleaded guilty to a felony in December 2014 and was placed on probation for five years. Three probation violation reports were filed in 2015, but no hearings were held regarding these reports. Two violation reports were filed in 2016, and both times, the state filed a motion to revoke Jones’ probation. The circuit court continued Jones’ probation. Three more probation violation reports were filed in 2017, and once again the state moved to revoke Jones’ probation. In August 2018, Jones filed a motion to be discharged from probation. The circuit court set for hearing in September 2018 both Jones’ motion for discharge and the state’s motion to revoke. Jones seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than discharging him from probation.
This case presents the questions for this Court of whether the circuit court has authority to conduct a probation revocation hearing; whether Jones has earned compliance credits; whether his probation term has expired as a result of accrued earned compliance credits; and, if probation has expired, whether the circuit court manifested an intent to hold one.
SC97417_Jones_amended_brief
SC97417
State ex rel. Travis Jones v. The Honorable Tony Williams
Taney County
Challenge to circuit court’s authority to hold probation revocation hearing
Listen to the oral argument: SC97417 MP3 file
Jones was represented during arguments by James Egan of the public defender’s office in Springfield; the state was represented by Thomas Kondro of the Taney County prosecutor’s office in Forsyth.
Travis Jones pleaded guilty to a felony in December 2014 and was placed on probation for five years. Three probation violation reports were filed in 2015, but no hearings were held regarding these reports. Two violation reports were filed in 2016, and both times, the state filed a motion to revoke Jones’ probation. The circuit court continued Jones’ probation. Three more probation violation reports were filed in 2017, and once again the state moved to revoke Jones’ probation. In August 2018, Jones filed a motion to be discharged from probation. The circuit court set for hearing in September 2018 both Jones’ motion for discharge and the state’s motion to revoke. Jones seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than discharging him from probation.
This case presents the questions for this Court of whether the circuit court has authority to conduct a probation revocation hearing; whether Jones has earned compliance credits; whether his probation term has expired as a result of accrued earned compliance credits; and, if probation has expired, whether the circuit court manifested an intent to hold one.
SC97417_Jones_amended_brief
SC97417_Jones_reply_brief
SC97175
State ex rel. General Credit Acceptance Company LLC v. The Honorable David L. Vincent III
St. Louis County
Challenge to certification of class action
Listen to the oral argument: SC97175 MP3 file
General Credit Acceptance was represented during arguments by William Ray Price Jr. of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; Weatherspoon was represented by Jesse Rochman of OnderLaw LLC in St. Louis.
David Deaver filed a lawsuit in early 2012 on behalf of a putative class of vehicle buyers who had defaulted on their loans and then had their vehicles repossessed. Helena Weatherspoon was allowed to intervene as an individual claimant in Deaver’s case. Ultimately, the circuit court overruled Deaver’s motion to certify the case as a class action, and he voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims – but not the action itself – in September 2016. Weatherspoon defaulted on payments she owed to Car Credit Acceptance Company under an installment loan for the purchase of a vehicle, and Car Credit Acceptance sent Weatherspoon a “right to cure” notice. Three weeks later, Car Credit Acceptance assigned its security interest in Weatherspoon’s vehicle to General Credit Acceptance Company, which sent her a pre-sale notice. She owes a deficiency to General Credit Acceptance for the balance remaining after her vehicle was sold; the company does not have a judgment against her. Weatherspoon filed a lawsuit against General Credit Acceptance on behalf of a putative class of vehicle buyers who defaulted on their loans and then had their vehicles repossessed. Her lawsuit includes the same members of the putative class as in Deaver’s case, as well as the same underlying issues. Weatherspoon moved to certify the class in her lawsuit, asking the circuit court to decide certification without an evidentiary hearing. General Credit Acceptance opposed class certification. During a hearing, the circuit court advised the parties it preferred to receive written submissions rather than to hear testimony. The parties offered oral argument and, pursuant to an order the circuit court entered, filed the evidence they had intended to present. Ultimately, the circuit court entered its order granting class certification. General Credit Acceptance seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than vacating its order and denying class certification.
This case presents a number of questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class and, if so, whether General Credit Acceptance was prejudiced as a result. One is whether the class is overbroad or otherwise includes a number of persons with no claims remaining after the prior litigation or no claims permitted under the statute of limitations. Other questions involve whether the extent to which the circuit court could have or should have considered the merits of Weatherspoon’s claims regarding interest accruing after default or whether any injury is attributable to General Credit Acceptance rather than the prior company, as well as whether Weatherspoon established common issues of fact or law predominate over individual issues. Additional questions include whether Weatherspoon’s claims are sufficient to qualify her as a member of the class she seeks to represent; if so, whether her claims are sufficient to qualify her as the sole representative of that class; and what extent, if any, Weatherspoon’s involvement in Deaver’s prior litigation affects her current claims.
Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Bankers Association argues state law allows lenders to charge post-default pre-judgment interest on consumer installment loans and permits a creditor to offset any deficiency balance from a debtor’s recovery. The National Consumer Law Center argues state law bars lenders from accruing post-default, pre judgment interest. The center also argues the prior litigation does not preclude those against whom General Credit Acceptance obtained collection judgments from being certified as a class.
SC97175_General_Credit_Acceptance_brief
SC97175_Weatherspoon_brief
SC97175
State ex rel. General Credit Acceptance Company LLC v. The Honorable David L. Vincent III
St. Louis County
Challenge to certification of class action
Listen to the oral argument: SC97175 MP3 file
General Credit Acceptance was represented during arguments by William Ray Price Jr. of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis; Weatherspoon was represented by Jesse Rochman of OnderLaw LLC in St. Louis.
David Deaver filed a lawsuit in early 2012 on behalf of a putative class of vehicle buyers who had defaulted on their loans and then had their vehicles repossessed. Helena Weatherspoon was allowed to intervene as an individual claimant in Deaver’s case. Ultimately, the circuit court overruled Deaver’s motion to certify the case as a class action, and he voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims – but not the action itself – in September 2016. Weatherspoon defaulted on payments she owed to Car Credit Acceptance Company under an installment loan for the purchase of a vehicle, and Car Credit Acceptance sent Weatherspoon a “right to cure” notice. Three weeks later, Car Credit Acceptance assigned its security interest in Weatherspoon’s vehicle to General Credit Acceptance Company, which sent her a pre-sale notice. She owes a deficiency to General Credit Acceptance for the balance remaining after her vehicle was sold; the company does not have a judgment against her. Weatherspoon filed a lawsuit against General Credit Acceptance on behalf of a putative class of vehicle buyers who defaulted on their loans and then had their vehicles repossessed. Her lawsuit includes the same members of the putative class as in Deaver’s case, as well as the same underlying issues. Weatherspoon moved to certify the class in her lawsuit, asking the circuit court to decide certification without an evidentiary hearing. General Credit Acceptance opposed class certification. During a hearing, the circuit court advised the parties it preferred to receive written submissions rather than to hear testimony. The parties offered oral argument and, pursuant to an order the circuit court entered, filed the evidence they had intended to present. Ultimately, the circuit court entered its order granting class certification. General Credit Acceptance seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than vacating its order and denying class certification.
This case presents a number of questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class and, if so, whether General Credit Acceptance was prejudiced as a result. One is whether the class is overbroad or otherwise includes a number of persons with no claims remaining after the prior litigation or no claims permitted under the statute of limitations. Other questions involve whether the extent to which the circuit court could have or should have considered the merits of Weatherspoon’s claims regarding interest accruing after default or whether any injury is attributable to General Credit Acceptance rather than the prior company, as well as whether Weatherspoon established common issues of fact or law predominate over individual issues. Additional questions include whether Weatherspoon’s claims are sufficient to qualify her as a member of the class she seeks to represent; if so, whether her claims are sufficient to qualify her as the sole representative of that class; and what extent, if any, Weatherspoon’s involvement in Deaver’s prior litigation affects her current claims.
Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Bankers Association argues state law allows lenders to charge post-default pre-judgment interest on consumer installment loans and permits a creditor to offset any deficiency balance from a debtor’s recovery. The National Consumer Law Center argues state law bars lenders from accruing post-default, pre judgment interest. The center also argues the prior litigation does not preclude those against whom General Credit Acceptance obtained collection judgments from being certified as a class.
SC97175_General_Credit_Acceptance_brief
SC97175_Weatherspoon_brief
SC97175_General_Credit_Acceptance_reply_brief
SC97175_MO_Bankers_Ass'n_amicus_brief
SC97175_Nat'l_Consumer_Law_Center_amicus_brief
SC97476
State ex rel. State of Kansas, Department of Children and Families and Gina Meier-Hummel v. The Honorable Charles H. McKenzie
Jackson County
Challenge to Missouri court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kansas agency in wrongful death lawsuit
Listen to the oral argument: SC97476 MP3 file
The Kansas department was represented during arguments by Terrelle Mock of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith LLP in Topeka, Kansas; the estate was represented by Michaela Shelton of Shelton Law Office PA in Overland Park, Kansas.
The Kansas department of children and families removed a child from his mother’s home and placed the child in his father’s custody. Hotline calls subsequently were made regarding potential child abuse while the child was living with his father’s family in both Kansas and Missouri. Each time one state’s authorities would intervene, the family apparently moved to the other state, prompting further hotline calls between authorities in the two states. Neither state removed the child from his father’s custody. For part of 2014, the child was placed in a residential treatment center in Missouri under a voluntary placement agreement. After the child’s discharge, the father reported he would be living in Kansas. In 2015, the Kansas department of children and families engaged in litigation on the father’s behalf to collect child support from the child’s mother. Later that year, the child was found dead in Kansas. The child’s father and stepmother were convicted of murder in the child’s death. The child’s mother and the representative of the child’s estate (collectively, the estate) subsequently filed two wrongful death lawsuits, one in Kansas and the other in Missouri. In the Missouri case, the estate alleged claims against the Kansas department of children and families and the department’s secretary (collectively, the department), among other defendants. The department moved to dismiss the Missouri lawsuit. The circuit court overruled the motion. The department seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to dismiss the case.
This case presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the circuit court clearly abused its discretion in not declining to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of comity (a legal principle under which one jurisdiction defers to another jurisdiction’s judgments). Other questions involve whether the department has sovereign immunity so as to deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction, whether the circuit court lacks personal jurisdiction over the department, and whether the department owed the child any legal duty.
SC97476_Kansas_DCF_brief
SC97476_estate_brief
SC97175_MO_Bankers_Ass'n_amicus_brief
SC97175_Nat'l_Consumer_Law_Center_amicus_brief
SC97476
State ex rel. State of Kansas, Department of Children and Families and Gina Meier-Hummel v. The Honorable Charles H. McKenzie
Jackson County
Challenge to Missouri court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kansas agency in wrongful death lawsuit
Listen to the oral argument: SC97476 MP3 file
The Kansas department was represented during arguments by Terrelle Mock of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith LLP in Topeka, Kansas; the estate was represented by Michaela Shelton of Shelton Law Office PA in Overland Park, Kansas.
The Kansas department of children and families removed a child from his mother’s home and placed the child in his father’s custody. Hotline calls subsequently were made regarding potential child abuse while the child was living with his father’s family in both Kansas and Missouri. Each time one state’s authorities would intervene, the family apparently moved to the other state, prompting further hotline calls between authorities in the two states. Neither state removed the child from his father’s custody. For part of 2014, the child was placed in a residential treatment center in Missouri under a voluntary placement agreement. After the child’s discharge, the father reported he would be living in Kansas. In 2015, the Kansas department of children and families engaged in litigation on the father’s behalf to collect child support from the child’s mother. Later that year, the child was found dead in Kansas. The child’s father and stepmother were convicted of murder in the child’s death. The child’s mother and the representative of the child’s estate (collectively, the estate) subsequently filed two wrongful death lawsuits, one in Kansas and the other in Missouri. In the Missouri case, the estate alleged claims against the Kansas department of children and families and the department’s secretary (collectively, the department), among other defendants. The department moved to dismiss the Missouri lawsuit. The circuit court overruled the motion. The department seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to dismiss the case.
This case presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the circuit court clearly abused its discretion in not declining to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of comity (a legal principle under which one jurisdiction defers to another jurisdiction’s judgments). Other questions involve whether the department has sovereign immunity so as to deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction, whether the circuit court lacks personal jurisdiction over the department, and whether the department owed the child any legal duty.
SC97476_Kansas_DCF_brief
SC97476_estate_brief