The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Wednesday, April 10, 2019
SC97631
Gary L. Mitchell v. Kenny Jones
Cole County
Whether repeal of criminal statute applies retroactively to sentence previously ordered
Listen to the oral argument: SC97631 MP3 file
Mitchell was represented during arguments by Kent Gipson of the Law Office of Kent Gipson LLC in Kansas City; the board chairman was represented by Olivea Myers of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
A jury found Gary Mitchell guilty of second-degree drug trafficking. In July 2013, the circuit court sentenced Mitchell, as a prior drug offender, to a prison term with no possibility of probation or parole, pursuant to a statute requiring prior drug offenders to serve their entire sentences without the possibility of probation or parole. The legislature repealed this statute effective in January 2017. Mitchell subsequently sued the probation and parole board chairman, seeking a declaratory judgment that the repeal should be applied retroactively and he was eligible for parole. The circuit court entered its judgment dismissing Mitchell’s petition but holding the repeal does not apply retroactively to his sentence. Mitchell appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One is whether the legislature’s repeal of the prior drug offender statute applies retroactively to Mitchell’s sentence or whether section 1.160, RSMo, bars the retroactive application of amendments to criminal statute affecting the penalty for an offense. The other question is whether Mitchell can challenge the validity of his sentence in a declaratory judgment action.
SC97631_Mitchell_brief
SC97631_Mitchell_reply_brief
SC97633
Dimetrious Woods v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Cole County
Whether repeal of criminal statute applies retroactively to sentence previously ordered
Listen to the oral argument: SC97633 MP3 file
The department was represented during arguments by Andrew Crane of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Woods was represented by Kent Gipson of the Law Office of Kent Gipson LLC in Kansas City.
Following a trial before a judge rather than a jury, a circuit court found Dimetrious Woods guilty of second-degree drug trafficking. In December 2007, the circuit court sentenced Woods, as a prior drug offender, to 25 years in prison with no possibility of probation or parole, pursuant to a statute requiring prior drug offenders without the possibility of probation or parole. The legislature repealed this statute effective in January 2017. Woods subsequently sued the department of corrections, seeking a declaratory judgment that the repeal should be applied retroactively and he was eligible for parole. The circuit court granted summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) in favor of Woods, holding the repeal applied retroactively and he could be made eligible for parole immediately. The department appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the legislature’s repeal of the prior drug offender statute applies retroactively to Mitchell’s sentence or whether section 1.160, RSMo, bars the retroactive application of amendments to criminal statute affecting the penalty for an offense.
SC97633_Department_of_Corrections_brief
SC97633_Woods_brief
SC97633
Dimetrious Woods v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Cole County
Whether repeal of criminal statute applies retroactively to sentence previously ordered
Listen to the oral argument: SC97633 MP3 file
The department was represented during arguments by Andrew Crane of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Woods was represented by Kent Gipson of the Law Office of Kent Gipson LLC in Kansas City.
Following a trial before a judge rather than a jury, a circuit court found Dimetrious Woods guilty of second-degree drug trafficking. In December 2007, the circuit court sentenced Woods, as a prior drug offender, to 25 years in prison with no possibility of probation or parole, pursuant to a statute requiring prior drug offenders without the possibility of probation or parole. The legislature repealed this statute effective in January 2017. Woods subsequently sued the department of corrections, seeking a declaratory judgment that the repeal should be applied retroactively and he was eligible for parole. The circuit court granted summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) in favor of Woods, holding the repeal applied retroactively and he could be made eligible for parole immediately. The department appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the legislature’s repeal of the prior drug offender statute applies retroactively to Mitchell’s sentence or whether section 1.160, RSMo, bars the retroactive application of amendments to criminal statute affecting the penalty for an offense.
SC97633_Department_of_Corrections_brief
SC97633_Woods_brief
SC97633_Department_of_Corrections_reply_brief
SC97385
Delores Henry v. Paul Piatchek, et al., Darrell Williams Sr.
St. Louis city
Father’s challenge to dismissal of wrongful death case in which he wished to intervene
Listen to the oral argument: SC97385 MP3 file
Williams was represented during arguments by Matthew Casey of Casey & Devoti PC in St. Louis; the police were represented by Peter T. Reed of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis.
A man was shot and killed by St. Louis metropolitan police officers in November 2009. He was survived by his grandmother, father and mother. In January 2010, the grandmother filed a wrongful death lawsuit against two police officers, the former police chief and the department’s board of police commissioners (collectively, the police), alleging she was her grandson’s “next of kin” and not mentioning he also was survived by his parents. In November 2010, the father – who was incarcerated in Florida – sent pro se correspondence to the circuit court asking how he could become a plaintiff in the wrongful death case and proceed pro se. In May 2011, the father sought to intervene in the case through correspondence he sent the circuit court but apparently not the police. The circuit court did not rule on his request. In April 2014, one week before the scheduled trial, the circuit court granted the grandmother’s voluntary motion to dismiss. In January 2017, the father moved to set aside the dismissal and allow him to proceed with his wrongful death claim. The circuit court overruled his motion, finding it lost authority over the case when it was dismissed three years earlier. The father appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court properly overruled the father’s motion to set aside its judgment dismissing the case, including whether the father was entitled to intervene in the grandmother’s case as a matter of right under section 537.080, RSMo, or Rule 52.12; whether the father’s request to intervene was proper and within the three-year statute of limitations; and whether the father is entitled to equitable or other relief.
SC97385_Williams_brief_filed_in_ED
SC97385_police_brief
SC97385_Williams_reply_brief
SC97461
State ex rel. AJKJ Inc. v. The Honorable Craig E. Hellmann
Franklin County
Whether circuit court had authority to set aside judgment in deed reformation case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97461 MP3 file
AJKJ was represented during arguments by Sean Brinker of Zick, Voss, Politte & Richardson PC in Washington, Missouri; the Birch Creek residents were represented by Michael Clithero of Lathrop Gage LLP in Clayton.
AJKJ Inc. conveyed property in the Birch Creek subdivision in Franklin County to New Sites LLC. Ultimately the property was conveyed to a construction company. AJKJ’s August 2014 general warranty deed conveying the property to New Sites and recorded with the county recorder of deeds did not include the words “including developer rights.” In April 2016, certain Birch Creek residents sued the construction company, seeking a declaratory judgment that the construction company did not have developer rights with respect to the subdivision and, therefore, could not amend the subdivision’s indentures to allow smaller and less expensive homes to be built. Two years later, the circuit court issued its declaratory judgment finding AJKJ’s president did not intend to convey developer rights in the deed to New Sites; therefore, the construction company did not have developer rights. Approximately five weeks later, AJKJ filed a lawsuit seeking to reform the August 2014 deed to clarify it intended to convey developer rights to New Sites. The day the reformation lawsuit was scheduled to be tried, AJKJ advised the circuit court about the prior adverse judgment regarding developer rights. The circuit court proceeded with the trial and, several days later, issued its judgment reforming the deed to add the words “including developer rights.” The Birch Creek residents filed a motion in the reformation lawsuit to set aside the judgment and intervene in the case. In response, AJKJ argued the circuit court lost authority over the reformation lawsuit when the judgment became final before it ruled on the motion. The circuit court ultimately sustained the Birch Creek residents’ motion and vacated its judgment. AJKJ now seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from joining the Birch creek residents or taking any other action in the underlying reformation of deed case.
This case presents several questions for this Court regarding whether the circuit court had authority over the case at the time it sustained the Birch Creek residents’ motion to vacate its prior judgment and to intervene in the reformation lawsuit. These questions include whether the circuit court lost authority over the reformation judgment when it became final; whether Rule 74.06 permitted the circuit court to grant the relief the Birch Creek residents requested; and whether AJKJ made misrepresentations to the circuit court about the prior judgment or its findings regarding the intent to convey developer rights.
SC97461_AJKJ_brief
SC97461_Birch_Creek_residents
SC97385
Delores Henry v. Paul Piatchek, et al., Darrell Williams Sr.
St. Louis city
Father’s challenge to dismissal of wrongful death case in which he wished to intervene
Listen to the oral argument: SC97385 MP3 file
Williams was represented during arguments by Matthew Casey of Casey & Devoti PC in St. Louis; the police were represented by Peter T. Reed of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis.
A man was shot and killed by St. Louis metropolitan police officers in November 2009. He was survived by his grandmother, father and mother. In January 2010, the grandmother filed a wrongful death lawsuit against two police officers, the former police chief and the department’s board of police commissioners (collectively, the police), alleging she was her grandson’s “next of kin” and not mentioning he also was survived by his parents. In November 2010, the father – who was incarcerated in Florida – sent pro se correspondence to the circuit court asking how he could become a plaintiff in the wrongful death case and proceed pro se. In May 2011, the father sought to intervene in the case through correspondence he sent the circuit court but apparently not the police. The circuit court did not rule on his request. In April 2014, one week before the scheduled trial, the circuit court granted the grandmother’s voluntary motion to dismiss. In January 2017, the father moved to set aside the dismissal and allow him to proceed with his wrongful death claim. The circuit court overruled his motion, finding it lost authority over the case when it was dismissed three years earlier. The father appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court properly overruled the father’s motion to set aside its judgment dismissing the case, including whether the father was entitled to intervene in the grandmother’s case as a matter of right under section 537.080, RSMo, or Rule 52.12; whether the father’s request to intervene was proper and within the three-year statute of limitations; and whether the father is entitled to equitable or other relief.
SC97385_Williams_brief_filed_in_ED
SC97385_police_brief
SC97385_Williams_reply_brief
SC97461
State ex rel. AJKJ Inc. v. The Honorable Craig E. Hellmann
Franklin County
Whether circuit court had authority to set aside judgment in deed reformation case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97461 MP3 file
AJKJ was represented during arguments by Sean Brinker of Zick, Voss, Politte & Richardson PC in Washington, Missouri; the Birch Creek residents were represented by Michael Clithero of Lathrop Gage LLP in Clayton.
AJKJ Inc. conveyed property in the Birch Creek subdivision in Franklin County to New Sites LLC. Ultimately the property was conveyed to a construction company. AJKJ’s August 2014 general warranty deed conveying the property to New Sites and recorded with the county recorder of deeds did not include the words “including developer rights.” In April 2016, certain Birch Creek residents sued the construction company, seeking a declaratory judgment that the construction company did not have developer rights with respect to the subdivision and, therefore, could not amend the subdivision’s indentures to allow smaller and less expensive homes to be built. Two years later, the circuit court issued its declaratory judgment finding AJKJ’s president did not intend to convey developer rights in the deed to New Sites; therefore, the construction company did not have developer rights. Approximately five weeks later, AJKJ filed a lawsuit seeking to reform the August 2014 deed to clarify it intended to convey developer rights to New Sites. The day the reformation lawsuit was scheduled to be tried, AJKJ advised the circuit court about the prior adverse judgment regarding developer rights. The circuit court proceeded with the trial and, several days later, issued its judgment reforming the deed to add the words “including developer rights.” The Birch Creek residents filed a motion in the reformation lawsuit to set aside the judgment and intervene in the case. In response, AJKJ argued the circuit court lost authority over the reformation lawsuit when the judgment became final before it ruled on the motion. The circuit court ultimately sustained the Birch Creek residents’ motion and vacated its judgment. AJKJ now seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from joining the Birch creek residents or taking any other action in the underlying reformation of deed case.
This case presents several questions for this Court regarding whether the circuit court had authority over the case at the time it sustained the Birch Creek residents’ motion to vacate its prior judgment and to intervene in the reformation lawsuit. These questions include whether the circuit court lost authority over the reformation judgment when it became final; whether Rule 74.06 permitted the circuit court to grant the relief the Birch Creek residents requested; and whether AJKJ made misrepresentations to the circuit court about the prior judgment or its findings regarding the intent to convey developer rights.
SC97461_AJKJ_brief
SC97461_Birch_Creek_residents