The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Wednesday, September 25, 2019
SC97730
The Kansas City Chiefs Football Club Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Jackson County Sports Complex Authority
Jackson County
Challenge to taxation of items used in renovating sports facilities
Listen to the oral argument: SC97730 MP3 file
The Chiefs were represented during arguments by Mark Olthoff of Polsinelli PC in Kansas City; the director was represented by Deputy Attorney General for Special Litigation Justin Smith of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Jackson County owns the Harry S Truman Sports Complex in Kansas City. The county leases the complex to the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority. The authority has subleased portions of the complex – Arrowhead Stadium, administrative offices and a training facility – to The Kansas City Chiefs Football Club Inc. through 2030. The authority and the Chiefs entered into a development agreement to renovate Arrowhead Stadium and other portions of the complex the Chiefs lease. Both agreed to contribute funds toward the renovation. The development agreement provided the Chiefs would manage the project on the authority’s behalf and with the county’s consent. The team negotiated with vendors and selected tangible personal property, fixtures and materials for approval by the authority and the architectural and engineering firms involved with the complex renovations. Some of the resulting transaction paperwork identified the Chiefs as “owners.” The Chiefs submitted monthly disbursement requests to the authority for approval, and the authority submitted the requests to the trustee for payment out of the project fund. The director of revenue issued the authority a project exemption certificate under section 144.062, RSMo, allowing the authority’s designee to purchase and pay for materials exempt from sales and use tax when fulfilling a contract with the authority. The authority provided its exemption certificate to the Chiefs. A dispute later arose over the taxation of certain contested items used in the renovation, including scoreboards and related equipment, television fixtures, stadium signs, a statue, and cabinetry, furniture and other items affixed throughout the stadium and offices. The Chiefs did not pay sales or use tax on any of these items. Following an audit, the director issued sales and use tax assessments against the team. The Chiefs appealed to the administrative hearing commission, which upheld the director’s tax assessments. The Chiefs seek this Court’s review.
This case presents multiple questions for this Court, including whether competent and substantial evidence on the whole record supports the determinations of tax liability as well as the extent to which the Chiefs’ financial contributions to the renovation project became county funds. Another question involves whether the Chiefs purchased or became the ultimate owner of the disputed items, making them taxable, or whether the team merely acted as a contractor, obtaining the items on behalf of the authority and county, making them tax exempt. If the items were taxable, additional questions involve whether they were exempt from taxation statutorily, because they were procured under a valid tax-exemption certificate, or constitutionally, because they were paid for by public funds owned and managed by the county. A further question involves whether certain contested items stopped being tangible personal property when they were attached to real property, thereby becoming non-taxable fixtures.
SC97730_Kansas_City_Chiefs_brief
SC97730_Sports_Complex_Authority_brief
SC97730_Director_brief
SC97730_Kansas_City_chiefs_reply_brief
SC97730_Sports_Complex_Authority_reply_brief
SC97695
In re Trenton Farms RE LLC, Permit No. MOGS10520; Missouri Department of Natural Resources and Missouri Clean Water Commission
Grundy County
Challenges to permit approval for CAFO, composition of commission granting approval
Listen to the oral argument: SC97695 MP3 file
Hickory Neighbors United was represented during arguments by Stephen Jeffery of Jeffery Law Group LLC in Chesterfield; the state was represented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; and Trenton Farms was represented by Robert Brundage of Newman, Comley & Ruth PC in Jefferson City.
The state’s department of natural resources issued Trenton Farms RE LLC a permit to operate a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) for swine in Grundy County. Hickory Neighbors United Inc. appealed, and the state’s clean water commission ultimately vacated the permit. The state legislature subsequently passed House Bill 1713. The governor vetoed the bill, which nonetheless became law when the legislature overrode the veto. The department of natural resources later issued Trenton Farms a second permit to operate the CAFO. Hickory Neighbors again appealed. A new governor subsequently replaced the commissioners who had voted to vacate the first permit. The newly constituted clean water commission approved Trenton Farms’ second permit. Hickory Neighbors seeks review in this Court.
This appeal involves two questions for this Court. One is whether HB 1713 was enacted in violation of the single subject, clear title and original purpose provisions of article III, sections 21 and 23 of the state constitution, making the appointment of the new commissioners unconstitutional, the commission unlawfully constituted and its decision invalid. Related issues include whether Hickory Neighbors preserved or has standing (legal ability to sue) to raise its constitutional challenges; whether it properly served the commission members; and whether it should have asserted its claims in a quo warranto action initiated by a county prosecutor or the attorney general. The second question is whether the permit is supported by competent and substantial evidence and complies with a state law and regulation. Related issues include whether manure containment structures are located within the 100-year floodplain as well as whether a professional engineer personally conducted, reviewed or supervised preparation of the flood study report bearing his certification and seal.
SC97695_Hickory_Neighbors_United_brief
SC97695_State_brief
SC97812
Theron Ingram v. Brook Chateau
Jackson County
Challenge to denial of arbitration in medical negligence case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97812 MP3 file
Brook Chateau was represented during arguments by Timothy Sansone of Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard PC in St. Louis; Ingram was represented by Kevin Young of Peterson & Associates in Kansas City.
Theron Ingram was involved in a severe motor vehicle collision resulting in quadriplegia. While hospitalized, Ingram executed a durable power of attorney for health care naming Andrea Nichole Hall as his attorney-in-fact. He was discharged from the hospital to a skilled nursing facility in Jackson County operated by Brook Chateau, and Hall executed a voluntary arbitration agreement with Brook Chateau. The agreement described the decision to move Ingram to the facility and the decision to enter into the voluntary arbitration agreement each as “a health care decision.” Ingram developed bed sores while at the Brook Chateau facility. He sued Brook Chateau for negligence, alleging the facility’s medical personnel and staff failed to provide him reasonable medical care. He also sought punitive damages and asked for a jury trial. Brook Chateau moved to compel arbitration. Ingram argued he is of sound mind, did not sign the arbitration agreement and was not incapacitated at the time Hall entered into the arbitration agreement. He also noted no one signed the arbitration agreement as the “patient’s legal representative.” Following a hearing, the circuit court overruled the motion to compel arbitration. Brook Chateau appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the federal arbitration act prohibits a rule of law discriminating against arbitration agreements and, if so, whether the arbitration agreement was in effect and enforceable as to each claim and whether the circuit court’s order or appellate decision reviewing the order is a “rule of law.” Another question involves whether the durable power of attorney complied with statutory requirements, took effect when Ingram signed it and was in effect when Hall executed the arbitration agreement. A further question involves whether the arbitration agreement involved a health care decision and, if so, whether the durable power of attorney granted Hall authority to enter into it.
SC97812_Chateau_brief
SC97912
In re: John Dale Wiley
Stone County
Attorney discipline
Note: On September 24, 2019, this case was removed from the September 25 docket and rescheduled for the November 5 docket.