The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Wednesday, October 23, 2019
SC97696
Gary Gentry v. Orkin LLC and Danny Biron
Jackson County
Challenge to judgment finding liability and awarding punitive damages against company following retaliation trial
Listen to the oral argument: SC97696 MP3 file
Orkin was represented during arguments by James Wyrsch of Wyrsch Hobbs & Mirakian PC in Kansas City; Gentry was represented by Kenneth Kinney of Ralston Kinney LLC in Kansas City. Judge Robin Ransom – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge Powell.
Gary Gentry worked for five years as a pest technician for Orkin LLC. Approximately three months after Gentry went on medical leave, Orkin terminated his employment. His branch manager, Danny Biron, wrote him a recommendation letter. Gentry filed a charge with the state’s human rights commission alleging Orkin had fired him because of age and disability discrimination, but he never filed a lawsuit. Gentry twice reapplied for employment but was not interviewed or rehired. He filed another charge with the human rights commission alleging Orkin’s failure to rehire him was in retaliation for his earlier discrimination charge. Gentry subsequently sued Orkin and Biron (collectively, Orkin). At trial, Orkin’s position was it had terminated Gentry and did not rehire him because he did not meet certain performance standards. The jury found Orkin liable and awarded Gentry actual and punitive damages. The circuit court reduced the jury’s punitive damages award under section 510.265, RSMo. Orkin appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury regarding how to determine whether Orkin had violated the state human rights act’s prohibition against retaliation. Related issues include whether the circuit court should have given the jury Orkin’s proffered instruction, which would have allowed the jurors to conclude the company’s failure to interview or rehire Gentry was based on business judgment, and whether a disjunctive instruction properly allowed the jury to find liability merely if Orkin failed to interview Gentry. Another question involves whether Orkin preserved any argument that its constitutional right to a jury trial was violated during the punitive damages phase of the trial when Gentry asked Orkin on cross-examination to acknowledge its retaliatory conduct or otherwise demonstrate remorse. An additional question involves whether Gentry was required or permitted to include a dollar amount in his petition’s demand for punitive damages and whether Orkin preserved any argument about Gentry’s pleadings. Further questions involve whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury during the punitive damages phase of the trial regarding Orkin’s failure to interview Gentry and whether the circuit court properly excluded evidence and instructions regarding whether Gentry failed to mitigate damages.
SC97696_Orkin_brief
SC97696_Gentry_brief
SC97696_Orkin_reply_brief
SC97721
Dwight Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers Inc., David Dobbs and Dustin Dobbs
St. Louis County
Challenge to dismissal of employment discrimination lawsuit filed by Illinois employee
Listen to the oral argument: SC97721 MP3 file
Tuttle was represented during arguments by Jerome Dobson of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis; Dobbs Tire was represented by Robert Younger of McMahon Berger PC in St. Louis.
Illinois resident Dwight Tuttle worked at and managed stores in Illinois for Dobbs Tire & Auto Center Inc., which is based in Jefferson County, Missouri. Both its president and chief executive officer, David Dobbs, and its director of retail operations, Dustin Dobbs, reside in St. Louis County. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, Tuttle sued the company and both Dobbses (collectively, Dobbs Tire) in Missouri for age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the state’s human rights act. Dobbs Tire moved to dismiss the suit, alleging Tuttle failed to state a claim and the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Dobbs Tire argued the act does not apply to persons who live and work outside Missouri and Tuttle failed to plead facts showing any discriminatory acts occurred in Missouri. The circuit court sustained Dobbs Tire’s motion and dismissed Tuttle’s lawsuit with prejudice (precluding him from refiling it). Tuttle appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the human rights act can be applied to protect individuals employed outside Missouri and whether Tuttle established facts sufficient to support his lawsuit and the circuit court’s jurisdiction over it. Other questions involve whether the circuit court properly dismissed the lawsuit, whether it should have transferred venue or whether it should have allowed Tuttle to file a more definitive statement about where the alleged discriminatory acts occurred.
SC97721_Tuttle_brief
SC97721_Dobbs_brief
SC97721_Tuttle_reply_brief
SC97845
State ex rel. Anheuser-Busch LLC v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
St. Louis
Challenge to employment discrimination lawsuit filed by Iowa employee
Listen to the oral argument: SC97845 MP3 file
Anheuser-Busch was represented during arguments by James Bennett of Dowd Bennett LLP in St. Louis; Esser was represented by Gregory Rich of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis.
Beginning in 2007, Iowa resident John Esser worked for St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch LLC as a retail sales director in Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota but not Missouri. His immediate supervisor worked in the company’s St. Louis office. Esser sued the company in St. Louis city, alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the state’s human rights act. Anheuser-Busch moved to dismiss the suit, alleging Esser failed to state a claim under the state’s human rights act because the act’s protections do not extend outside Missouri. The company also moved to compel arbitration. The circuit court overruled the company’s motions. Although the circuit court recognized the act does not affirmatively indicate it applies to acts committed outside Missouri, and some circuit courts have held the act does not apply outside the state, it also noted no appellate decisions have so held. The circuit court found Esser had stated a claim because he alleged his supervisor is in St. Louis and he was in St. Louis when his supervisor told him about one of his lower performance reviews. Anheuser-Busch seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than dismissing Esser’s lawsuit with prejudice.
This case presents one question for this Court – whether the state’s human rights extends protections to employees who work outside Missouri and, if so, whether Esser alleged that any unlawful employment practice occurred in Missouri. A related issue involves whether Anheuser-Busch has another remedy available to it so as to preclude a writ.
SC97845_Anheuser-Busch_brief
Gary Gentry v. Orkin LLC and Danny Biron
Jackson County
Challenge to judgment finding liability and awarding punitive damages against company following retaliation trial
Listen to the oral argument: SC97696 MP3 file
Orkin was represented during arguments by James Wyrsch of Wyrsch Hobbs & Mirakian PC in Kansas City; Gentry was represented by Kenneth Kinney of Ralston Kinney LLC in Kansas City. Judge Robin Ransom – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge Powell.
Gary Gentry worked for five years as a pest technician for Orkin LLC. Approximately three months after Gentry went on medical leave, Orkin terminated his employment. His branch manager, Danny Biron, wrote him a recommendation letter. Gentry filed a charge with the state’s human rights commission alleging Orkin had fired him because of age and disability discrimination, but he never filed a lawsuit. Gentry twice reapplied for employment but was not interviewed or rehired. He filed another charge with the human rights commission alleging Orkin’s failure to rehire him was in retaliation for his earlier discrimination charge. Gentry subsequently sued Orkin and Biron (collectively, Orkin). At trial, Orkin’s position was it had terminated Gentry and did not rehire him because he did not meet certain performance standards. The jury found Orkin liable and awarded Gentry actual and punitive damages. The circuit court reduced the jury’s punitive damages award under section 510.265, RSMo. Orkin appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury regarding how to determine whether Orkin had violated the state human rights act’s prohibition against retaliation. Related issues include whether the circuit court should have given the jury Orkin’s proffered instruction, which would have allowed the jurors to conclude the company’s failure to interview or rehire Gentry was based on business judgment, and whether a disjunctive instruction properly allowed the jury to find liability merely if Orkin failed to interview Gentry. Another question involves whether Orkin preserved any argument that its constitutional right to a jury trial was violated during the punitive damages phase of the trial when Gentry asked Orkin on cross-examination to acknowledge its retaliatory conduct or otherwise demonstrate remorse. An additional question involves whether Gentry was required or permitted to include a dollar amount in his petition’s demand for punitive damages and whether Orkin preserved any argument about Gentry’s pleadings. Further questions involve whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury during the punitive damages phase of the trial regarding Orkin’s failure to interview Gentry and whether the circuit court properly excluded evidence and instructions regarding whether Gentry failed to mitigate damages.
SC97696_Orkin_brief
SC97696_Gentry_brief
SC97696_Orkin_reply_brief
SC97721
Dwight Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers Inc., David Dobbs and Dustin Dobbs
St. Louis County
Challenge to dismissal of employment discrimination lawsuit filed by Illinois employee
Listen to the oral argument: SC97721 MP3 file
Tuttle was represented during arguments by Jerome Dobson of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis; Dobbs Tire was represented by Robert Younger of McMahon Berger PC in St. Louis.
Illinois resident Dwight Tuttle worked at and managed stores in Illinois for Dobbs Tire & Auto Center Inc., which is based in Jefferson County, Missouri. Both its president and chief executive officer, David Dobbs, and its director of retail operations, Dustin Dobbs, reside in St. Louis County. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, Tuttle sued the company and both Dobbses (collectively, Dobbs Tire) in Missouri for age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the state’s human rights act. Dobbs Tire moved to dismiss the suit, alleging Tuttle failed to state a claim and the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Dobbs Tire argued the act does not apply to persons who live and work outside Missouri and Tuttle failed to plead facts showing any discriminatory acts occurred in Missouri. The circuit court sustained Dobbs Tire’s motion and dismissed Tuttle’s lawsuit with prejudice (precluding him from refiling it). Tuttle appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the human rights act can be applied to protect individuals employed outside Missouri and whether Tuttle established facts sufficient to support his lawsuit and the circuit court’s jurisdiction over it. Other questions involve whether the circuit court properly dismissed the lawsuit, whether it should have transferred venue or whether it should have allowed Tuttle to file a more definitive statement about where the alleged discriminatory acts occurred.
SC97721_Tuttle_brief
SC97721_Dobbs_brief
SC97721_Tuttle_reply_brief
SC97845
State ex rel. Anheuser-Busch LLC v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
St. Louis
Challenge to employment discrimination lawsuit filed by Iowa employee
Listen to the oral argument: SC97845 MP3 file
Anheuser-Busch was represented during arguments by James Bennett of Dowd Bennett LLP in St. Louis; Esser was represented by Gregory Rich of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis.
Beginning in 2007, Iowa resident John Esser worked for St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch LLC as a retail sales director in Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota but not Missouri. His immediate supervisor worked in the company’s St. Louis office. Esser sued the company in St. Louis city, alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the state’s human rights act. Anheuser-Busch moved to dismiss the suit, alleging Esser failed to state a claim under the state’s human rights act because the act’s protections do not extend outside Missouri. The company also moved to compel arbitration. The circuit court overruled the company’s motions. Although the circuit court recognized the act does not affirmatively indicate it applies to acts committed outside Missouri, and some circuit courts have held the act does not apply outside the state, it also noted no appellate decisions have so held. The circuit court found Esser had stated a claim because he alleged his supervisor is in St. Louis and he was in St. Louis when his supervisor told him about one of his lower performance reviews. Anheuser-Busch seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than dismissing Esser’s lawsuit with prejudice.
This case presents one question for this Court – whether the state’s human rights extends protections to employees who work outside Missouri and, if so, whether Esser alleged that any unlawful employment practice occurred in Missouri. A related issue involves whether Anheuser-Busch has another remedy available to it so as to preclude a writ.
SC97845_Anheuser-Busch_brief
SC97845_Anheuser-Busch_reply_brief
SC97641
Li Lin v. Matthew J. Ellis and The Washington University in Saint Louis
St. Louis
Challenge to retaliation judgment in employment case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97641 MP3 file
Washington University was represented during arguments by James Layton of Tueth Keeney Cooper Mohan & Jackstadt PC in St. Louis; Lin was represented by Jonathan Berns of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis.
Li Lin worked as a staff scientist in Dr. Matthew Ellis’ research laboratory at Washington University’s School of Medicine in St. Louis. She had a physical inability to perform cell cultures and an allergy to mice, so she was assigned to grant-funded microarray research. In August 2012, Ellis and others notified Lin her position would be eliminated. She was not offered any other job within the university, and her employment terminated in November 2012. Lin did not ask Ellis to provide a reference for her before or after her employment ended. In August 2014, Lin sued the university and Ellis for disability discrimination and retaliation in violation the state’s human rights act. Before trial, she dismissed her disability claim, proceeding to trial only on her retaliation claim. Ellis and the university contended her lawsuit was barred by the act’s two-year statute of limitations because their decision to eliminate her position occurred in July 2012; she responded no one definitively told her the job would be eliminated until the next month. The jury found in Lin’s favor on her retaliation claim against the university but found in Ellis’ favor on Lin’s retaliation claim against him. The circuit court overruled the university’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The university appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the state’s human rights act authorizes a claim for retaliation for seeking a disability accommodation. Another question involves whether Lin’s claim is time-barred under section 213.075, RSMo. Related issues include whether the 2017 amendment to the statute applies in this case, whether a 180-day window for filing her administrative complaint began running when she was told she was being terminated or when her termination was effective, and whether she was required to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely manner before bringing a lawsuit. Other questions involve whether certain statements by Lin’s counsel in a pleading filed on her behalf were admissible as an admission by a party opponent; whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury as to the elements Lin had to establish to prove her retaliation claim; and whether the jury’s verdict exonerating Ellis requires entry of judgment in the university’s favor.
SC97641_Washington_University_brief
SC97641_Lin_brief
SC97641
Li Lin v. Matthew J. Ellis and The Washington University in Saint Louis
St. Louis
Challenge to retaliation judgment in employment case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97641 MP3 file
Washington University was represented during arguments by James Layton of Tueth Keeney Cooper Mohan & Jackstadt PC in St. Louis; Lin was represented by Jonathan Berns of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis.
Li Lin worked as a staff scientist in Dr. Matthew Ellis’ research laboratory at Washington University’s School of Medicine in St. Louis. She had a physical inability to perform cell cultures and an allergy to mice, so she was assigned to grant-funded microarray research. In August 2012, Ellis and others notified Lin her position would be eliminated. She was not offered any other job within the university, and her employment terminated in November 2012. Lin did not ask Ellis to provide a reference for her before or after her employment ended. In August 2014, Lin sued the university and Ellis for disability discrimination and retaliation in violation the state’s human rights act. Before trial, she dismissed her disability claim, proceeding to trial only on her retaliation claim. Ellis and the university contended her lawsuit was barred by the act’s two-year statute of limitations because their decision to eliminate her position occurred in July 2012; she responded no one definitively told her the job would be eliminated until the next month. The jury found in Lin’s favor on her retaliation claim against the university but found in Ellis’ favor on Lin’s retaliation claim against him. The circuit court overruled the university’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The university appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the state’s human rights act authorizes a claim for retaliation for seeking a disability accommodation. Another question involves whether Lin’s claim is time-barred under section 213.075, RSMo. Related issues include whether the 2017 amendment to the statute applies in this case, whether a 180-day window for filing her administrative complaint began running when she was told she was being terminated or when her termination was effective, and whether she was required to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely manner before bringing a lawsuit. Other questions involve whether certain statements by Lin’s counsel in a pleading filed on her behalf were admissible as an admission by a party opponent; whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury as to the elements Lin had to establish to prove her retaliation claim; and whether the jury’s verdict exonerating Ellis requires entry of judgment in the university’s favor.
SC97641_Washington_University_brief
SC97641_Lin_brief
SC97641_Washington_University_reply_brief
SC97922
In re: John W. Stapleton Jr.
Jackson County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97922 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Nancy Ripperger of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Stapleton was represented by James Morrow of Morrow Willnauer Church LLC in Kansas City.
The chief disciplinary counsel’s office conducted an audit of the trust, operating and personal accounts of Kansas City attorney John Stapleton Jr. after his bank notified the office pursuant to Rule 4-1.15 that the trust account had insufficient funds. The investigator concluded Stapleton had not made timely or full payments to a number of clients and third-party lienholders; paid clients and lienholders from sources other than his trust account; transferred funds out of the trust account without documenting why or for which clients the transfers related; did not document his withdrawal of earned attorney fees from the trust account; withdrew more than he was owed or wrote checks to cash rather than to himself; held funds from his operating and personal accounts in cashier’s checks; and had his operating and personal accounts subjected to tax liens and garnishments by state and federal tax authorities. After the chief disciplinary counsel filed an information alleging Stapleton violated various rules of professional conduct, Stapleton closed his trust account, opened a new trust account with a different bank and hired an outside bookkeeper to manage his trust account,. He also has received continuing legal education regarding proper trust accounting practices. Following a hearing, a regional disciplinary hearing panel found Stapleton had violated Rule 4-1.15 and recommended he be suspended indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years, the suspension be stayed and he be placed on probation for two years. Stapleton accepted the recommendation; the chief disciplinary counsel did not. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to disbar Stapleton.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Stapleton violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97922_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC97922_Stapleton_brief
SC97922
In re: John W. Stapleton Jr.
Jackson County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97922 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Nancy Ripperger of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Stapleton was represented by James Morrow of Morrow Willnauer Church LLC in Kansas City.
The chief disciplinary counsel’s office conducted an audit of the trust, operating and personal accounts of Kansas City attorney John Stapleton Jr. after his bank notified the office pursuant to Rule 4-1.15 that the trust account had insufficient funds. The investigator concluded Stapleton had not made timely or full payments to a number of clients and third-party lienholders; paid clients and lienholders from sources other than his trust account; transferred funds out of the trust account without documenting why or for which clients the transfers related; did not document his withdrawal of earned attorney fees from the trust account; withdrew more than he was owed or wrote checks to cash rather than to himself; held funds from his operating and personal accounts in cashier’s checks; and had his operating and personal accounts subjected to tax liens and garnishments by state and federal tax authorities. After the chief disciplinary counsel filed an information alleging Stapleton violated various rules of professional conduct, Stapleton closed his trust account, opened a new trust account with a different bank and hired an outside bookkeeper to manage his trust account,. He also has received continuing legal education regarding proper trust accounting practices. Following a hearing, a regional disciplinary hearing panel found Stapleton had violated Rule 4-1.15 and recommended he be suspended indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years, the suspension be stayed and he be placed on probation for two years. Stapleton accepted the recommendation; the chief disciplinary counsel did not. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to disbar Stapleton.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Stapleton violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97922_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC97922_Stapleton_brief