The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Wednesday, November 6, 2019
SC97869
In the Interest of D.E.G. v. Juvenile Officer of Jackson County
Jackson County
Constitutional challenges to statutory process and judgment certifying juvenile to stand trial as an adult
Listen to the oral argument: SC97869 MP3 file
The juvenile was represented during arguments by Tim Honse of the public defender’s office in Kansas City; the juvenile office was represented by Lori Fluegel, an attorney in Kansas City.
The Jackson County juvenile officer filed a petition alleging 15-year-old D.E.G. committed conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The juvenile officer sought to certify D.E.G. to stand trial as an adult. D.E.G. moved to deny certification, alleging the state’s certification process is unconstitutional. The circuit court overruled D.E.G.’s motion, held the certification hearing and certified him to stand trial as an adult. The juvenile appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. Procedural questions involve whether D.E.G. should be allowed to appeal the certification decision directly, as provided in chapter 211, RSMo, or whether he first should have to move to dismiss the indictment in which the adult charge is pending, as this Court required in its 1972 decision in In re T.J.H.; whether the juvenile officer is a proper party in this appeal now that the case is no longer a juvenile proceeding; and whether dismissing the appeal would deprive D.E.G. of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the certification because he could become ineligible for a juvenile disposition while awaiting the conclusion of his adult proceedings. Substantive questions involve whether the certification process under section 211.071, RSMo, violates a juvenile’s constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, and to confront witnesses. Related issues include whether the burden of proof used is vague, unknown or nonexistent; whether an adequate probable cause determination is made at the initiation of juvenile delinquency proceedings; whether the evidence used in the certification decision was our should have been subjected to adversarial testing, challenging or additional confrontation before being admitted; and whether unadjudicated prior referrals against D.E.G. were used to certify him to stand trial as an adult. Another question involves whether the statutory structure of the state’s juvenile divisions violates the separation of powers by involving circuit courts in charging and prosecuting youth through their supervision of juvenile officers. An additional question involves whether the certification proceedings are applied disproportionately to African-American juveniles.
SC97869_juvenile_brief
SC97932
DI Supply LLC and Its Individual Members v. Director of Revenue
Cole County
Whether hotel room furnishings are exempt from sales tax
Listen to the oral argument: SC97932 MP3 file
DI Supply was represented during arguments by Carole Iles of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP in Jefferson City; the director was represented by Emily Dodge of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
DI Supply LLC is a Drury Hotels Company LLC entity that buys products for hotels in the Drury chain. Following an audit, the state’s director of revenue concluded DI Supply had made more than $11.7 million in taxable sales for which it had not remitted sales taxes and assessed taxes and interest against the company. In a proceeding before the administrative hearing commission, DI Supply contested the tax assessment on certain items, arguing they were furnishings located or used in hotel rooms for use by hotel customers renting rooms, their cost was factored into the rental price of the hotel rooms, and they should qualify for a resale tax exemption. Following an evidentiary hearing, the commission concluded DI Supply had not presented clear, unequivocal evidence it was entitled to a resale exemption and found it liable for more than $613,000 in unpaid sales taxes plus statutory interest. DI Supply appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the furnishings are excluded from taxation under chapter 144, RSMo, or otherwise run afoul of the policy against multiple taxation. Related issues include whether DI Supply waived any claim its purchases are exempt from tax under section 144.018; whether section 144.018 overrides any resale exemption for tangible personal property in section 144.010; whether section 144.010 authorizes a resale exemption for the furnishings based on the subsequent “sale” of a hotel room to a guest for a charge; and whether the room furnishings qualify as reusable tangible property transferred to guests who paid to use and consume the furnishings
SC97932_DI_Supply_brief
DI Supply LLC and Its Individual Members v. Director of Revenue
Cole County
Whether hotel room furnishings are exempt from sales tax
Listen to the oral argument: SC97932 MP3 file
DI Supply was represented during arguments by Carole Iles of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP in Jefferson City; the director was represented by Emily Dodge of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
DI Supply LLC is a Drury Hotels Company LLC entity that buys products for hotels in the Drury chain. Following an audit, the state’s director of revenue concluded DI Supply had made more than $11.7 million in taxable sales for which it had not remitted sales taxes and assessed taxes and interest against the company. In a proceeding before the administrative hearing commission, DI Supply contested the tax assessment on certain items, arguing they were furnishings located or used in hotel rooms for use by hotel customers renting rooms, their cost was factored into the rental price of the hotel rooms, and they should qualify for a resale tax exemption. Following an evidentiary hearing, the commission concluded DI Supply had not presented clear, unequivocal evidence it was entitled to a resale exemption and found it liable for more than $613,000 in unpaid sales taxes plus statutory interest. DI Supply appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the furnishings are excluded from taxation under chapter 144, RSMo, or otherwise run afoul of the policy against multiple taxation. Related issues include whether DI Supply waived any claim its purchases are exempt from tax under section 144.018; whether section 144.018 overrides any resale exemption for tangible personal property in section 144.010; whether section 144.010 authorizes a resale exemption for the furnishings based on the subsequent “sale” of a hotel room to a guest for a charge; and whether the room furnishings qualify as reusable tangible property transferred to guests who paid to use and consume the furnishings
SC97932_DI_Supply_brief
SC98027
In re: John Kevin Sheehan
St. Louis
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC98027 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Sheehan was represented by Richard Wuestling of Roberts Perryman PC in St. Louis. Judge Breckenridge did not participate; the Court sat with six judges.
In the course of representing a husband and wife, St. Louis attorney John Kevin Sheehan prepared two revocable trusts, which named him as successor trustee if the husband and wife were unable or unwilling to serve. Sheehan also prepared a will for the couple’s son, who had no spouse or children. The will provided the husband or wife should serve as personal representative but, if they were unable or unwilling to do so, Sheehan should serve as successor personal representative. The son died in June 2011. Sheehan opened an estate and successfully petitioned the circuit court to appoint him as an independent personal representative. The husband died in October 2014, and the wife died in March 2015. Sheehan took on the duties of trustee of the couple’s two trusts. A year later, he applied to open the wife’s estate and was appointed the estate’s independent personal representative. Sheehan ultimately was removed as personal representative of the son’s estate after he failed to close it. Following extensive litigation to discover, recover and collect assets from the estate, he was ordered to pay more than $52,000. Sheehan also was sued over his handling of the couple’s trusts and the wife’s estate. After extensive litigation, he resigned as personal representative, was removed as trustee and was ordered to pay the trusts nearly $225,000 plus attorney fees. The chief disciplinary counsel’s office filed an information charging Sheehan with violating four rules of professional conduct – Rule 4-1.1 (competence), Rule 4-1.3 (diligence), Rule 4-1.15 (safekeeping of property), and Rule 4-8.4 (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation). The parties entered into a joint stipulation that Sheehan had violated only Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.3 and 4-1.15; the chief disciplinary counsel dismissed the Rule 4-8.4 allegation. The joint stipulation proposed that Sheehan be suspended indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years. The panel concluded Sheehan violated all four rules but recommended discipline as proposed. Sheehan rejected the panel’s decision. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to find Sheehan violated only Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.3 and 4-1.5 and to suspend his law license indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for two years.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Sheehan violated rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC98027_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC98027_Sheehan_brief