The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


SC98020
Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, et al. v. Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services, et al.
St. Louis
Constitutional validity of appropriations bill, challenge to costs taxed against the state
Listen to the oral argument: SC98020 MP3 file
The state was represented during arguments by Solicitor General D. John Sauer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Planned Parenthood was represented by Charles W. Hatfield of Stinson LLP in Jefferson City.

The legislature appropriated funds for fiscal 2019 to the department of social services through House Bill No. 2011. In the bill, section 11.800 prohibited the expenditure of funds to any abortion facility as defined in section 188.015, RSMo, or any such facility’s affiliate or associate. The department’s Medicaid audit and compliance unit denied the fiscal 2019 claims of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region and its associate and affiliate, Reproductive Health Services of St. Louis Region (collectively, Planned Parenthood) because Planned Parenthood falls within section 11.800; therefore, the department did not have appropriation authority to pay the claims. Planned Parenthood appealed to the administrative hearing commission, which ruled in the state’s favor. Planned Parenthood sought review in the circuit court. The circuit court entered judgment in Planned Parenthood’s favor on claims that portions of HB 2011 violated article III, section 23 and article IV, section 23 of the state constitution; entered judgment in the state’s favor on all other claims; and taxed costs against the state. The state appeals.



SC97913
Missouri Coalition for the Environment and Thomas J. Sager v. State of Missouri
Cole County
Constitutional validity of bill placing notice and hearing prerequisites on department of natural resources land purchases
Listen to the oral argument: SC97913 MP3 file
The coalition was represented during arguments by Henry B. Robertson of Great Rivers Environmental Law Center in St. Louis; the state was represented by Jason K. Lewis of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis.

The legislature amended section 34.030, RSMo, during its 2017 session. As introduced, Senate Bill No. 5 – its title “relating to land purchases made on behalf of the state” – imposed certain land purchasing requirements on state executive departments for which the commissioner of administration did the purchasing. During the legislative process, the bill underwent certain revisions, including adding the department of natural resources to the state agencies subject to its provisions. When truly agreed to and finally passed, the bill’s title related “to state purchases of land” and required the department of natural resources, when contracting to purchase land the department will own or manage, to publish notice in newspapers and hold public hearings in counties affected by the proposed land purchase. The governor signed the bill into law. The Missouri Coalition for the Environment and its member, Missouri resident and taxpayer Thomas Sager (collectively, the coalition), filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutional validity of section 34.030, as amended by SB 5. The circuit court granted summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) in the state’s favor. The coalition appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court regarding the bill’s validity under the state constitution, including whether the bill contained more than one subject or lacked a clear title in violation of article III, section 23; deviated from its original purpose in violation of article III, section 21; followed the drafting requirements of article III, section 28; or constitutes an invalid special law under article III, section 40(30).

The Missouri Press Association, which filed a brief as a friend of the Court, argues the bill’s original purpose was to promote transparency in government and to allow Missourians to be informed in advance before state agencies purchase land, this purpose did not change during the legislative process; therefore, the bill is valid under article III, section 21.

SC97913_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_brief
SC97913_State_brief
SC97913_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_reply_brief

SC97913_Missouri_Press_Association_amicus_brief

SC97878
Andrew Luke Lemasters v. State of Missouri
Newton County
Challenge to denial of postconviction relief
Listen to the oral argument: SC97878 MP3 file
Lemasters was represented during arguments by Tyler P. Coyle of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Garrick Aplin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Andrew Lemasters’ teenage daughter told her stepmother that her father had molested her. The state charged Lemasters with first-degree statutory sodomy. Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude any testimony from the stepmother that Lemasters had physically abused her and their sons. The circuit court sustained the motion. During the trial, the prosecutor asked the stepmother whether Lemasters had abused her and the sons. Defense counsel did not object and later cross-examined her about the abuse. The stepmother then testified in detail about the alleged abuse. Lemasters testified in his own defense, denying the molestation allegations. The jury found Lemasters guilty of one count of sodomy, but the circuit court entered judgment on two counts and sentenced him to a total of 31 years in prison. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the second sodomy count and remanded (sent back) the case with instructions the judgment be vacated with respect to the second sodomy count. This Court subsequently issued its mandate. The circuit court purportedly entered such a judgment while the appeal was pending. Lemasters subsequently sought postconviction relief, and appointed counsel filed an amended motion on his behalf. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied relief. Lemasters appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves the timeliness of Lemasters’ motion and whether the postconviction proceeding was premature. Related issues involve whether timeliness is measured from the date of this Court’s mandate, whether postconviction proceedings must wait until the circuit court entered the amended judgment in response to the mandate, and whether the circuit court could amend its judgment while the direct appeal was pending. Another question involves whether the circuit court failed to adjudicate all the claims in Lemaster’s amended motion. A further question involves whether trial counsel’s failure to object to the stepmother’s testimony about the alleged abuse of her and her sons constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

SC97878_Lemasters_brief
SC97878_State_brief
SC97878_Lemasters_reply_brief


SC97985
Samuel S. Knopik v. Shelby Investments LLC
Jackson County
Enforceability of no-contest clause in trust, ramifications of beneficiary suing trustee
Listen to the oral argument: SC97985 MP3 file
Knopik was represented during arguments by Michael W. Blanton of Gerash Steiner PC in Evergreen, Colorado; Shelby Investments was represented by Kevin D. Stanley of Humphrey, Farrington & McClain in Independence.

Shelby Investments LLC is the sole trustee of the Knopik irrevocable trust, for which Samuel Knopik is the sole beneficiary. The trust requires the trustee to distribute $100 each month to Knopik. Shelby made one payment to Knopik and indicated it did not intend to make any further distributions. Knopik then sued Shelby, alleging Shelby had breached its fiduciary duties under the trust and should be removed as trustee. Shelby filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging that, by suing Shelby, Knopik had triggered the trust’s no-contest clause, thereby forfeiting all interest in the trust. Both parties moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial). The circuit court entered summary judgment in Shelby’s favor. The court found, under Missouri law, it must enforce the no-contest clause, which it concluded Knopik’s claims triggered, and terminated all beneficiary provisions in his favor. Knopik appeals.

This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court erred in granting Shelby summary judgment. One related issue involves the extent to which a no-clause clause is enforceable in trust administration cases. Others include whether such a clause is triggered in actions for breach of trust or removal of a trustee; should be applied to prevent enforcement of a trust or eliminate a trustee’s core duties; and should be subject to good faith, probable cause, or exceptions and limitations. Another related issue involves whether Knopik has standing as a beneficiary or whether his lawsuit against Shelby canceled his beneficiary rights.

SC97985_Knopik_brief
SC97985_Shelby_Investments_brief
SC97985_Knopik_reply_brief

Supreme Court - Dockets