The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


SC97993
Vincent Hegger (Deceased), et al. v. Valley Farm Dairy Company, et al.
St. Louis
Availability of enhanced mesothelioma benefits under workers’ compensation law
Listen to the oral argument: SC97993 MP3 file
Hegger was represented during arguments by Thomas Stewart of O’Brien Law Firm PC in St. Louis; the dairy and insurance companies were represented by Michael Ward of Brown & James PC in St. Louis.

From 1968 until 1984, Vincent Hegger worked for Valley Farm Dairy Company, where his removal and replacement of gaskets and insulation exposed him to asbestos dust. The company changed its insurance provider from Amerisure Insurance Company to The Travelers Indemnity Company in October 1984 and ceased operations in 1998. Section 287.400.4(3), RSMo – providing enhanced mesothelioma benefits – took effect in January 2014. Hegger was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2014, filed a claim for enhanced mesothelioma benefits in March 2015 and died three months later. His son was substituted as claimant (collectively, Hegger). An administrative law judge entered an award in favor of Valley Farm and the insurers (collectively, Valley Farm). Hegger appealed to the labor and industrial relations commission, which denied compensation. It found Hegger’s employment at Valley Farm was the prevailing factor causing his mesothelioma, his last exposure to asbestos was at Valley Farm in 1984, and Valley Farm was the employer liable for compensation under section 287.063.2, RSMo. Nevertheless, the commission determined Valley Farm – which ceased to exist before section 287.200.4(3) was enacted – could not have elected to accept liability for the enhanced mesothelioma benefits the statute provides. Hegger appeals.

This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether section 287.200.4(3) can be applied retrospectively and, if so, whether it can or should be construed strictly to deem Valley Farm to have elected to accept liability for the enhanced mesothelioma benefits the statute provides. A related issue involves how the company could have elected to accept liability or procured insurance coverage to satisfy the election requirement when it ceased to exist 16 years before the statute took effect. Another question involves what notice of election, if any, a liable employer of last exposure such as Valley Farm is required to provide the division of workers’ compensation to accept liability for the benefits enumerated in section 287.200.4(3).

The American Property Casualty Insurance Association and the Missouri Insurance Coalition argue, as friends of the Court, that the enhanced mesothelioma benefits provided by section 287.200.4(3) are not available when an employer does not take requisite steps to elect those benefits and that the state constitution prohibits the retrospective application of a statute to change preexisting contractual relationships.

SC97993_Hegger_brief

SC97993_insurance_association_and_coalition_amici_brief


SC98010
Denise Kappel, et al. v. Fredric Prater
St. Louis
Admission of photographs in trial following motor vehicle collision
Listen to the oral argument: SC98010 MP3 file
The Kappels were represented during arguments by Joan Lockwood of Gray, Ritter & Graham PC in St. Louis; Prater was represented by Susan M. Herold of Rynearson, Suess, Schnurbusch & Champion LLC in St. Louis.

Denise Kappel alleges she was injured when the rental vehicle she was driving was hit by a vehicle driven by Fredrick Prater. When she returned her rental vehicle, the rental company’s representative advised her the company already was aware of the collision and no paperwork was necessary. She alleges she had no opportunity to photograph the rental vehicle. Kappel ultimately sued Prater. During discovery, she requested all photographs of either vehicle. Prater initially responded he had no photographs of Kappel’s rental vehicle, but two years later, he advised he photocopied photographs of the vehicle Kappel had been driving. Before trial, Kappel moved to exclude all photographs from evidence, arguing the photographs were of poor quality, incomplete and misleading and their late disclosure prejudiced her ability to prepare her case. The circuit court overruled her motion and admitted photographs of both vehicles during trial. During the jury trial, Prater argued the photographs were reflective of a “minimal” collision. Kappel’s doctors testified about medical treatment they had provided her, with bills totaling nearly $105,850. The jury returned its verdict in Kappel’s favor, awarding her $20,000 in damages. Kappel appeals.

This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs of Kappel’s rental vehicle. Related issues include whether the photographs were relevant and admissible and, if not, whether admitting the photographs caused prejudice or confusion, otherwise misled the jury, or affected the trial’s outcome.

SC98010_Kappels_brief_filed_in_ED
SC98010_Prater_brief


SC98012
Dwight Laughlin v. Dewayne Perry and Ellen Flottman
Newton County
Public defenders’ challenge to verdict against them in legal malpractice case
Listen to the oral argument: SC98012 MP3 file
The public defenders were represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor General Zachary M. Bluestone of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Laughlin was represented by William Fleischaker of Fleischaker & Williams in Joplin.

Dwight Laughlin was arrested for burglarizing a federal post office in Neosho, causing property damage. The federal prosecutor’s office advised the state prosecutor it would not bring federal charges against Laughlin. The state prosecutor charged Laughlin with burglary and first-degree property damage. Dewayne Perry was one of the public defenders who represented Laughlin in his criminal trial. Although Laughlin told his attorneys the state did not have the right to prosecute him for anything, they did not challenge the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the case because they believed the state and federal courts had concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Laughlin was convicted, and the circuit court sentenced him, as a prior and persistent offender, to 40 years in prison. Laughlin sought postconviction relief. The public defender who represented him argued that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to try Laughlin’s criminal case because the offense was federal, preempting state court jurisdiction, and that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue his case should be tried in federal court, where he would have been subjected to a possible three-year sentence, rather than state court, where he received a 40-year sentence. The circuit court denied postconviction relief. Public defender Ellen Flottman represented Laughlin in the consolidated appeals from his criminal and postconviction cases. She also concluded there had been concurrent state and federal jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin and did not raise this point on appeal. Some years later, Laughlin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, which granted habeas relief and ordered him released on the ground the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute his crimes. Laughlin subsequently sued his public defenders for legal malpractice. The jury returned a verdict against only Perry and Flottman, who moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court overruled their motion and entered judgment accordingly. Perry and Flottman appeal.

This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One is whether Perry and Flottman have official immunity from legal malpractice actions against them as public employees acting within the scope of their authority as public defenders representing Laughlin in criminal proceedings. Related issues include whether official immunity applies only to public officials or to all public employees, including professional employees such as lawyers; whether it applies to discretionary acts regardless of whether those acts are governmental in nature; and whether granting immunity to public defenders would leave wrongfully incarcerated individuals without a remedy or would create a system protecting only public defenders but not private counsel or contract attorneys engaged by the public defender system. The other question involves whether Laughlin made a submissible case for legal malpractice. Related issues include whether he presented evidence to show Perry and Flottman were negligent solely because this Court eventually found his criminal conviction was defective on jurisdictional grounds.



SC97779
In re: Rebecca J. Grosser
St. Louis County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97779 MP3 file
Alan Pratzel, the chief disciplinary counsel, represented his office of Jefferson City during arguments; Grosser was represented by Michael Downey of Downey Law Group LLC in St. Louis. Judge Laura J. Johnson, presiding judge of the 38th Judicial Circuit (Christian County), sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge Patricia Breckenridge.

St. Louis County solo practitioner Rebecca Grosser entered into a diversion agreement with the chief disciplinary counsel’s office after she was retained by clients for estate planning work but failed to return their calls or complete their estate planning documents. The agreement required her to comply with certain conditions of diversion, including random audits of her trust account. Grosser failed to maintain communication with her designated diversion monitor and failed to provide financial records upon request by an investigator for the chief disciplinary counsel’s office. Using subpoenaed bank records, the investigator concluded Grosser failed to move earned fees out of her trust account promptly. The chief disciplinary counsel’s office began disciplinary proceedings against Grosser. She responded, asking that her mental health conditions be considered in determining any appropriate discipline against her, but she failed to provide any medical evidence, disclose her mental health history, submit to an independent mental health examination or give the chief disciplinary counsel consent to contact her mental health providers. Following a hearing, at which Grosser was allowed to testify about her mental health, the disciplinary hearing panel found Grosser had violated Rule 4-1.15(a) by not taking her earned fees promptly from her client trust account and Rule 4-8.4(c) by failing to comply with her conditions of diversion. The panel recommended a reprimand. The chief disciplinary counsel asks this Court to reprimand Grosser’s law license and suggests certain conditions of probation; Grosser argues no more than a reprimand is warranted.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Grosser violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

Supreme Court - Dockets