Case Summaries for January 14, 2020


The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, January 14, 2020
 

 
SC97833
Rebecca Karney and Johnny Miller v. The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations and Todd Smith, Darryl Forte and Jackson County, Missouri
Jackson County

Constitutional challenge to statute restricting picketing by public employees
Listen to the oral argument: SC97833 MP3 file
The department was represented during arguments by Alyssa Mayer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the dispatchers were represented by Joshua Sanders of Boyd, Kenter, Thomas & Parrish LLC in Independence.

In 2018, the legislature enacted a public-sector union reform bill, which amended section 105.585(2), RSMo, to providing, in pertinent part, that every labor agreement shall “expressly prohibit all strikes and picketing of any kind” and “include a provision acknowledging that any public employee who engages in any strike or concerted refusal to work, or who pickets over any personnel matter, shall be subject to immediate termination of employment.” Rebecca Karney and Johnny Miller are 911 dispatchers for the Jackson County sheriff’s office; members of a local Communication Workers of America Union covered by a labor agreement with the county, from November 205 through December 2018, that allowed picketing; and members of the bargaining committee to negotiate a new agreement that would provide higher wages for 911 dispatchers. Karney and Miller sued the state’s department of labor and industrial relations, the Jackson County sheriff and the chair of the state board of mediation (collectively, the state), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that section 105.585(2) violates their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and to organize and bargain collectively. The circuit court entered a preliminary injunction and, following a trial, issued its judgment holding the statute violates the state and federal constitutions. The state appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving the construction and constitutional validity of section 105.585(2), RSMo. One involves whether the statutory language “picketing of any kind” should be construed to require public employee labor agreements to ban picketing completely or to ban only picketing in conjunction with a labor strike and picketing about disputes over personnel matters or other employment conditions governed by a labor agreement. Another question involves whether the picketing referenced in the statute constitutes protectable speech; whether there is a compelling state interest in avoiding disruption associated with labor picketing; and whether any content-based restrictions in the statute are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Further questions involve whether the statute constitutes an impermissible blanket prohibition against speech by public employees or violates any public employees’ collective bargaining right to picket about disputes over employment conditions governed by a labor agreement.

The Missouri National Education Association, which filed a brief as a friend of the Court, argues section 105.585(2) is clear on its face, exempts members of public safety labor organizations from its provisions, and unconstitutionally restricts the state constitutional rights of public employees who are members of other unions.

SC97833_Department_brief



SC97940
Joan L. Robinson v. John F. Langenbach, Judy Landfri f/k/a Judy Longbrook and Perma-Jack Company
St. Louis County

Proper resolution of litigation involving closely held company’s directors after two terminated the third as the company’s president
Listen to the oral argument: SC97940 MP3 file
The siblings were represented during arguments by Paul Puricelli of Stone, Leyton & Gershman PC in St. Louis; Robinson was represented by John Beseau of Foley & Mansfield LLP in St. Louis.

Perma-Jack Company is a closely held company owned equally by Joan Robinson and her two siblings. When their father, who founded the company, retired in 1985, he gifted his stock equally to the three siblings and appointed Robinson president. The siblings constitute the company’s board of directors, with company duties divided among Robinson, her two children and her brother; her sister never worked for or drew any salary from the company. By 2007, the company had lost nearly half its franchises. Robinson blamed her brother for the decline in business; her siblings claimed she worked only eight hours a week and did nothing to fix performance problems or recruit new franchisees and, in 2010, asked Robinson to resign. She refused to do so. Two years later, Robinson’s siblings terminated her employment, and she sued them. Following extensive litigation, Robinson proceeded to trial with claims of equitable relief based on shareholder oppression; breach of fiduciary duty to her individually, arising out of her termination; and a derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty. As to the fiduciary duty claims, the circuit court directed its verdict in favor of Robinson’s siblings on the derivative claim, and the jury returned its verdict in her favor on her individual claim, awarding her $390,000 in damages. As to the shareholder oppression claim, the circuit court entered its judgment in Robinson’s favor, ordering her siblings to buy her stock in the company for $59,000. The siblings appeal, and Robinson cross-appeals.

The siblings’ appeal

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Robinson’s shareholder status provided her any right, fiduciary or otherwise, to continued employment or whether her removal violated the fiduciary duties her siblings, as majority shareholders, owed to her as a minority shareholder. Related issues involve whether Robinson alleged or demonstrated damage to her shareholding interest; what effect, if any, her at-will employment had on her fiduciary claims as a shareholder; whether Missouri law resolves this issue; and, if not, whether this Court should adopt the minority view that shareholders have no fiduciary right to employment or the majority view that shareholders have no fiduciary right to employment absent a protectable investment. Another question involves whether evidence of her brother’s and other Perma-Jack employees’ salaries after Robinson was terminated was relevant to show the brother’s motive in removing Robinson or otherwise admissible. An additional question involves whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment in Robinson’s favor on her shareholder oppression claim. Related issues include the extent to which Robinson was required to plead and prove equitable relief was necessary in her case and whether the evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that the termination of her employment constituted shareholder oppression.

Robinson’s appeal

This cross-appeal also presents several questions for the Court. One involves whether the circuit court improperly applied marketability and minority discounts, instead of fair market value, to the purchase price for Robinson’s stock. Related issues include whether the discounts rewarded dominant shareholders at the minority shareholder’s expense, whether the evidence supported the discounts, and the effect, if any, of the fact Robinson opted for a buyout remedy. Other questions involve whether the circuit court abused its discretion in selecting the 2012 date on which Robinson was terminated as the valuation date for the purchase price of her stock; in not awarding her prejudgment interest on the purchase price of her stock between the valuation date and the judgment date; in denying Robinson equitable relief after Perma-Jack indemnified the siblings’ costs in defending against her lawsuit; and in denying her request for attorney fees. Related issues include the impact, if any, of Robinson’s request at trial for a buyout and whether Robinson sought relief from the company’s indemnification of her siblings’ defense costs.

SC97940_Langenbach_et_al._first_brief

SC97940_Robinson_first_brief
SC97940_Langenbach_et_al._second_brief
SC97940_Robinson_second_brief


SC97983
Michael Holmes .v Sarah Steelman and Eric Schmitt
St. Louis

Legal responsibility for payment of judgment against former St. Louis police officers
Listen to the oral argument: SC97983 MP3 file
The state was represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor General Zachary Bluestone of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Holmes was represented by David Owens of Loevy & Loevy in Chicago; and the city was represented by Deputy City Counselor Nancy Kistler of the city counselor’s office in St. Louis.

Two St. Louis metropolitan police department officers arrested Michael Holmes in December 2003 for possession of cocaine base at his grandmother’s home. Based in part on their testimony, Holmes was convicted on two counts of federal drug crimes and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. A subsequent department investigation into the two officers uncovered misconduct, including fabricating evidence in certain cases. A federal court sustained Holmes’ motion to vacate his sentence, finding the officers’ testimony had been discredited; ultimately, prosecutors opted not to retry his case, and the indictment against Holmes was dismissed. In December 2012, Holmes filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the two officers and various city officials, alleging they wrongfully arrested and prosecuted him. The federal district court dismissed the claims against the city officials but allowed the claims against the former police officers to proceed. Following a trial, the jury returned its verdict in Holmes’ favor, awarding him $2.5 million in damages. In March 2016, Holmes sought payment of his award through the state’s legal expense fund. The state rejected his request on the ground the statute governing the fund precluded such payment. Holmes then brought a declaratory judgment action to resolve whether the state or the city is responsible for paying his judgment against the former police officers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial). Ultimately, the circuit court granted Holmes summary judgment against the state, finding the state was responsible for reimbursing his claims through the state’s legal expense fund because Holmes’ claims against the former officers arose before September 2013, when control over the metropolitan police department transferred from the state to local control. The state appeals.

This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether state legal expense fund coverage is triggered by the conduct underlying a claim or at the time the claim for coverage is made. Related issues include whether a 2005 amendment to the fund statute can be applied retrospectively to a liability claim against police officers that arose before it became effective; whether the version of the statute applying to Holmes’ claim excludes coverage for “any police officer;” and whether the state is precluded from denying liability after representing to the federal court the judgment would be paid.

SC97983_State_brief
SC97983_State_reply_brief


SC97959
State ex rel. Keanna Miller v. The Honorable Scott Millikan
St. Louis

Discovery dispute over former claims adjuster’s performance reviews in insurance case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97959 MP3 file
Miller was represented during arguments by Spencer Farris of The S.E. Farris Law Firm in St. Louis; Esurance was represented by Michael Cerulo of Baty Otto Coronado PC in St. Louis.

Keanna Miller filed a claim against Esurance Insurance Company for the total loss of her vehicle, which had been stolen and was burned before it was recovered. When Esurance denied her claim, Miller sued for damages, including a count for vexatious refusal to pay insurance proceeds. During discovery, Miller served an interrogatory asking for the name and address of any person taking her statement. Esurance identified certain documents with the name of its claims adjuster but did not answer more specifically. Later in discovery, Esurance explained it had terminated the adjuster’s employment for performance-related issues. Miller then sought the adjuster’s performance reviews and portions of his personnel file. Discovery disputes continued, and, ultimately, the circuit court barred any questions as to the claims adjuster’s performance reviews. Miller seeks to make permanent this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to vacate its order barring Miller’s inquiry into the claims adjuster’s performance reviews.

This case presents one issue for this Court – whether the circuit court abused its discretion by violating Rule 56.01 when it prohibited Miller’s discovery of the claims adjuster’s performance reviews. A related issue is the extent to which the performance reviews are relevant to Esurance’s denial of Miller’s claim for coverage.

SC97959_Miller_brief
SC97959_Esurance_brief


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