The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Tuesday, February 25, 2020
SC98043
Jeanne H. Olofson v. Scott W. Olofson, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Tom W. Olofson
Jackson County
Effect of spouse’s death on an action to set aside a dissolution for fraud
Listen to the oral argument: SC98043 MP3 file
The wife was represented during arguments by Jonathan Sternberg of Jonathan Sternberg, Attorney, PC in Kansas City; the state was represented by William Odle of McDowell, Rice, Smith & Buchanan PC in Kansas City.
Judge Robert G. Dowd Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge Patricia Breckenridge.
Tom Olofson was chairman and chief executive officer of a publicly traded company in which he and his wife, Jeanne Olofson, owned shares of stock that constituted their largest asset when they divorced. The circuit court accepted the spouses’ joint property settlement agreement, which allocated their stock and valued it at $13.50 per share. As part of the settlement, the spouses stipulated they had made a full disclosure about the nature and extent of their property, income, assets, liabilities and financial conditions. About six months after the dissolution was final, the husband sold the company at $16.50 per share to a buyer who took it private, allegedly triggering the husband’s receipt of $16 million in benefits. The wife subsequently moved under Rule 74.06(b)(2) to set aside the division of the marital estate on the basis of fraud, alleging the husband deliberately misrepresented and failed to disclose facts regarding the company, including that a buyer had made a compelling offer to purchase Epiq for more per share than the stock’s current trading price. The husband died shortly after responding to the wife’s motion, and his estate was substituted in his place. Following extended litigation and discovery, the circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings (without a trial) in favor of the estate and dismissed the wife’s Rule 74.06(b)(2) motion with prejudice, holding the husband’s death had mooted or abated it. The wife appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the husband’s death mooted or abated the wife’s Rule 74.06(b)(2) action. Related issues include whether the doctrine of abatement by death applies; whether the spouses’ property rights remain at issue; whether the rule permits the division of the marital estate to be set aside when the deceased spouse is alleged to have defrauded the other; whether the rule permits effectual relief in the form of monetary damages; whether the wife abandoned her fraud claim, precluding her from attacking the dissolution judgment; and whether the wife’s motion under the rule was timely.
SC98043_Wife_brief
Jeanne H. Olofson v. Scott W. Olofson, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Tom W. Olofson
Jackson County
Effect of spouse’s death on an action to set aside a dissolution for fraud
Listen to the oral argument: SC98043 MP3 file
The wife was represented during arguments by Jonathan Sternberg of Jonathan Sternberg, Attorney, PC in Kansas City; the state was represented by William Odle of McDowell, Rice, Smith & Buchanan PC in Kansas City.
Judge Robert G. Dowd Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge Patricia Breckenridge.
Tom Olofson was chairman and chief executive officer of a publicly traded company in which he and his wife, Jeanne Olofson, owned shares of stock that constituted their largest asset when they divorced. The circuit court accepted the spouses’ joint property settlement agreement, which allocated their stock and valued it at $13.50 per share. As part of the settlement, the spouses stipulated they had made a full disclosure about the nature and extent of their property, income, assets, liabilities and financial conditions. About six months after the dissolution was final, the husband sold the company at $16.50 per share to a buyer who took it private, allegedly triggering the husband’s receipt of $16 million in benefits. The wife subsequently moved under Rule 74.06(b)(2) to set aside the division of the marital estate on the basis of fraud, alleging the husband deliberately misrepresented and failed to disclose facts regarding the company, including that a buyer had made a compelling offer to purchase Epiq for more per share than the stock’s current trading price. The husband died shortly after responding to the wife’s motion, and his estate was substituted in his place. Following extended litigation and discovery, the circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings (without a trial) in favor of the estate and dismissed the wife’s Rule 74.06(b)(2) motion with prejudice, holding the husband’s death had mooted or abated it. The wife appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the husband’s death mooted or abated the wife’s Rule 74.06(b)(2) action. Related issues include whether the doctrine of abatement by death applies; whether the spouses’ property rights remain at issue; whether the rule permits the division of the marital estate to be set aside when the deceased spouse is alleged to have defrauded the other; whether the rule permits effectual relief in the form of monetary damages; whether the wife abandoned her fraud claim, precluding her from attacking the dissolution judgment; and whether the wife’s motion under the rule was timely.
SC98043_Wife_brief
SC98043_Estate_brief
SC98088
State of Missouri v. Kane Carpenter
Cole County
Challenge to eyewitness identification used at trial
Listen to the oral argument: SC98088 MP3 file
Carpenter was represented during arguments by Rosemary Percival of the public defender’s office in Kansas City; the state was represented by Karen Kramer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Kane Carpenter with one count of first-degree robbery. During the jury trial, a witness identified Carpenter as the man who stole his iPhone. The witness testified Carpenter told him he had a weapon and appeared to have a .38-caliber pistol in his waistband. The witness testified he chased Carpenter and another man for a short distance before stopping to call 911. The responding officer stopped two men walking in the area shortly thereafter and found the witness’s cell phone and earbuds nearby. The witness was driven to where Carpenter and the other man were being detained, and he identified Carpenter. Defense counsel cross-examined the witness and sought to introduce testimony from an eyewitness identification expert. The circuit court disallowed the expert’s testimony but instructed the jury that presence at a crime scene alone is insufficient to hold a defendant responsible for an offense and gave the jury factors to consider in evaluating the eyewitness identification testimony. The jury found Carpenter guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Carpenter appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court abused its discretion and violated Carpenter’s constitutional rights in excluding the expert’s testimony. Related issues include whether the expert’s testimony was critical to Carpenter’s defense of mistaken identity as well as whether the testimony was admissible because it would have assisted the jury, was not within the jury’s common experience and was relevant to issues at trial.
The Innocence Project Inc. and the Midwest Innocence Project, which filed a brief as friends of the Court, urge this Court to reconsider its prior precedent and allow expert testimony to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. They argue the scientific and legal consensus favors permitting expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications; such evidence does not invade the jury’s province; and preventive measures discussed in this Court’s prior decisions fail to protect against mistaken eyewitness identification testimony.
SC98088_Carpenter_brief
SC98088
State of Missouri v. Kane Carpenter
Cole County
Challenge to eyewitness identification used at trial
Listen to the oral argument: SC98088 MP3 file
Carpenter was represented during arguments by Rosemary Percival of the public defender’s office in Kansas City; the state was represented by Karen Kramer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Kane Carpenter with one count of first-degree robbery. During the jury trial, a witness identified Carpenter as the man who stole his iPhone. The witness testified Carpenter told him he had a weapon and appeared to have a .38-caliber pistol in his waistband. The witness testified he chased Carpenter and another man for a short distance before stopping to call 911. The responding officer stopped two men walking in the area shortly thereafter and found the witness’s cell phone and earbuds nearby. The witness was driven to where Carpenter and the other man were being detained, and he identified Carpenter. Defense counsel cross-examined the witness and sought to introduce testimony from an eyewitness identification expert. The circuit court disallowed the expert’s testimony but instructed the jury that presence at a crime scene alone is insufficient to hold a defendant responsible for an offense and gave the jury factors to consider in evaluating the eyewitness identification testimony. The jury found Carpenter guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Carpenter appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court abused its discretion and violated Carpenter’s constitutional rights in excluding the expert’s testimony. Related issues include whether the expert’s testimony was critical to Carpenter’s defense of mistaken identity as well as whether the testimony was admissible because it would have assisted the jury, was not within the jury’s common experience and was relevant to issues at trial.
The Innocence Project Inc. and the Midwest Innocence Project, which filed a brief as friends of the Court, urge this Court to reconsider its prior precedent and allow expert testimony to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. They argue the scientific and legal consensus favors permitting expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications; such evidence does not invade the jury’s province; and preventive measures discussed in this Court’s prior decisions fail to protect against mistaken eyewitness identification testimony.
SC98088_Carpenter_brief
SC98088_Carpenter_reply_brief
SC98088_Innocence_Projects_amici_brief
SC98007
Dreyer Electric Co. LLC v. Director of Revenue
Perry County
Applicability of manufacturing exemption from sales tax for certain electrical parts
Listen to the oral argument: SC98007 MP3 file
The director was represented during arguments by Julia Rives of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Dreyer was represented by Leah Robinson of Mayer Brown LLP in New York city.
A timber company hired Dreyer Electric Company LLC to replace the electrical system in one of its sawmill buildings in Marble Hill following a fire. Ultimately, Dreyer sought a refund of nearly $6,400 in sales taxes it collected from the timber company for the sale of certain disputed items. These items included system components used to help prevent service disruptions for other customers, to stop electricity from flowing to motors in the event of a malfunction, and to stop equipment automatically if it overheats. Other disputed items included parts used to heat and illuminate the building as well as electrical outlets to provide temporary power for items other than the timber company’s manufacturing machines. The director of revenue denied the refund claim, and Dreyer appealed to the administrative hearing commission. The commission found the disputed items constituted replacement equipment used directly in the manufacturing process; therefore, Dreyer was entitled to the sales tax refund. The director seeks review.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the disputed items were exempt from sales tax under the manufacturing exemption of section 144.030.2(5). Related issues include the extent to which this Court must defer to the commission’s findings of fact, whether the disputed items are used – directly or indirectly – in manufacturing, how broadly the manufacturing exemption should be construed, the extent to which the “integrated-plant doctrine” explains what qualifies for the manufacturing exemption, and whether the legislature’s abrogation of this Court’s 2016 decision in IBM Corporation v. Director of Revenue applies retroactively.
SC98007_Director_brief
SC98088_Innocence_Projects_amici_brief
SC98007
Dreyer Electric Co. LLC v. Director of Revenue
Perry County
Applicability of manufacturing exemption from sales tax for certain electrical parts
Listen to the oral argument: SC98007 MP3 file
The director was represented during arguments by Julia Rives of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Dreyer was represented by Leah Robinson of Mayer Brown LLP in New York city.
A timber company hired Dreyer Electric Company LLC to replace the electrical system in one of its sawmill buildings in Marble Hill following a fire. Ultimately, Dreyer sought a refund of nearly $6,400 in sales taxes it collected from the timber company for the sale of certain disputed items. These items included system components used to help prevent service disruptions for other customers, to stop electricity from flowing to motors in the event of a malfunction, and to stop equipment automatically if it overheats. Other disputed items included parts used to heat and illuminate the building as well as electrical outlets to provide temporary power for items other than the timber company’s manufacturing machines. The director of revenue denied the refund claim, and Dreyer appealed to the administrative hearing commission. The commission found the disputed items constituted replacement equipment used directly in the manufacturing process; therefore, Dreyer was entitled to the sales tax refund. The director seeks review.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the disputed items were exempt from sales tax under the manufacturing exemption of section 144.030.2(5). Related issues include the extent to which this Court must defer to the commission’s findings of fact, whether the disputed items are used – directly or indirectly – in manufacturing, how broadly the manufacturing exemption should be construed, the extent to which the “integrated-plant doctrine” explains what qualifies for the manufacturing exemption, and whether the legislature’s abrogation of this Court’s 2016 decision in IBM Corporation v. Director of Revenue applies retroactively.
SC98007_Director_brief
SC98007_Director_reply_brief
SC97991
State ex rel. LG Chem Ltd. v. The Honorable Nancy Watkins McLaughlin
St. Louis County
Challenge to jurisdiction over foreign company in personal injury case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97991 MP3 file
LG Chem was represented during arguments by Rachel Hedley of Nelson Mullins in Columbia, South Carolina; Bishop was represented by John M. Simon of The Simon Law Firm PC in St. Louis.
Multinational company LG Chem Limited, headquartered in South Korea, designs, manufactures and distributes lithium-ion batteries. Missouri resident Peter Bishop purchased a lithium-ion battery from a Missouri retailer. The battery exploded while in his pocket, and he sustained burn injuries. Bishop filed a personal injury lawsuit against the retailer and another manufacturer, later adding LG Chem as a defendant. LG Chem moved to dismiss Bishop’s claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court overruled the motion. LG Chem seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than dismissing the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.
This case presents several questions for this Court about whether LG is subject to the circuit court’s jurisdiction. One involves whether LG Chem came within Missouri’s long-arm statute by transacting business or committing a tortious act in Missouri. Another involves whether LG Chem has sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process, including whether its actions in placing its product into the stream of commerce or whether unilateral actions of third parties brought the product into Missouri. Other questions include whether LG Chem waived its personal jurisdiction defense by taking actions inconsistent with its assertion that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction and whether there are sufficient facts in the record to determine jurisdiction or whether Bishop is entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
SC97991_LG_Chem_brief
SC97991_Bishop_brief
SC97991
State ex rel. LG Chem Ltd. v. The Honorable Nancy Watkins McLaughlin
St. Louis County
Challenge to jurisdiction over foreign company in personal injury case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97991 MP3 file
LG Chem was represented during arguments by Rachel Hedley of Nelson Mullins in Columbia, South Carolina; Bishop was represented by John M. Simon of The Simon Law Firm PC in St. Louis.
Multinational company LG Chem Limited, headquartered in South Korea, designs, manufactures and distributes lithium-ion batteries. Missouri resident Peter Bishop purchased a lithium-ion battery from a Missouri retailer. The battery exploded while in his pocket, and he sustained burn injuries. Bishop filed a personal injury lawsuit against the retailer and another manufacturer, later adding LG Chem as a defendant. LG Chem moved to dismiss Bishop’s claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court overruled the motion. LG Chem seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than dismissing the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.
This case presents several questions for this Court about whether LG is subject to the circuit court’s jurisdiction. One involves whether LG Chem came within Missouri’s long-arm statute by transacting business or committing a tortious act in Missouri. Another involves whether LG Chem has sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process, including whether its actions in placing its product into the stream of commerce or whether unilateral actions of third parties brought the product into Missouri. Other questions include whether LG Chem waived its personal jurisdiction defense by taking actions inconsistent with its assertion that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction and whether there are sufficient facts in the record to determine jurisdiction or whether Bishop is entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
SC97991_LG_Chem_brief
SC97991_Bishop_brief