The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Wednesday, March 4, 2020
SC98268
State of Missouri v. David M. Barnett
St. Louis County
Constitutional challenge to imposition of life without parole sentence on an offender who was 19 years old at the time of the crime
Listen to the oral argument: SC98268 MP3 file
Barnett was represented during arguments by Rosemary Percival of the public defender’s office in Kansas City; the state was represented by Evan Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state indicted David Barnett on two counts of first-degree murder, armed criminal action and first-degree robbery for entering the home of his adoptive grandparents and stabbing them to death. The crimes occurred when he was 19 years old. Following a trial, a jury found Barnett guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to death. A federal court later determined Barnett had been denied effective assistance of counsel during his penalty phase trial. On retrial of the penalty phase, the state waived the death penalty. Barnett asked the circuit court to impose a sentence of less than life in prison without parole, arguing the United States Supreme Court’s rationale in Miller v. Alabama, requiring individualized sentencing procedures for juvenile offenders, also should apply to a 19-year-old offender such as him. The circuit court sentenced Barnett to life in prison without eligibility for probation or parole, finding that was the only available punishment under section 565.020, RSMo. Barnett appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether section 565.020 is unconstitutional as applied to Barnett by mandating he be sentenced to two counts of life without parole for offenses he committed as a 19-year-old. Related issues include whether the scientific evidence justifying banning mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders, whom the United States Supreme Court has defined as those younger than 18 years old, should apply equally to offenders who commit first-degree murder at age 19; whether immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences are hallmarks that apply to all teenagers, not just those younger than 18; whether the rationale of Miller should be expanded to offenders 18 or older; and whether imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole on an offender who was 19 at the time of the crime creates a risk of disproportionate sentencing.
SC98268_Barnett_brief_filed_in_ED
State of Missouri v. David M. Barnett
St. Louis County
Constitutional challenge to imposition of life without parole sentence on an offender who was 19 years old at the time of the crime
Listen to the oral argument: SC98268 MP3 file
Barnett was represented during arguments by Rosemary Percival of the public defender’s office in Kansas City; the state was represented by Evan Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state indicted David Barnett on two counts of first-degree murder, armed criminal action and first-degree robbery for entering the home of his adoptive grandparents and stabbing them to death. The crimes occurred when he was 19 years old. Following a trial, a jury found Barnett guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to death. A federal court later determined Barnett had been denied effective assistance of counsel during his penalty phase trial. On retrial of the penalty phase, the state waived the death penalty. Barnett asked the circuit court to impose a sentence of less than life in prison without parole, arguing the United States Supreme Court’s rationale in Miller v. Alabama, requiring individualized sentencing procedures for juvenile offenders, also should apply to a 19-year-old offender such as him. The circuit court sentenced Barnett to life in prison without eligibility for probation or parole, finding that was the only available punishment under section 565.020, RSMo. Barnett appeals.
This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether section 565.020 is unconstitutional as applied to Barnett by mandating he be sentenced to two counts of life without parole for offenses he committed as a 19-year-old. Related issues include whether the scientific evidence justifying banning mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders, whom the United States Supreme Court has defined as those younger than 18 years old, should apply equally to offenders who commit first-degree murder at age 19; whether immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences are hallmarks that apply to all teenagers, not just those younger than 18; whether the rationale of Miller should be expanded to offenders 18 or older; and whether imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole on an offender who was 19 at the time of the crime creates a risk of disproportionate sentencing.
SC98268_Barnett_brief_filed_in_ED
SC98235
In re: Henry V. Griffin
Taney County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC98235 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Griffin was represented by Joseph Allen, an attorney in Branson.
Hollister attorney Henry Griffin acted as an escrow agent for a transaction in which Erie Shore LLC was selling Vintro Group of Companies LLC a hotel and water park in Sandusky, Ohio. Griffin previously had represented Vintro and its principal member. Griffin sent Erie Shore’s attorney a letter advising Vintro had paid $200,000 in earnest money into escrow and, at the attorney’s request, confirmed the letter was authentic. In his correspondence, Griffin copied “Client,” whom he later told Shore’s attorney was either Vintro, its principal or both. Three months later, Erie Shore’s counsel advised Griffin that Vintro was in breach and demanded payment of the earnest money deposit to Erie Shore or place the monies in a court account. Griffin did not respond, and Erie Shore’s attorney filed a complaint against Griffin. After an investigation, the chief disciplinary counsel instituted disciplinary proceedings. Griffin admitted that he was the transaction’s escrow agent and that he never deposited Ventro’s earnest money into escrow, instead returning the check to Ventro at Ventro’s request. He also admitted he drafted and signed the verification of deposit, told Erie Shore’s attorney the verification letter was authentic, and did not respond to the attorney’s further communications. Following a hearing, the disciplinary hearing panel found Griffin had violated several rules of professional conduct and recommended his license be placed on probation for one year. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation, noting he previously has been admonished several times and suspended once for not paying taxes. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to suspend Griffin’s license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least two years. Griffin accepts the panel’s recommendations and asks this Court to impose no more than probation.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Spiegel violated rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC98235_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief