Case Summaries for April 22, 2020


The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Wednesday morning, April 22, 2020
 

 
March 31, 2020, update: Due to concerns regarding the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), oral arguments scheduled for April 2020 will be conducted remotely, unless the parties request their case be submitted on briefs.

Scheduled to begin at 9 a.m. – SC98252
Thomas Hootselle Jr., et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Missouri Corrections Officers Association v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Cole County

Challenges to judgment awarding overtime pay for state corrections officers
Listen to the oral argument: SC98252 MP3 file
The department was represented during arguments by Solicitor General D. John Sauer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the corrections officers were represented by Gary Burger of Burger Law LLC in St. Louis.

Thomas Hootselle and other corrections officers sued the state’s department of corrections, on behalf of a proposed class of more than 13,000 corrections officers, for allegedly failing to pay them under the federal fair labor standards act (FLSA) for certain pre- and post-shift activities. Labor agreements the department executed with the state corrections officers’ association and the department’s procedure manual generally state the department will comply with the FLSA and section 105.935, RSMo, regarding the accrual of time and payment of overtime. The labor agreements and procedure manual do not specifically address pre- and post-shift activities. The corrections officers’ shifts typically last eight hours, although they frequently engage in additional pre- and post-shift activities, including passing through security features when entering and leaving, logging their arrival at and departure from the prison, reporting to a central post and supervisor to receive daily assignments, picking up and returning equipment such as keys and radios, walking to their duty posts and, for certain officers, inventorying weapons, ammunition and equipment, and passing pertinent information from one shift to another. All officers also are expected to remain alert and respond in emergencies such as inmate fights or assaults on staff during shift changes. Although the department typically does not pay corrections officers for pre- or post-shift activities, officers are entitled to overtime pay for the time spent responding to emergency incidents.

Ultimately the circuit court certified the class. During discovery, the department sought to use two witnesses as experts to rebut testimony regarding damages. The officers objected, arguing the department had not disclosed its proposed experts in a timely manner. The circuit court sustained the objection and excluded the witnesses from testifying at trial. After discovery, the circuit court overruled the department’s motion to decertify the class. The corrections officers then sought summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) as to issues of liability. The department opposed the motion, arguing the pre- and post-shift activities are not compensable under federal law and the officers had no avenue to pursue their breach-of-contract claims. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in the officers’ favor as to liability, holding the pre- and post-shift activities are compensable and limiting the trial to damages. Following a jury trial, the officers were awarded more than $113.7 million in damages plus postjudgment interest. The circuit court’s judgment further ordered the department to pay overtime for pre- and post-shift activities and to implement a new timekeeping system to track such activities. The department appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the corrections officers were entitled to partial summary judgment on their breach of contract claims. Related issues include whether their pre- and post-shift activities are compensable under federal or state laws or a plain meaning of “work;” whether responding to occasional emergencies during shift changes renders all pre- and post-shift time compensable; whether these claims were based on statutes and regulations and could not be enforced through a breach of contract action; whether the department’s promise to comply with a preexisting legal duty can create a separate breach of contract claim; and whether the officers’ breach of contract claim for failure to pay their full wages was preempted or barred by sovereign immunity. An additional question involves whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the department’s proposed experts. Related issues include whether their testimony was admissible as expert evidence; whether the state failed to disclose the witnesses in a timely manner; and whether the witnesses’ exclusion prejudiced the department. Another question involves whether the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to decertify the class. Related issues include whether common questions predominated over individualized questions and whether variances among the officers as to activities performed or their length of employment precluded common proof or defenses. A further question involves whether the circuit court had a legal basis on which to enter its declaratory judgment requiring the department to track pre- and post-shift time. Related issues include whether this judgment duplicated the damages verdict, was a permissible remedy in a breach of contract action, and whether the judgment orders the expenditure of funds without an appropriation.

SC98252_Department_of_Corrections_brief
SC98252_corrections_officers_brief 
SC98252_Department_of_Corrections_reply_brief 


Scheduled to begin at 11 a.m. SC97872
State ex rel. Universal Credit Acceptance Inc. v. The Honorable Gloria Clark Reno
St. Louis County

Challenge to change of venue granted after change of judge
Listen to the oral argument: SC97872 MP3 file
Universal Credit Acceptance was represented during arguments by Corey Kraushaar of Brown & James PC in St. Louis; Ware was represented by Martin Daesch of OnderLaw LLC in St. Louis.

Universal Credit Acceptance Inc. sued Renwick Ware in the St. Charles County circuit court’s associate division seeking amounts it alleged Ware owed after defaulting on a retail sales installment contract. Ware’s answer asserted venue was improper in St. Charles County and sought to transfer venue to St. Louis County, where he lived. He later applied for a change of judge. The court granted the application, assigning the case to a different associate circuit judge. Ware subsequently moved to change venue to St. Louis County. Before the motion was heard, Universal Credit Acceptance filed a response opposing Ware’s venue motion and applied for a change of judge. The court granted the application and assigned the case to a third associate circuit judge. The circuit court ultimately sustained Ware’s venue motion and transferred the case to St. Louis County. Universal Credit Acceptance seeks to make permanent this Court’s preliminary writ of mandamus requiring the circuit court to transfer venue back to St. Charles County.
 
This proceeding presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court is required to transfer venue back to St. Charles County. Related issues include where venue is proper under section 508.010, RSMo; whether Ware’s motion for change of venue was timely under section 517.061, RSMo; whether Rule 51.06 applies in the associate division and, if so, whether it changes the statutory deadlines or requires a party wanting a change of both venue and judge to join those requests in a single application; and whether the circuit court’s prior grant of Ware’s application for change of judge precluded it from granting a change of venue.

SC97872_Universal_Credit_Acceptance_brief
SC97872_Ware_brief
SC97872_Universal_Credit_Acceptance_reply_brief 

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