The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
Tuesday, June 23, 2020
Due to concerns regarding the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), oral arguments scheduled for June 2020 will be conducted remotely, unless the parties request their cases be submitted on briefs.
Scheduled for 9 a.m. – SC98227
State ex rel. Woodco Inc. v. The Honorable Jennifer Phillips
Jackson County
Challenge to whether defendants added to suit are necessary parties under Rule 52.04
Listen to the oral argument: SC98227 MP3 file
Woodco was represented during arguments by Michael F. Barzee of Shafer Lombardo Shurin PC in Kansas City; Haren & Laughlin Construction was represented by Peter G. Collins of Hinkle Law Firm LLC in Overland Park, Kansas. Judge William W. Francis Jr. – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge W. Brent Powell.
As part of a project to build a senior living facility in Independence, a developer entered into several contracts, including with an architectural firm, a structural engineering company and Woodco Inc., with which it contracted to oversee the project’s general construction. Woodco, in turn, hired certain subcontractors, including a framing organization, a window supplier, and certain brick masons. Woodco also entered into a contract with Haren & Laughlin Construction Company Inc. to provide quality control for the project, including being on the building site at all times and providing general oversight and management of the subcontractors. Sometime after the project was completed, the developer sued Woodco and the architect, claiming work including the installation of brick, synthetic stone and cast stone details of the building’s façade was defective. Woodco settled the claims, and the developer assigned to Woodco any and all rights, claims and interest against any third party arising from or relating to the project defects. In February 2019, Woodco filed various contractual and tort claims against defendants including Haren & Laughlin, the architectural firm, the structural engineering company and certain subcontractors. In September 2019, the structural engineer moved to add the brick masons as defendants under Rule 52.04, alleging they were necessary parties. The circuit court sustained the motion. Woodco seeks to make permanent this Court’s preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to dismiss the brick masons.
This case presents one primary question for this Court – whether the brick mason subcontractors are necessary parties under Rule 52.04. Related issues include whether they are parties to any of the contracts on which Woodco bases its claims; whether, to the extent they are tortfeasors, that makes them necessary parties under the rule; whether Haren & Laughlin can be afforded complete relief or could be exposed to risk of excessive or inconsistent liability if the brick masons are not defendants in the suit; whether this is a unique situation justifying not following Missouri’s traditional rule of allowing plaintiffs to choose their defendants; and whether, if the brick masons are not necessary parties, they should be dismissed from the lawsuit.
Listen to the oral argument: SC98227 MP3 file
Woodco was represented during arguments by Michael F. Barzee of Shafer Lombardo Shurin PC in Kansas City; Haren & Laughlin Construction was represented by Peter G. Collins of Hinkle Law Firm LLC in Overland Park, Kansas. Judge William W. Francis Jr. – a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge W. Brent Powell.
As part of a project to build a senior living facility in Independence, a developer entered into several contracts, including with an architectural firm, a structural engineering company and Woodco Inc., with which it contracted to oversee the project’s general construction. Woodco, in turn, hired certain subcontractors, including a framing organization, a window supplier, and certain brick masons. Woodco also entered into a contract with Haren & Laughlin Construction Company Inc. to provide quality control for the project, including being on the building site at all times and providing general oversight and management of the subcontractors. Sometime after the project was completed, the developer sued Woodco and the architect, claiming work including the installation of brick, synthetic stone and cast stone details of the building’s façade was defective. Woodco settled the claims, and the developer assigned to Woodco any and all rights, claims and interest against any third party arising from or relating to the project defects. In February 2019, Woodco filed various contractual and tort claims against defendants including Haren & Laughlin, the architectural firm, the structural engineering company and certain subcontractors. In September 2019, the structural engineer moved to add the brick masons as defendants under Rule 52.04, alleging they were necessary parties. The circuit court sustained the motion. Woodco seeks to make permanent this Court’s preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to dismiss the brick masons.
This case presents one primary question for this Court – whether the brick mason subcontractors are necessary parties under Rule 52.04. Related issues include whether they are parties to any of the contracts on which Woodco bases its claims; whether, to the extent they are tortfeasors, that makes them necessary parties under the rule; whether Haren & Laughlin can be afforded complete relief or could be exposed to risk of excessive or inconsistent liability if the brick masons are not defendants in the suit; whether this is a unique situation justifying not following Missouri’s traditional rule of allowing plaintiffs to choose their defendants; and whether, if the brick masons are not necessary parties, they should be dismissed from the lawsuit.
Scheduled for 10 a.m. – SC98251
State ex rel. Beutler Inc. d/b/a George J. Shaw Construction Co. and Brian Henderson v. The Honorable Sandra C. Midkiff
Jackson County
Whether civil suit for damages from alleged workplace injury can proceedListen to the oral argument: SC98251 MP3 file
Shaw Construction was represented during arguments by Hal D. Meltzer of Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC in Kansas City; McArthur was represented by Abigail Han of the Law Offices of Brian Timothy Meyers in Kansas City.
Joshua McCarthur sued George J. Shaw Construction Company and Brian Henderson, alleging he was injured in September 2016 in the course of his work on a commercial construction project in Kansas City. He alleged Shaw had subcontracted hauling excavated materials from the building site with a second company, which subcontacted with R&B Trucking to assist in the hauling. At the time of the alleged injury, McArthur was employed by R&B as a dump truck driver, and Henderson was employed by Shaw to operate an excavator. Shaw and Henderson moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), alleging they are immune from civil liability for McArthur’s workplace injury because, under the state’s workers’ compensation law, they qualified as McArthur’s statutory employer and statutory co employee, respectively. The circuit court overruled the motion. Shaw and Henderson seek this Court’s relief.
This proceeding presents one question for this Court – whether Shaw and Henderson are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Related issues include whether Shaw is McArthur’s statutory employer and Henderson his statutory co-employee and, if so, whether they have established they are immune from civil liability; and whether applying the statutory employment defense in this case violates McArthur’s constitutional right to trial by jury.
Scheduled for 11 a.m. – SC98295
State of Missouri v. Rashidi Don Loper
St. Louis
Challenge to admission of evidence during domestic violence caseListen to the oral argument: SC98295 MP3 file
Loper was represented during arguments by Susan DeGeorge of the public defender’s office in St. Louis; the state was represented by Garrick Aplin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Rashidi Loper was in an on-again, off-again relationship from 2009 through 2016 with a woman he ultimately married. Their relationship ended in December 2016. In February 2017, the state charged Loper with multiple crimes against the estranged wife, including first-degree attempted rape, first-degree domestic assault, serious injury, armed criminal action, and tampering or attempting to tamper with a victim in a felony prosecution. Three months later, Loper’s estranged wife approached him and his girlfriend and, Loper alleges, she attempted to hit him with a tire iron and his girlfriend with her hand. Before trial, the state sought to endorse the executive director of a women’s domestic violence shelter as an expert witness regarding domestic violence. Loper objected to her qualifications; the circuit court overruled Loper’s objections and allowed the director to testify as an expert. During the trial, the state presented the testimony of Loper’s estranged wife. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to question her about the tire iron incident; the circuit court sustained the state’s motion to exclude this evidence. In response to further questioning, the estranged wife denied ever attempting suicide. A police officer who responded to the couple’s home later testified he at first believed the estranged wife had attempted suicide but then – over Loper’s objection – said an unidentified doctor at the hospital told him the injuries were not self-inflicted. A detective testified, over Loper’s objection, that based on her experience as part of the city’s domestic assault response team, she believed Loper was exhibiting “power and control” over the estranged wife. The shelter director testified, also over Loper’s objection, about how an abuser can exert “power and control” over the victim, causing the victim to return to the abuser out of guilt or fear for the safety of themselves or family members. On the third day of trial, before calling the estranged wife’s treating emergency room physician to testify, the state advised Loper the doctor would opine the estranged wife’s wound was not self-inflicted. Loper moved to exclude the opinion testimony because it was not disclosed before trial. Relying on the police report’s unattributed doctor statement, the circuit court permitted the physician’s testimony. Ultimately, the jury found Loper guilty on all counts, and the circuit court sentenced him to a total of 22 years in prison. Loper appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court violated Loper’s constitutional due process rights to a fair trial by allowing the detective to testify Loper had exerted “power and control” over the estranged wife and the shelter director as an expert witness. Related issues include whether their testimony invaded the jury’s province by vouching for the estranged wife’s credibility and, if so, whether Loper was prejudiced. Another question is whether the circuit court violated Loper’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial in allowing the police officer to testify about what the hospital doctor told him. Related issues include whether the unidentified doctor’s statements constituted inadmissible hearsay or were necessary to explain the officer’s subsequent conduct and whether the circuit court’s later reliance on the officer’s report to admit the emergency room physician’s testimony violated Rule 25.08 or prejudiced Loper. An additional question is whether the circuit court violated Loper’s constitutional rights to due process of law and to present a complete defense in admitting the physician’s medical opinion testimony that the estranged wife’s wound was not self-inflicted. Related issues include whether medical records the state disclosed during discovery contained the doctor’s opinion and whether the state otherwise disclosed her opinion prior to the day she testified at trial. A further question involves whether the circuit court plainly erred or violated Loper’s constitutional rights in refusing to allow him to present evidence of the estranged wife’s conduct during the tire iron incident. Related issues include whether the evidence was logically and legally relevant and whether it prejudiced Loper.
Scheduled for noon – SC98262
Marcia Green v. Mehrdad Fotoohighiam
Boone County
Challenges to judgment in civil case alleging conspiracy to burn residence
Listen to the oral argument: SC98262 MP3 file
Fotoohighiam was represented during arguments by Michael G. Berry of Newman, Comley & Ruth PC in Jefferson City; Green was represented by Andrew L. Veatch of Eng & Woods in Columbia.
In December 2014, Marcia Green awoke to find her mobile home in Columbia on fire. She escaped but was injured, and her mobile home was completely destroyed. Mehrdad Fotoohighiam owned a mobile home on a lot adjacent to Green’s. Green subsequently sued Fotoohighiam, James Hall and David Reed for conspiring to set fire to her mobile home. Her first theory was that Fotoohighiam conspired with Hall and Scotty Christopher, who had performed work on Fotoohighiam’s property, to burn her mobile home and that Fotoohighiam actually paid Christopher to set the fire. Her second theory, based on a statement from a former employee of Fotoohighiam’s company, was that Fotoohighiam conspired with Hall and Reed to burn her mobile home. At the time Green deposed him, Fotoohighiam was facing a felony arson charge and asserted his Fifth Amendment right in declining to answer certain questions. Green moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), asserting there was no genuine dispute of material fact whether Fotoohighiam caused or contributed to cause the fire. The circuit court granted summary judgment as to liability, finding that Fotoohighiam paid the co-conspirators money to burn Green’s mobile home. The circuit court stated it drew adverse inferences from Fotoohighiam’s failure to answer certain deposition questions on Fifth Amendment grounds. The issues of actual and punitive damages were tried to a jury. The jury returned verdicts in Green’s favor, awarding her a total of $2.5 million in actual and punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and overruled Fotoohighiam’s motion for new trial. Fotoohighiam appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court erred in granting partial summary judgment in Green’s favor on the issue of Fotoohighiam’s liability for conspiring to set fire to Green’s mobile home. Related issues include whether the material facts as to liability were uncontroverted; whether the deposition statements Green filed in support of summary judgment created a dispute as to whether Fotoohighiam knew the people with whom she alleged he conspired; whether the deposition statements she filed in support set forth the factual bases for two different, inconsistent and conflicting conspiracy theories; and whether the circuit court could consider portions of Fotoohighiam’s deposition testimony Green did not cite in support of summary judgment. Another question involves whether the circuit court misapplied the law in overruling Fotoohighiam’s motion for new trial. Related issues include whether his assertion in his post-trial motion that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the issue of liability required the circuit court, as a matter of law, to set aside the judgment and retry the case in its entirety; and whether the summary judgment as to liability prejudiced Fotoohighiam’s subsequent trial as to damages. A further question is whether the circuit court plainly erred in granting summary judgment on the record Green filed in support.
Fotoohighiam was represented during arguments by Michael G. Berry of Newman, Comley & Ruth PC in Jefferson City; Green was represented by Andrew L. Veatch of Eng & Woods in Columbia.
In December 2014, Marcia Green awoke to find her mobile home in Columbia on fire. She escaped but was injured, and her mobile home was completely destroyed. Mehrdad Fotoohighiam owned a mobile home on a lot adjacent to Green’s. Green subsequently sued Fotoohighiam, James Hall and David Reed for conspiring to set fire to her mobile home. Her first theory was that Fotoohighiam conspired with Hall and Scotty Christopher, who had performed work on Fotoohighiam’s property, to burn her mobile home and that Fotoohighiam actually paid Christopher to set the fire. Her second theory, based on a statement from a former employee of Fotoohighiam’s company, was that Fotoohighiam conspired with Hall and Reed to burn her mobile home. At the time Green deposed him, Fotoohighiam was facing a felony arson charge and asserted his Fifth Amendment right in declining to answer certain questions. Green moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), asserting there was no genuine dispute of material fact whether Fotoohighiam caused or contributed to cause the fire. The circuit court granted summary judgment as to liability, finding that Fotoohighiam paid the co-conspirators money to burn Green’s mobile home. The circuit court stated it drew adverse inferences from Fotoohighiam’s failure to answer certain deposition questions on Fifth Amendment grounds. The issues of actual and punitive damages were tried to a jury. The jury returned verdicts in Green’s favor, awarding her a total of $2.5 million in actual and punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and overruled Fotoohighiam’s motion for new trial. Fotoohighiam appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court erred in granting partial summary judgment in Green’s favor on the issue of Fotoohighiam’s liability for conspiring to set fire to Green’s mobile home. Related issues include whether the material facts as to liability were uncontroverted; whether the deposition statements Green filed in support of summary judgment created a dispute as to whether Fotoohighiam knew the people with whom she alleged he conspired; whether the deposition statements she filed in support set forth the factual bases for two different, inconsistent and conflicting conspiracy theories; and whether the circuit court could consider portions of Fotoohighiam’s deposition testimony Green did not cite in support of summary judgment. Another question involves whether the circuit court misapplied the law in overruling Fotoohighiam’s motion for new trial. Related issues include whether his assertion in his post-trial motion that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the issue of liability required the circuit court, as a matter of law, to set aside the judgment and retry the case in its entirety; and whether the summary judgment as to liability prejudiced Fotoohighiam’s subsequent trial as to damages. A further question is whether the circuit court plainly erred in granting summary judgment on the record Green filed in support.
Scheduled for 2 p.m. – SC97784
In re: Allan H. Bell
Clay County
Criminal contempt proceeding following attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97784 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan D. Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Bell was represented by David G. Bandre of Bandre Hunt Snider LLC in Jefferson City.
Kansas City attorney Allan Bell previously has been reprimanded and suspended, but his suspension was stayed and he was placed on probation. In March 2019, the chief disciplinary counsel sought an interim suspension under Rule 5.24 of Bell’s law license, alleging he had failed to maintain a trust account for client funds; deposited client funds from more than 30 cases into his operating account; used his operating account for personal expenses and payments to third parties and allowed it to become overdrawn. In April 2019, this Court found probable cause that Bell was guilty of multiple instances of professional misconduct, determined he posed a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public and the integrity of the profession, and suspended his law license, ordering he stop practicing law immediately and take certain other actions to wind down his practice. Five months later, the Court accepted Bell’s petition to surrender his law license and disbarred him. Meanwhile, the chief disciplinary counsel’s office received reports that, after learning of his suspension, Bell continued to accept new clients, take new fees, present himself to lawyers as well as existing and potential clients as if he still were authorized to practice law. He also allegedly refused to comply with the authority of the four attorneys the Clay County circuit court had appointed to take over his practice.
The chief disciplinary counsel filed a motion for criminal contempt and sanctions against Bell, substantiating the allegations it previously received and further alleging Bell took deceptive steps to hide his continued practice from the chief disciplinary counsel’s office and this Court. Bell filed a response, in part denying his actions were knowing or willful, contending assistance he provided certain clients with customs and immigration paperwork did not require a law license, and alleging he has developed cognitive deficiencies that caused him to forget he was suspended. This Court appointed a master to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the issues raised in the pleadings and to file a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The master conducted several evidentiary hearings and completed her report in December 2019. Bell subsequently filed objections and exceptions to the report, and the chief disciplinary counsel filed suggestions in support of the report. In February 2020, the master submitted her amended final report to this Court, recommending Bell be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of the Court’s suspension order, be sentenced to serve 30 days in jail and be ordered to pay a $21,000 fine. The Court ultimately sustained Bell’s motion for allocution, ordering the parties to brief the case. The Court also ordered Bell to appear personally before it and be prepared to answer questions about whether there is any just cause why – if the Court agrees with the master’s report – punishment for contempt should not be pronounced.
This case presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Bell violated the Court’s order suspending his law license and, if so, whether his actions constitute criminal contempt. A related issue is whether this is the appropriate forum for allegations of practicing law without a license, a misdemeanor described in section 484.020, RSMo. Another involves whether just cause exists to impose punishment and, if so, what punishment is appropriate.
Listen to the oral argument: SC97784 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan D. Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Bell was represented by David G. Bandre of Bandre Hunt Snider LLC in Jefferson City.
Kansas City attorney Allan Bell previously has been reprimanded and suspended, but his suspension was stayed and he was placed on probation. In March 2019, the chief disciplinary counsel sought an interim suspension under Rule 5.24 of Bell’s law license, alleging he had failed to maintain a trust account for client funds; deposited client funds from more than 30 cases into his operating account; used his operating account for personal expenses and payments to third parties and allowed it to become overdrawn. In April 2019, this Court found probable cause that Bell was guilty of multiple instances of professional misconduct, determined he posed a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public and the integrity of the profession, and suspended his law license, ordering he stop practicing law immediately and take certain other actions to wind down his practice. Five months later, the Court accepted Bell’s petition to surrender his law license and disbarred him. Meanwhile, the chief disciplinary counsel’s office received reports that, after learning of his suspension, Bell continued to accept new clients, take new fees, present himself to lawyers as well as existing and potential clients as if he still were authorized to practice law. He also allegedly refused to comply with the authority of the four attorneys the Clay County circuit court had appointed to take over his practice.
The chief disciplinary counsel filed a motion for criminal contempt and sanctions against Bell, substantiating the allegations it previously received and further alleging Bell took deceptive steps to hide his continued practice from the chief disciplinary counsel’s office and this Court. Bell filed a response, in part denying his actions were knowing or willful, contending assistance he provided certain clients with customs and immigration paperwork did not require a law license, and alleging he has developed cognitive deficiencies that caused him to forget he was suspended. This Court appointed a master to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the issues raised in the pleadings and to file a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The master conducted several evidentiary hearings and completed her report in December 2019. Bell subsequently filed objections and exceptions to the report, and the chief disciplinary counsel filed suggestions in support of the report. In February 2020, the master submitted her amended final report to this Court, recommending Bell be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of the Court’s suspension order, be sentenced to serve 30 days in jail and be ordered to pay a $21,000 fine. The Court ultimately sustained Bell’s motion for allocution, ordering the parties to brief the case. The Court also ordered Bell to appear personally before it and be prepared to answer questions about whether there is any just cause why – if the Court agrees with the master’s report – punishment for contempt should not be pronounced.
This case presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Bell violated the Court’s order suspending his law license and, if so, whether his actions constitute criminal contempt. A related issue is whether this is the appropriate forum for allegations of practicing law without a license, a misdemeanor described in section 484.020, RSMo. Another involves whether just cause exists to impose punishment and, if so, what punishment is appropriate.