The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are provided by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
Tuesday, November 10, 2020
Scheduled for 9 a.m. – SC98444
John Charles Gott, d/b/a Gott's to Go v. Director of Revenue
Greene County
Challenge to finding of tax liability for portable toilet rentals
Listen to the oral argument: SC98444 MP3 file
Gott was represented during arguments by B. Edwin Bloomfield of the Law Office of B. Edwin Bloomfield LC in Springfield; the director was represented by Jason K. Lewis of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Gott was represented during arguments by B. Edwin Bloomfield of the Law Office of B. Edwin Bloomfield LC in Springfield; the director was represented by Jason K. Lewis of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
John Charles Gott operates Gotts-to Go, a rental company providing portable toilets to customers in Greene, Christian, Stone and Taney counties. Gott did not remit sales or use tax when he purchased the portable toilets for his rental business. Gott delivers the portable toilets to the customers and provides certain services such as cleaning and waste removal during the rental period. Following an audit, the director of revenue determined Gott owed approximately $56,900 in sales tax and $200 in use tax. Gott appealed the director’s decision to the administrative hearing commission, which affirmed the director’s decision. Gott petitions this Court for review of the commission’s decision.
This case presents two questions for this Court. The first is whether the rental of portable toilets is subject to sales tax under section 144.020.1(8), RSMo. Related issues include whether the commission erred in finding the true object of Gott’s rental transactions is the portable toilet as opposed to the services Gott provides to the customer – namely, the removal of human waste from the customer’s premises. The second question involves whether the director’s application of section 144.020.1(8) to the rental of portable toilets and related services violates article X, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution by impermissibly expanding the reach of sales tax by imposing taxes on services that previously were not taxable.
Scheduled for 10 a.m. – SC98409
APLUX LLC and Paul & Ann Lux Associates LP v. Director of Revenue
St. Louis County
Challenge to finding of a use tax exemption for aircraft purchases
Listen to the oral argument: SC98409 MP3 file
The director was represented during arguments by Julia E. Rives of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; APLUX was represented by Lowell D. Pearson of Husch Blackwell LLP in Jefferson City.
The director was represented during arguments by Julia E. Rives of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; APLUX was represented by Lowell D. Pearson of Husch Blackwell LLP in Jefferson City.
APLUX LLC is a company that owns and leases aircraft. APLUX was formed in part by Donn Lux, who also is the chief executive officer and chairman of Luxco, a corporation that produces and markets alcoholic beverages. APLUX is a wholly owned subsidiary of Luxco. In 2011, APLUX purchased an aircraft it then leased to Luxco for an annual fee. APLUX also entered into an agreement with Aero Charter Inc. to provide maintenance and hangar space for the aircraft. In 2012, APLUX purchased a second aircraft and entered into a lease permitting Aero to use the second aircraft for charter flights for a monthly rental fee. APLUX similarly entered into an agreement with Luxco to use the second aircraft for an annual fee. APLUX did not remit sales or use tax for the purchase of either aircraft. Following an audit, the director of revenue determined APLUX was not in the business of leasing aircraft and owed sales and use taxes resulting from the aircraft purchases. APLUX appealed to the administrative hearing commission, which concluded APLUX was entitled to a use tax resale exemption with respect to the aircraft purchases. The commission found APLUX was in the business of leasing aircraft solely to resell them to Luxco and Aero; the leases between APLUX and Luxco were not disingenuous; and Luxco had operational control and the right to use the aircrafts. The director petitions this Court for review of the commission’s decision.
This case presents two questions for this Court. The first involves whether the commission erred in determining APLUX is entitled to the use tax resale exemption on the aircraft purchases. Related issues involve whether there was a transfer of the right to use the aircrafts under the leases and whether APLUX exercised significant control over the aircrafts by maintaining operational control over them. The second question involves whether the commission erroneously found APLUX purchased the aircrafts for resale given the relationship between Luxco and APLUX and the nature of the leasing agreements.
Scheduled for 11 a.m. – SC98640
Blake H. Donaldson, D.O. v. Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
SC98650_insurance_company_brief
Platte County
Challenge to emergency suspension and revocation of medical license
Listen to the oral argument: SC98640 MP3 file
Donaldson was represented during arguments by Scott R. Pool of Gibbs Pool and Turner PC in Jefferson City; the board was represented by Adam G. Grayson of Grayson & Grayson LLC in Jefferson City.
Donaldson was represented during arguments by Scott R. Pool of Gibbs Pool and Turner PC in Jefferson City; the board was represented by Adam G. Grayson of Grayson & Grayson LLC in Jefferson City.
In 1995, Dr. Blake H. Donaldson became a licensed physician and surgeon in Missouri. In November 2017, the state board of registration for the healing arts filed a complaint against Donaldson and moved for the emergency suspension of his medical license after allegations were made he had inappropriate relations with a minor patient. A few days later, the administrative hearing commission issued an emergency suspension without a hearing. The commission subsequently held an evidentiary hearing to determine if Donaldson should be subject to discipline. Evidence was admitted that Donaldson sent the minor naked pictures and sexually suggestive messages and that he engaged in sexual activity with the minor. The commission found there was cause for discipline because Donaldson committed misconduct and his behavior was unethical and unprofessional in that he exercised his influence as a physician to engage the minor in sexual activity. The commission further found Donaldson’s conduct was harmful and dangerous and constituted incompetence. The board then revoked Donaldson’s license with no application for reinstatement for seven years. Donaldson sought review in the circuit court, which found sufficient evidence supported the commission’s decision. Donaldson appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the commission’s emergency suspension of Donaldson’s medical license violated his due process rights. Related issues include whether the commission’s notice properly informed Donaldson of the statutory framework under which his license would be suspended; whether the commission violated its own regulations by not conducting a hearing as represented in the notice to Donaldson; and whether section 334.102, RSMo, is facially unconstitutional because it does not permit judicial review of emergency suspensions, provides an arbitrarily narrow window for discovery, and provides no method for admitting additional, exculpatory evidence. Another question involves whether Donaldson’s emergency suspension was arbitrary and capricious because the alleged misconduct occurred more than two year prior to the emergency suspension and was not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Additional questions involve whether the commission erred in finding an adverse inference from Donaldson’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or in finding the minor’s testimony credible despite alleged inconsistencies and contradictions. A further question involves whether the commission violated section 536.083, RSMo, by allowing the commissioner who issued the emergency suspension to preside over Donaldson’s disciplinary hearing.
Scheduled for noon – SC98650
State ex rel. COUNTRY Mutual Insurance Company v. The Honorable Brian H. May
St. Louis County
Challenge to denial of insurer’s motion for change of judge and for discovery
Listen to the oral argument: SC98650 MP3 file
The insurance company was represented during arguments by Richard I. Woolf of Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC in St. Louis; Woodson was represented by Michael R. Durham of Dowd & Dowd PC in St. Louis.
The insurance company was represented during arguments by Richard I. Woolf of Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC in St. Louis; Woodson was represented by Michael R. Durham of Dowd & Dowd PC in St. Louis.
In 2015, an altercation occurred at a St. Louis County convenience store between Donte Woodson and Silver Franklin in which Woodson was shot and killed. Woodson’s parents filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Franklin, alleging he was at the convenience store servicing ATMs for his employer, Action ATM, at the time of the altercation. The parties executed an agreement pursuant to section 537.065, RSMo, that any judgment entered against Franklin would be satisfied by his insurer, COUNTRY Mutual Insurance Company. The insurance company then was granted intervention in the wrongful death action and sought a change of judge. The circuit court overruled the insurance company’s change of judge motion, finding section 537.065 permitted intervention as a matter of right but did not abrogate prior case law regarding an insurer’s right to participate in and control the litigation. The circuit court also quashed the insurer’s notice to depose Franklin. The insurance company now seeks a permanent writ of prohibition from this Court requiring the circuit court to sustain its motion for change of judge and permitting it to substantively participate in the underlying action, including discovery.
This case presents two questions for this Court. The first involves whether, pursuant to Rule 51.05, the circuit court had any discretion to overrule the insurance company’s timely motion for change of judge. The second question involves whether section 537.065 distinguishes between the rights of a section 537.065 intervenor and the rights of any other intervenor and, if so, whether the insurer has the right to participate substantively in the wrongful death action.