DOCKET SUMMARIES

SC96751
Mary Doe v. Eric Greitens, et al.
Cole County
Constitutional and statutory challenges to state’s informed consent law
Listen to the oral argument: SC96751 MP3 file
Doe was represented during arguments by W. James MacNaughton, an attorney in Newton, New Jersey; the state was represented by First Assistant and Solicitor D. John Sauer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

A Greene County resident known as Mary Doe became pregnant in February 2015 and began making plans the next month to have an abortion. As such, she said she knew she would be subject to the state’s informed consent law, which in part required her to acknowledge receipt of a booklet containing certain information she believes is untrue and based not on science but on a political and religious point of view. Specifically, the booklet – prepared by the state’s department of health and senior services pursuant to state law – states that human life begins at conception and that abortion will terminate the life of a separate, unique, living human being. When Doe arrived at the St. Louis clinic in May 2015 to obtain an abortion, she gave her doctors a letter advising she adheres to principles of the Satanic temple and has sincerely held religious beliefs different from the information in the informed consent booklet. Specifically, her letter advised she has deeply held religious beliefs that a non-viable fetus is not a separate human being but is part of her body and that abortion of a non-viable fetus does not terminate the life of a separate, unique, living human being. Her letter further absolved the doctors of their responsibility to deliver the booklet to her or to wait 72 hours before performing her abortion, advising them she voluntarily, freely and without coercion was choosing to have the abortion that day. The clinic, however, refused her request. Instead, as required by the law, it gave Doe an ultrasound and the opportunity to listen to the fetal heartbeat. The clinic made Doe acknowledge receipt of the booklet and advised it would not perform the abortion until after the statutory waiting period. She returned after the time had lapsed and received the abortion. Doe subsequently challenged the informed consent law under both the state’s religious freedom restoration act (section 1.302, RSMo) and the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the federal constitution. The circuit court dismissed Doe’s lawsuit. Doe appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court. One is whether Doe sufficiently stated a claim under the state’s religious freedom restoration act. Related issues include whether the informed consent law substantially restricts Does’ free exercise of religion, serves the government’s compelling interest in obtaining her informed consent to an abortion and is the least restrictive means of obtaining such consent. Another question is whether the informed consent law violates the establishment clause. Related issues include whether Missouri’s political branches of government are permitted to express a position about when life begins, whether the informed consent law constitutes a religious tenet promoting a religious belief, and whether the informed consent law discriminates against religion or among religions.

SC96751_Doe_brief_filed_in_WD
SC96751_State_amended_brief_filed_in_WD
 
 
 
SC96599
Charles M. Ryan v. State of Missouri
St. Francois County
Denial of postconviction relief for allegedly ineffective counsel relating to group guilty plea proceeding
Listen to the oral argument: SC96599 MP3 file
Ryan was represented during arguments by Gwenda Renee Robinson of the public defender’s office in St. Louis; the state was represented by Shaun J. Mackelprang of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Charles Ryan pleaded guilty, during a group guilty plea proceeding in September 2012, to felony manufacturing methamphetamine. The circuit court sentenced him to 15 years in prison, suspended execution of the sentence and placed him on supervised probation. In April 2015, the circuit court revoked Ryan’s probation and executed the previously imposed prison sentence. In June 2015, Ryan timely filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appointed counsel subsequently filed an amended motion, alleging, in part, ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the group guilty plea proceeding. The circuit court denied Ryan relief without an evidentiary hearing. Ryan appeals.

This appeal presents one primary question for the Court – whether Ryan pleaded facts, unrefuted by the record, sufficient to entitle him to postconviction relief based on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at the group guilty plea proceeding. A related issues includes whether that attorney unreasonably pressured or misled Ryan to plead guilty unknowingly, unintelligently and involuntarily minutes before the proceeding began.
 
SC96599_Ryan_brief
SC96599_State_brief

 

 
SC96356
State ex rel. Valley Hope Association v. The Honorable Robert L. Koffman and The Honorable James D. Youngs 
Cooper and Jackson counties
 
By order dated November 21, 2017, the Court sustained the parties' joint motion to remove this case from the argument docket, stay the briefing schedule and permit the circuit court to transfer the case to St. Louis County.
 
 
 
SC96640
Sybil Anne Archdekin v. Jarrett Alan Archdekin
Buchanan County
Challenge to division of property and award of maintenance in divorce case
Listen to the oral argument: SC96649 MP3 file
The husband was represented during arguments by Craig D. Ritchie of the Law Office of Ritchie & Soper PC in St. Joseph; the wife was represented by James D. Boggs of The Boggs Law Firm LLC in Kansas City.

A husband and wife separated in September 2011, when the wife filed for divorce. For most of their marriage, the husband worked to support the family while the wife cared for the couple’s three children. The husband was a real estate developer, and three of his companies were made parties to the divorce due to the entwining of business and personal finances. The circuit court held a trial in the spring of 2013, but before the circuit court entered its judgment, one of the businesses subject to the dissolution action filed for bankruptcy. The circuit court entered an interlocutory judgment in July 2013 ordering the division of marital assets be tabled until the bankruptcy stay was lifted. While the circuit court’s judgment was under review on appeal, another of the companies filed for bankruptcy. In January 2014, the circuit court entered a second amended interlocutory judgment, which stated it was “final for purposes of appeal” as to all the issues it addressed and declaring “there is no just reason for delay.” This judgment imputed to the husband $5,000 in monthly income based in part on money the businesses had spent for the husband’s personal benefit and on representations the husband had made to lending institutions about his total net worth. In October 2015, the wife filed a motion asking the circuit court to hold the husband in contempt for failure to pay maintenance and child support, and the husband moved to reopen the evidence and modify the second interlocutory judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court in April 2016 entered a “final judgment” dividing previously undivided marital and non-marital property and debt, leaving in place the amount of income imputed to the husband as well as the amount of maintenance awarded, and modifying custody and child support to reflect that the couple’s oldest child was emancipated. The husband appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court. One is whether the second amended interlocutory judgment disposed of all the issues in the case or otherwise can constitute a final judgment. Another question involves the order in which the circuit court reached its decisions and whether marital property must be divided before a court can determine any award of maintenance as well as whether the circuit court properly considered whether it could modify the maintenance award. An additional question is whether state law permits a court to award maintenance retroactively or only prospectively. Further questions involve the amount of maintenance awarded – whether the circuit court properly imputed income to the husband, considered the family’s standard of living, and included expenses for the children or the wife’s retirement contribution as well as whether the amount awarded may exceed reasonable needs or a party’s ability to pay – and whether the amount was against the weight of the evidence.

SC96640_Husband_brief_filed_in_WD

SC96640_Husband_reply_brief_filed_in_WD