The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.

SC96911

Matthew D. Vacca v. Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Workers' Compensation and Brian May

St. Louis city
Challenges to award of compensatory and punitive damages in employment retaliation case
Listen to the oral argument: SC96911 MP3 file
The department was represented during arguments by State Solicitor D. John Sauer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Vacca was represented by Joan Marie Swartz of the Law Office of Joan M. Swartz in St. Louis.

This appeal arises from a discrimination lawsuit Matthew Vacca filed against the state’s department of labor and industrial relations, its division of workers’ compensation and certain employees, including the division’s director (collectively, the department). Vacca began working as an administrative law judge in the division in 1992. Four years later, he advised the department he had been diagnosed with muscular dystrophy. As his resulting disability progressed, he sought certain accommodations, including special parking privileges and permission to work from home three days per week. He subsequently filed disability discrimination and retaliation complaints with the department; discrimination charges against the department, including one with the state’s commission on human rights, claiming disability discrimination and retaliation; and an application for long-term disability benefits. Ultimately, the department informed Vacca it found no evidence of discrimination or retaliation against him. A subsequent grievance process reached the same result. In January 2011, an administrative law judge review committee entered a vote of no confidence against Vacca. Four months later, Vacca was approved to begin receiving long-term disability benefits, though the parties dispute the nature and effect of these benefits. In June 2011, the department advised Vacca he no longer was employed with the division. Ultimately, Vacca sued the department for disability discrimination and retaliation. He proceeded to trial only on his retaliation claim, alleging he was discharged because of his earlier discrimination complaints. The jury awarded him $4 million in compensatory damages, $2.5 million in punitive damages against the division and $500,000 in punitive damages against the division’s director. The circuit court entered its judgment, later reduced the punitive award against the director to $5,000 and, in its eventual amended judgment, granted Vacca post-judgment interest. The division appeals, and Vacca cross-appeals.

The department’s appeal

The department’s appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Related issues involve whether the department preserved this claim; whether the record establishes Vacca asserted contradictory positions about his ability to work in simultaneous proceedings regarding his application for long-term disability benefits and to seek maintenance in the dissolution of his marriage; and, if so, whether the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel bars his retaliation claim. Another issue involves the nature of the long-term disability benefits Vacca obtained and whether they reflect his voluntary resignation from his employment or otherwise preclude him from establishing a causal link between his earlier discrimination claim and his eventual discharge. Another question is whether the jury’s award of compensatory damages was excessive or otherwise against the weight of the evidence and, if so, whether the circuit court should have reduced the award. An additional question involves whether there was clear and convincing evidence the department acted with evil motive or reckless indifference sufficient for the circuit court to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and whether the department properly preserved this issue for appeal. Another question is whether the punitive damages award against the division was grossly excessive or arbitrary so as to violate due process and, if so, whether the circuit court should have reduced it. A further question involves the timeliness of Vacca’s request for post-judgment interest and whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to issue a new judgment granting Vacca post-judgment interest during his appeal.

Vacca’s appeal

Vacca’s cross-appeal presents two questions for this Court regarding whether the circuit court should have entered its amended judgment reducing the amount of punitive damages awarded against the director. One involves whether the director timely requested such a reduction and whether the circuit court retained jurisdiction at the time it entered its amended judgment. The other question involves whether the circuit court misapplied statutory and case law in calculating the reduced damages award and whether the circuit court properly considered evidence before it.

SC96911_Department_first_brief
SC96911_Vacca_first_brief



SC96862
City of Chesterfield, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al.
Cole County
Constitutional challenges to sales tax laws affecting St. Louis County and its municipalities
Listen to the oral argument: SC96862 MP3 file
Chesterfield was represented during arguments by Edward D. Robertson Jr. of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC in Jefferson City. The state was represented by Peter T. Reed of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the county and cities were represented by Robert J. Golterman of Lewis Rice LLC in St. Louis.

St. Louis County is a first-class county governed by its own charter. Before 1969, its revenue came primarily from property and utility taxes, while its municipalities derived revenue from their own ad valorem taxes. In 1969, the state legislature authorized cities to seek voter approval to adopt their own sales taxes, which many cities in St. Louis County did. In 1977, the legislature passed section 66.600, RSMo, a sales tax law allowing any first-class county with a charter form of government and not containing a city with a population of 400,000 or more to ask its voters to adopt a countywide sales tax to benefit both incorporated and unincorporated areas of the county. It also passed section 66.620, RSMo, creating two classifications for distributing any such county sales tax – one comprised of “point-of-sale” cities with their own local sales taxes, and the other comprised of “pool” cities without their own local sales taxes and unincorporated areas. St. Louis County’s voters subsequently approved a county sales tax, thereby nullifying the local sales taxes in place in 54 of the county’s municipalities under section 66.600. Later statutory changes modified the distribution of revenue among point-of-sale cities and pool cities. Chesterfield, a city within St. Louis County, was incorporated in 1988 and was classified as a pool city. It later sought to be reclassified as a point-of-sale city, and, following litigation, this Court in 1991 affirmed the administrative hearing commission’s decision denying Chesterfield’s application to hold section 66.620 unconstitutional. Four years later, in separate litigation involving Chesterfield and other cities, this Court affirmed a circuit court’s judgment holding sections 66.600 and 66.620 were constitutional. The legislature most recently amended these statutes in 2016. Chesterfield and its mayor (collectively, Chesterfield) subsequently filed an amended lawsuit against the state and its director of revenue (collectively, the state), asking the circuit court to declare sections 66.600 through 66.630 special laws in violation of article III, sections 40(21) and (30) of the state constitution. St. Louis County and several of its cities – Florissant, University City, Webster Groves and Wildwood – (collectively, the county) intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court entered summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) in favor of the state and county, holding neither section 66.600 nor section 66.620 is an unconstitutional special law. The circuit court also found Chesterfield’s claims were barred by doctrines of res judicata (barred because already adjudged in prior litigation), estoppel (barred by a party’s prior assertions or actions) and laches (barred because a party unreasonably delayed asserting a claim). Chesterfield appeals.

This appeal presents two primary questions for this Court. One question involves whether Chesterfield’s claims are barred by res judicata, estoppel or laches. Related issues include whether the judgments in the prior litigation were decided on the merits and, if so, whether the issues raised then are the same as those raised now; whether amendments to the statutes created new rights or obligations for Chesterfield not previously addressed; whether case law governing the prior judgments or on which the circuit court now relies has been superseded; the extent to which Chesterfield seeks to void the county’s tax law; and the impact, if any, this Court’s standard of review for claims involving special laws has on the issue of claims preclusion here.
The other question involves whether the sales tax laws set forth in sections 66.600 and 66.620 are unconstitutional special laws. Related issues include whether these statutes regulate the affairs of and appropriate the revenues of only St. Louis County and, if so, whether such issues should be governed by the county rather than the state; whether the legislature amended section 66.600 to assure St. Charles County would not become eligible for the same status as St. Louis County and, if so, whether this establishes the statute is an unconstitutional special law; whether the classifications in section 66.620 are open-ended (and subject to change) or are closed-ended and based on immutable historical facts; and, if the law is special, whether there is a rational basis or substantial justification for making it so. Finally, Chesterfield argues the county’s and its cities’ powers to tax are so interwoven sections 66.600 and 66.620 cannot be severed, and, therefore, if the Court finds only one is unconstitutional, both must be struck.




SC97008
State ex rel. Jerry Cullen v. The Honorable Kevin Harrell
Jackson County
Challenge to order compelling husband to release records in action to calculate military retirement pay
Listen to the oral argument: SC97008 MP3 file
The husband was represented during arguments by Jonathan Sternberg of Jonathan Sternberg, Attorney, PC in Kansas City; the wife was represented by John J. Benge of the Benge Law Firm in Kansas City.

Four years after the dissolution of her marriage, a wife asked the circuit court to modify its judgment concerning the formula by which the wife’s portion of the husband’s retirement pay from his service in the United States Air Force Reserves would be calculated. She alleged it should be based on “reservist points.” Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered its judgment modifying the formula and determining the husband’s reservist points accrued during the marriage. Several years later, the wife sought to compel the husband to authorize the air force to release to her the contents of his military and other records from the years they were married and to waive his privacy rights in these records. She alleged the number of points attributed as accruing during the marriage was incorrect. The husband moved to dismiss her motion. The circuit court overruled the husband’s motion and summarily sustained the wife’s motion. The husband now seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to dismiss the wife’s motion to compel or, alternatively, to afford the husband an evidentiary hearing before compelling him to give up any privacy rights in his records.

This case presents two questions for this Court. One is whether the husband is entitled to an order dismissing the wife’s motion to compel. Related issues include whether the motion seeks to relitigate the number of the husband’s reservist points on the merits or seeks to compel information to allow the wife to enforce the terms of the dissolution judgment; whether the number of points can be determined before the husband reaches retirement age; whether the motion is barred by issue and claim preclusion; whether the motion is barred by the one-year limitation of Rule 74.06 or qualifies as an independent action under the rule; and whether the marital settlement agreement or dissolution judgment allow the husband to execute the wife’s requested authorization. The other question is whether the husband is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the circuit court rules on the wife’s motion to compel. Related issues include whether the motion is self-proving or can be proven only by competent evidence and whether a hearing must precede a taking of property.

SC97008_Cullen_brief
SC97008_Scroggin_brief

Supreme Court - Dockets