DOCKET SUMMARIES

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, October 24, 2018

SC97317
Douglas Cosby v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund
Crawford County
Challenge to denial of benefits under and constitutional validity of amendments to workers’ compensation law
Listen to the oral argument: SC97317 MP3 file
Cosby was represented during arguments by Marshall B. Edelman of The Office of Ronald D. Edelman, Attorney, in St. Louis; the treasurer was represented by David L. McCain Jr. of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

While working as a carpenter January 22, 2014, in Cuba, Missouri, Douglas Cosby fell from a ladder, injuring his left knee and leg. He had four prior injuries – including at least one suffered while he was working – all occurring before 2014. Cosby sought workers’ compensation. He settled his claim against his employer for a 20-percent permanent partial disability of his left knee. He proceeded to a hearing regarding his claim for permanent partial disability benefits from the second injury fund. During the hearing, Cosby and the fund disputed the extent to which the fund is liable for permanent partial disability benefits following amendments to section 287.220, RSMo, which took effect January 1, 2014. Cosby also challenged the constitutional validity of the amendments. An administrative law judge denied Cosby’s claim for benefits, finding his injury occurred after the amendments took effect and, therefore, he was barred from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from the fund under the amended version of the statute. Cosby sought review in the labor and industrial relations commission, which determined the amendments to the statute are not unconstitutional and affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision. Cosby appeals.

This appeal presents two questions for this Court involving whether the commission should have ordered the fund to pay Cosby permanent partial disability benefits. One involves whether Cosby met his burden of proving he is entitled to benefits under the amended version of section 287.220. A related issue involves whether the commission applied the correct subdivision of the statute in analyzing Cosby’s claim. An alternative question involves whether the amended version of section 287.220, as applied to Cosby’s claim for benefits, violates constitutional provisions regarding open courts, due process and equal protection. A related issue is whether Cosby properly preserved his constitutional challenge.

SC97317_Cosby_brief_filed_in_SD
SC97317_Treasurer_brief_filed_in_SD
 
 
 
SC97069
Shereen Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University
St. Louis city
Challenge to judgment finding employment discrimination and awarding damages
Listen to the oral argument: SC97069 MP3 file
The board of regents was represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor Peter T. Reed of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Kader was represented by Jonathan Sternberg, a solo practitioner in Kansas City.

Dr. Shereen Kader came from her native Egypt to the United States for graduate study under a   J-1 nonimmigrant visa. Beginning in 2007, Kader taught at Harris-Stowe State University in St. Louis under a series of annual contracts. Following a performance evaluation from her dean early in her third academic year, Kader alleged the university was discriminating against her. Both Kader and the dean agree the dean told Kader some of the students had complained about her teaching. The parties disagree about whether the dean discussed Kader’s race, national origin or immigrant status; whether other faculty supported the university helping Kader renew her visa; and the extent to which the university investigated Kader’s complaints. With her J-1 visa scheduled to expire in spring 2010, Kader asked Egypt to waive the requirement she live there for two years before applying for an H1-B visa, a nonimmigrant visa allowing certain foreign nationals to live and work in the United States. She also began the process to apply for an O-1 “extraordinary person” visa. Kader’s J-1 visa expired in June 2010. In early July 2010, the federal agency denied her application for the O-1 visa. The university informed Kader it was unable to renew her contract for the 2010-2011 academic year because she had no valid visa, and it terminated her employment. Kader ultimately received a waiver of the residency requirement, obtained a permanent worker visa, requested asylum and obtained a tenure-track teaching position at a different institution. Kader sued Harris-Stowe in 2013, alleging race discrimination, national-origin discrimination and retaliation. Following a trial, the jury returned its verdict in the university’s favor on the race discrimination claim but in Kader’s favor on the national origin and retaliation claims and awarded her damages. The circuit court overruled the university’s post-trial motions and entered its judgment awarding Kader $750,000 in actual damages; $1.75 million in punitive damages; $67,000 in front pay; nearly $183,000 in attorney fees and costs; and post-judgment interest. The university appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court should have granted the university’s motion for a new trial. Related issues include whether the verdict-directing instructions misdirected, misled or otherwise confused the jury and, if so, whether they prejudiced the university; whether any evidence established an adverse employment action causing damages; and the extent to which the university preserved for review its claims regarding the instructions. Other questions involve whether Kader made a submissible case of national-origin discrimination or retaliation or offered evidence sufficient to support her request for punitive damages and, if not, whether the circuit court should have granted the university’s motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Related issues include whether Kader established the university discriminated against Kader or took adverse employment action against her because she is of Egyptian origin, showed a connection between her complaints to the university and the university’s later employment actions, proved actual damages, or offered evidence the university had evil intent or reckless indifference sufficient to support her request for punitive damages. Other related issues involve the extent to which the university cooperated with Kader in her attempt to obtain a work visa, should have challenged the federal agency’s decision or should have given her a leave of absence until she could resolve the visa issue.

SC97069_Board_of_Regents_brief
SC97069_Kader_brief

 

 

 
SC97179
State ex rel. Mario Richardson v. The Honorable Brian H. May
St. Louis County
Challenge to refusal to grant change of judge
Listen to the oral argument: SC97179 MP3 file
Richardson was represented during arguments by Melinda Gorman, a solo practitioner in Clayton; the state was represented by Ryan A. Kemper of the St. Louis County prosecutor’s office in Clayton.

The state charged Mario Richardson with one count each of unlawful possession of a firearm, second-degree assault on a law enforcement officer and resisting felony arrest. He was arraigned on the charges and pleaded not guilty. Ultimately, the case was assigned to a judge and was set for an April 2018 jury trial. The same judge was presiding over another criminal case involving unrelated charges against Richardson. A few weeks before trial, a prosecutor from the unrelated case entered her appearance in the assault case, released additional discovery to Richardson’s counsel and advised she might ask the grand jury to indict Richardson on additional charges for possession of a controlled substance, which she ultimately did. The grand jury indicted Richardson on the additional charges, he waived arraignment, and the new charges were assigned to the same judge presiding over the original charges and the unrelated case. Richardson sought a change of judge, which the circuit court denied. Richardson seeks this Court’s writ prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the change of judge.

This case presents one question for this Court – whether Richardson is entitled to a change of judge under Rule 32.07. Related issues include whether he was required to seek a change of judge within 10 days of the time the judge was assigned to hear the assault charges, whether the later indictment adding charges superseded the prior indictment or otherwise gave Richardson another 10 days to seek a change of judge, and the extent to which local rules governing division assignments affects a defendant’s right to an automatic change of judge under Rule 32.07.

SC97179_Richardson_brief
SC97179_State_brief
SC97179_Richardson_reply_brief