SC97165
Jereme J. Roesing v. Director of Revenue
Jackson County
Extent of statutory right to counsel in police department following DWI arrest

Listen to the oral argument: SC97165 MP3 file
Roesing was represented during arguments by William Charles Kenney of the Bill Kenney Law Firm LLC in Kansas City; the director was represented by Deputy Solicitor General Zachary M. Bluestone of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

A Lee’s Summit police officer arrested Jerome Roesing for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the police department. Before deciding whether to consent to a chemical breath test, Roesing asked to speak with his attorney, and the officer allowed Roesing to call his attorney. During the call, the attorney asked to speak with the officer, requesting to speak with Roesing in private. The officer refused to give Roesing privacy and stood near Roesing for the remainder of the conversation. Roesing ultimately refused to submit to the chemical breath test, and the director of revenue revoked his driving privileges for one year. Roesing sought review in the circuit court. The arresting officer testified there was one room in the police department not subject to audio and video recording where Roesing could have talked with his attorney, but because Roesing had not yet been processed by detention officers, department policy prohibited him from speaking with his attorney in private. The officer testified he could hear everything Roesing said to his attorney, and audio and video recordings were made of Roesing’s side of the conversation. The circuit court issued its judgment sustaining the revocation. Roesing appeals.

This appeal presents one primary question – whether the circuit court should have sustained the revocation of Roesing’s drivers license. Related issues include whether the statutory right to counsel is limited to attempting to contact an attorney or extends to a private consultation with an attorney, whether the arresting officer deprived Roesing of any statutory right to counsel and, if so, whether Roesing was prejudiced or whether reinstating his license is the appropriate remedy.

Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri argues the plain meaning of the statute conveys a right to speak privately with counsel or, alternatively, this Court should interpret the statute to convey such a right. The Missouri Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argues the statutory right to counsel – to be meaningful – implicitly and necessarily includes privacy to maintain the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and to hold otherwise creates an absurd and confusing result.

SC97165_Roesing_brief

SC97165_Roesing_reply_brief

SC97165_ACLU_amicus_brief
SC97165_MACDL_amicus_brief



SC97307
Lawrence B. Rebman v. Mike Parson, et al.
Cole County
Challenges to validity of appropriations statute defunding administrative law judge

Listen to the oral argument: SC97307 MP3 file
The state was represented during arguments by Deputy Solicitor Julie Marie Blake of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; Rebman was represented by J. Andrew Hirth of TGH Litigation LLC in Columbia.

The state’s department of labor and industrial relations is an executive branch department funded by money the legislature appropriates to it. By statute, the department’s administrative law judges are funded by money appropriated to the workers’ compensation fund. For fiscal 2019, the department asked the legislature to increase its funding for administrative law judges to fund its existing 28 positions, to restore eight positions cut the prior year and to add two chief administrative law judge positions. Instead, the legislature appropriated less money, declining to create the two new positions or restore the positions previously cut and cutting the funding for an additional administrative law judge position. This reduced the department’s funding to 27 administrative law judge positions. In its bill, the legislature specified the position it was defunding – any administrative law judge appointed from January 2012 through December 2014. Because Lawrence Rebman was the only administrative law judge appointed during this time, the department eliminated his position. Rebman sued, challenging the appropriations statute’s validity and the reasons underlying the legislature’s decision. The circuit court invalidated part of the appropriations statute, finding it violated state constitutional provisions guaranteeing separation of powers and equal protection of law and prohibiting special laws as well as a statute governing removal of administrative law judges. The circuit court permanently enjoined Rebman’s termination and ordered the department to pay his salary. The state appeals.

This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court relating to whether the circuit court should have enjoined Rebman’s termination and order payment of his salary. One involves the extent of the legislature’s appropriation authority to defund administrative law judges as a check on executive personnel decisions. Other questions involve whether the legislature’s appropriation statute for the department, effectively defunding only Rebman’s administrative law judge position, violates the state constitution. Related issues include whether the appropriations statute violates equal protection or the prohibition against special laws; under what level of constitutional scrutiny the statute is subject; whether the legislature has shown either a rational basis or substantial justification for its appropriation action; and the extent to which the circuit court considered evidence of the state’s interest in the appropriations statute. Another question involves whether another statute provides an administrative law judge can be terminated only for cause and, if so, whether this statute limits the legislature’s authority to eliminate administrative law judge positions through an appropriations statute. A related issue includes whether the administrative law judge statute creates a private cause of action and, if so, whether Rebman satisfied the standards to obtain relief. A further question involves the propriety of the circuit court’s judgment. Related issues include whether the judgment granting injunctive relief is supported by sufficient evidence of irreparable harm and whether the judgment’s requirement that the department pay Rebman’s salary orders the expenditure of state funds not appropriated or otherwise violates separation of powers.

SC97307_State_brief

SC97307_State_reply_brief




SC97132
Ronald J. Calzone v. Interim Commissioner of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Roger Dorson, in his official capacity, et al.
Cole County

Constitutional validity of procedures the legislature used in passing a particular bill

Listen to the oral argument: SC97132 MP3 file
Calzone, of Dixon, represented himself during arguments; the interim commissioner was represented by Jason K. Lewis of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

When Senate Bill No. 638 was introduced during the 2016 legislative session, its title was to repeal one particular statutory section and to enact in lieu thereof two new sections “relating to civics education.” Both the senate and the house of representatives made certain amendments to the bill before passing it. Further amendments were made to the bill during a conference committee appointed to reconcile the differences in the two versions of the bill. The resulting version of the bill was truly agreed to and finally passed by both chambers, and the governor signed it into law. As enacted, the bill’s final title was to repeal 20 statutory sections and to enact in lieu thereof 29 new sections “relating to elementary and secondary education ….” A Missouri taxpayer – Ronald Calzone – subsequently filed a lawsuit against certain state officials, alleging the final bill violated the state constitution’s original-purpose and single-subject requirements; he further alleged the legislature impermissibly made substantive changes to the bill’s title. The circuit court granted the state’s motion to dismiss Calzone’s claim that the legislature impermissibly changed the bill’s title. The circuit court also granted the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Calzone’s two constitutional claims. Calzone appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving whether the bill violates the state constitution and, if any of the bill’s provisions are unconstitutional, whether they may be severed from the remainder of the bill. One question is whether amendments during the legislative process changed the bill’s original purpose. Related issues involve how a bill’s original purpose is determined and the extent to which particular words used in a bill’s title affect the subject of the bill. Another question involves whether the final version of the bill contained more than one subject. Related issues include when a bill’s subject is established, what subject controlled this bill or otherwise was at its core, whether the bill’s title correctly identified that subject, and whether the provisions in the bill fairly relate to its subject. A further question involves whether the circuit court correctly held Missouri law does not recognize a claim alleging a bill’s title was changed improperly.

 

SC97132_Calzone_reply_brief