The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
1:30 p.m. Tuesday, May 14, 2019
SC97542
Danny Brock v. Peter Dunne, in His Capacity as Defendant Ad Litem for Mark Edwards, Deceased
St. Louis County
Coemployee liability in negligence case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97542 MP3 file
Dunne was represented during arguments by Brian R. Shank of Evans & Dixon LLC in St. Louis; Brock was represented by Patrick K. Bader of Bader & Murov LLC in St. Louis.
Danny Brock was working at JMC Manufacturing Co. with his supervisor, Mark Edwards, on a high-pressure laminating machine. Edwards instructed Brock to clean glue off the moving rollers. When Brock did so, his left thumb got caught in a pinch point, resulting in permanent nerve and structural damage, permanent pain, and permanent limited use of his thumb and hand. Brock received workers’ compensation benefits from his employment agency and settled a product liability lawsuit against the laminating machine’s manufacturer. He then sued Edwards for negligence. Edwards moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), asserting he was not discharging a personal duty separate and distinct from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and, therefore, he was entitled to immunity under the workers’ compensation law. The circuit court overruled the motion for summary judgment. Edwards died prior to trial, and Peter Dunne was substituted as defendant ad litem. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Brock’s favor and awarded him $1.05 million in damages, apportioning 90 percent of the fault to Edwards and 10 percent to Brock. The circuit court reduced the damages award by the amount of Brock’s product liability settlement, applied the jury’s apportionment and entered judgment against Edwards in the amount of $873,000. The circuit court overruled all subsequent motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Dunne appeals on behalf of Edwards’ estate.
This appeal raises a number of questions for this Court regarding whether the circuit court should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. One includes whether Brock made a submissible case by showing the injury was reasonably foreseeable and Edwards owed an independent, personal duty of care separate and distinct from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace. Another question involves whether Brock established Edwards performed an affirmative negligent act, caused or increased the risk of injury, acted dangerously, and is not entitled to immunity. A related question involves the extent, if any, to which Brock’s injury was caused by his own independent, intervening negligent acts. Another question is whether the circuit court erred in refusing Edwards’ proposed jury instruction and, if so, whether the instruction given prejudiced Edwards. Evidentiary questions involve admission of a federal occupational safety and health administration machine guard regulation, an economist’s calculations of Brock’s future lost wages, and JMC’s post-incident modification of the laminating machine and cleaning procedure. Further questions involve whether the circuit court erred in excluding testimony about Brock’s prior accident on a laminate machine and whether Brock violated a circuit court ruling by emphasizing the issue of insurance and telling potential jurors that Edwards’ estate would not have to pay any judgment.
Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers argues Brock failed to make a submissible case for coemployee liability because the workers’ compensation statute operates as a release but does not impose liability; the statute required Brock to show Edwards acted “purposefully;” and Brock did not show Edwards breached an independent, personal duty separate from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace in a way that JMC could reasonably foresee. The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys argues neither the statute nor common law negligence requires Edwards’ conduct to be unforeseeable to JMC; Brock established Edwards owed a duty under general negligence law; Brock need not prove Edwards intended for the injury to occur; and it would violate public policy to require Brock to show Edwards’ conduct falls outside the scope of JMC’s responsibility to provide a safe workplace.
SC97542_Dunne_brief
Danny Brock v. Peter Dunne, in His Capacity as Defendant Ad Litem for Mark Edwards, Deceased
St. Louis County
Coemployee liability in negligence case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97542 MP3 file
Dunne was represented during arguments by Brian R. Shank of Evans & Dixon LLC in St. Louis; Brock was represented by Patrick K. Bader of Bader & Murov LLC in St. Louis.
Danny Brock was working at JMC Manufacturing Co. with his supervisor, Mark Edwards, on a high-pressure laminating machine. Edwards instructed Brock to clean glue off the moving rollers. When Brock did so, his left thumb got caught in a pinch point, resulting in permanent nerve and structural damage, permanent pain, and permanent limited use of his thumb and hand. Brock received workers’ compensation benefits from his employment agency and settled a product liability lawsuit against the laminating machine’s manufacturer. He then sued Edwards for negligence. Edwards moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), asserting he was not discharging a personal duty separate and distinct from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and, therefore, he was entitled to immunity under the workers’ compensation law. The circuit court overruled the motion for summary judgment. Edwards died prior to trial, and Peter Dunne was substituted as defendant ad litem. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Brock’s favor and awarded him $1.05 million in damages, apportioning 90 percent of the fault to Edwards and 10 percent to Brock. The circuit court reduced the damages award by the amount of Brock’s product liability settlement, applied the jury’s apportionment and entered judgment against Edwards in the amount of $873,000. The circuit court overruled all subsequent motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Dunne appeals on behalf of Edwards’ estate.
This appeal raises a number of questions for this Court regarding whether the circuit court should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. One includes whether Brock made a submissible case by showing the injury was reasonably foreseeable and Edwards owed an independent, personal duty of care separate and distinct from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace. Another question involves whether Brock established Edwards performed an affirmative negligent act, caused or increased the risk of injury, acted dangerously, and is not entitled to immunity. A related question involves the extent, if any, to which Brock’s injury was caused by his own independent, intervening negligent acts. Another question is whether the circuit court erred in refusing Edwards’ proposed jury instruction and, if so, whether the instruction given prejudiced Edwards. Evidentiary questions involve admission of a federal occupational safety and health administration machine guard regulation, an economist’s calculations of Brock’s future lost wages, and JMC’s post-incident modification of the laminating machine and cleaning procedure. Further questions involve whether the circuit court erred in excluding testimony about Brock’s prior accident on a laminate machine and whether Brock violated a circuit court ruling by emphasizing the issue of insurance and telling potential jurors that Edwards’ estate would not have to pay any judgment.
Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers argues Brock failed to make a submissible case for coemployee liability because the workers’ compensation statute operates as a release but does not impose liability; the statute required Brock to show Edwards acted “purposefully;” and Brock did not show Edwards breached an independent, personal duty separate from JMC’s nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace in a way that JMC could reasonably foresee. The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys argues neither the statute nor common law negligence requires Edwards’ conduct to be unforeseeable to JMC; Brock established Edwards owed a duty under general negligence law; Brock need not prove Edwards intended for the injury to occur; and it would violate public policy to require Brock to show Edwards’ conduct falls outside the scope of JMC’s responsibility to provide a safe workplace.
SC97542_Dunne_brief
SC97591
Missouri Coalition for the Environment, et al. v. State of Missouri and the Clean Water Commission of the State of Missouri
Missouri Coalition for the Environment, et al. v. State of Missouri and the Clean Water Commission of the State of Missouri
Cole County
Constitutional validity of bill changing composition of state commission
Listen to the oral argument: SC97591 MP3 file
The coalition was represented during arguments by Henry B. Robertson of the Great Rivers Environmental Law Center in St. Louis; the state was represented by Justin D. Smith of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
In 2016, the legislature enacted House Bill No. 1713. As introduced, the bill addressed wastewater treatment systems and consisted of a single statutory section. Amendments made as the bill progressed through both chambers of the legislature added sections dealing with the multipurpose water resource program fund, design-build contracts for water treatment systems and fluoridation of public water supplies. Another amendment changed the composition of the state’s clean water commission to require at least two members be knowledgeable about agriculture, industry or mining and no more than four members represent the public. The Missouri Coalition for the Environment and one of its members brought a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the state and the clean water commission, challenging the constitutional validity of the bill. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding the coalition and its member lacked standing (legal ability to sue) and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. To avoid unnecessary remand in the event of reversal, the circuit court alternatively held the bill dealt was constitutional because it neither dealt with a single subject nor deviated from its original purpose. The coalition appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the coalition filed the lawsuit based on procedural defects in the bill before the next legislative session adjourned and, if so, whether the coalition needed to show taxpayer standing or any further “aggrieved” status to have standing. Another question involves whether the coalition’s claims are ripe (ready to be adjudicated). Other questions are whether the bill violated the state constitution’s single-subject requirement of article III, section 23 or original purpose requirement of article III, section 21.
SC97591_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_brief
SC97591_ltr_correcting_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_brief
SC97591_State_brief
Listen to the oral argument: SC97591 MP3 file
The coalition was represented during arguments by Henry B. Robertson of the Great Rivers Environmental Law Center in St. Louis; the state was represented by Justin D. Smith of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
In 2016, the legislature enacted House Bill No. 1713. As introduced, the bill addressed wastewater treatment systems and consisted of a single statutory section. Amendments made as the bill progressed through both chambers of the legislature added sections dealing with the multipurpose water resource program fund, design-build contracts for water treatment systems and fluoridation of public water supplies. Another amendment changed the composition of the state’s clean water commission to require at least two members be knowledgeable about agriculture, industry or mining and no more than four members represent the public. The Missouri Coalition for the Environment and one of its members brought a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the state and the clean water commission, challenging the constitutional validity of the bill. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding the coalition and its member lacked standing (legal ability to sue) and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. To avoid unnecessary remand in the event of reversal, the circuit court alternatively held the bill dealt was constitutional because it neither dealt with a single subject nor deviated from its original purpose. The coalition appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One is whether the coalition filed the lawsuit based on procedural defects in the bill before the next legislative session adjourned and, if so, whether the coalition needed to show taxpayer standing or any further “aggrieved” status to have standing. Another question involves whether the coalition’s claims are ripe (ready to be adjudicated). Other questions are whether the bill violated the state constitution’s single-subject requirement of article III, section 23 or original purpose requirement of article III, section 21.
SC97591_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_brief
SC97591_ltr_correcting_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_brief
SC97591_State_brief
SC97591_MO_Coalition_for_the_Environment_reply_brief
SC97715
In re: John F. Washington
St. Louis city
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97715 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Washington, an attorney in St. Louis, represented himself.
St. Louis attorney John Washington was granted licensure in Missouri under a monitoring agreement, which gave him three years to resolve his financial delinquencies, bring his debts into current payment status and not incur any new deficiencies. Despite being given additional time, he failed to resolve his delinquencies and was admonished for violating Rule 4-8.4(d) – conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. During the next several years, this Court suspended his license three times under Rule 5.245 for failing to file or pay his state income tax. As a result, the Court placed him on probation for one year. In 2012, the state’s family support division filed a motion for contempt and a show cause order against Washington based on child support arrearages. Washington responded by moving to modify child support. The circuit court ultimately struck his motion, which he filed in the contempt case rather than the underlying dissolution case. Washington subsequently sued the judges and prosecutors in the contempt case and his ex-wife, alleging they were abusing the judicial process and conspiring to violate his constitutional rights. The case dismissed after being removed to a federal district court. The chief disciplinary counsel instigated disciplinary proceedings against Washington. Following an evidentiary hearing, the disciplinary hearing panel found Washington violated Rule 4-3.1 by filing a lawsuit with no basis in law or fact but concluded he did not violated Rule 4-8.4(d) because there was insufficient proof his actions materially affected the circuit court’s daily operations. The disciplinary hearing panel recommended Washington be reprimanded without conditions. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the panel’s decision and now asks this Court to suspend his law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months; Washington asserts he should receive no more than a reprimand with certain conditions.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Washington violated rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97715_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC97715
In re: John F. Washington
St. Louis city
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97715 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented his office during arguments; Washington, an attorney in St. Louis, represented himself.
St. Louis attorney John Washington was granted licensure in Missouri under a monitoring agreement, which gave him three years to resolve his financial delinquencies, bring his debts into current payment status and not incur any new deficiencies. Despite being given additional time, he failed to resolve his delinquencies and was admonished for violating Rule 4-8.4(d) – conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. During the next several years, this Court suspended his license three times under Rule 5.245 for failing to file or pay his state income tax. As a result, the Court placed him on probation for one year. In 2012, the state’s family support division filed a motion for contempt and a show cause order against Washington based on child support arrearages. Washington responded by moving to modify child support. The circuit court ultimately struck his motion, which he filed in the contempt case rather than the underlying dissolution case. Washington subsequently sued the judges and prosecutors in the contempt case and his ex-wife, alleging they were abusing the judicial process and conspiring to violate his constitutional rights. The case dismissed after being removed to a federal district court. The chief disciplinary counsel instigated disciplinary proceedings against Washington. Following an evidentiary hearing, the disciplinary hearing panel found Washington violated Rule 4-3.1 by filing a lawsuit with no basis in law or fact but concluded he did not violated Rule 4-8.4(d) because there was insufficient proof his actions materially affected the circuit court’s daily operations. The disciplinary hearing panel recommended Washington be reprimanded without conditions. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the panel’s decision and now asks this Court to suspend his law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months; Washington asserts he should receive no more than a reprimand with certain conditions.
This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Washington violated rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97715_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief