DOCKET SUMMARIES

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

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August 7 update: Due to concerns regarding the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), oral arguments scheduled for September 2020 will be conducted remotely, unless the parties request their cases be submitted on briefs.

Scheduled for 9 a.m. – SC98222
State ex rel. Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and Janssen Research & Development LLC v. The Honorable Michael Noble 
St. Louis
Venue
A group of plaintiffs sued Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and Janssen Research & Development LLC (collectively, the pharmaceutical companies) in the St. Louis circuit court for alleged physical and economic injuries from taking the medication Risperdal. Only three plaintiffs alleged residence or injury in Missouri: Treyvon Johnson alleged he was injured in St. Louis; Ryan Shelton alleged he resides and was injured in St. Louis County; and Jacob Simms alleged he resides and was injured in Dunklin County. The pharmaceutical companies moved to dismiss the claims of all plaintiffs but Johnson for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to a proper venue. The parties did not waive the 90-day rule set forth in section 508.010, RSMo. The circuit court overruled the motion nearly 240 days after it was filed, holding Johnson’s claims rendered the city a proper venue for all the plaintiffs’ claims. Approximately three years later, this Court issued its opinions in State ex rel. HeplerBroom LLC v. Moriarty and State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, addressing venue under section 508.010 and Rule 51.01. The pharmaceutical companies asked the circuit court to reconsider its venue ruling in light of those opinions. The circuit court overruled the motion to reconsider, holding the 90-day rule did not apply because the venue motion was not noticed for hearing within 90 days of filing and Johnson & Johnson did not apply because no individual claims had been separated out for trial. The out-of-state plaintiffs subsequently consented to transfer their claims to St. Louis County, where Janssen’s registered agent is located, leaving only the claims of the three Missouri plaintiffs in the case. The pharmaceutical companies seek to make permanent this Court’s preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any action other than to transfer Shelton’s claims to St. Louis County and Simms’ claims to Dunklin County.

This case presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer Shelton’s and Simms’ claims. Related issues include whether the 90-day rule in section 508.010 is mandatory or leaves the court discretion to make an informed ruling after a hearing and what impact, if any, the provision allowing parties to waive the 90-day rule has on construing the rule’s meaning. Another question involves whether the city is a proper venue for Shelton’s and Simms’ claims. Related issues include whether Rule 51.01 applies only when claims are designated for a separate trial; and whether the legislature intended changes in the venue statutes made after this Court’s opinions in HeplerBroom and Johnson & Johnson to apply to existing cases.

SC98222_pharmaceutical_companies_brief  
SC98222_remaining_plaintiffs_brief  
SC98222_pharmaceutical_companies_reply_brief  



Scheduled for 10 a.m. – SC98323
State ex rel. Vacation Management Solutions LLC v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
St. Louis
Venue
St. Louis resident Kyle Klosterman sued Vacation Management Solutions LLC, which has its registered agent in St. Charles County, alleging violation of the state’s merchandising practices act over his booking through the company of a vacation package at a Warren County resort. Vacation Management filed motions to dismiss and to transfer venue to either St. Charles or Warren County. The company sought a hearing on its motion to dismiss, which the circuit court overruled. Klosterman did not respond to the venue motion, and the circuit court did not rule on it within 90 days of its filing. The company now seeks to make permanent this Court’s preliminary writ mandating the circuit court to transfer venue of the case to either St. Charles or Warren County.

This case presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to transfer venue in the case to St. Charles or Warren County. Related issues include whether the 90-day rule in section 508.010 required the circuit court to transfer venue by not ruling within 90 days after the motion was filed, whether the company agreed to waive the 90-day rule, and what impact, if any, there was from Klosterman not responding to the transfer motion and the company not ensuring a hearing regarding its motion.

SC98323_Vacation_Management_brief  
SC98323_Klosterman_brief  
SC98323_Vacation_Management_reply_brief  



Scheduled for 11 a.m. – SC98380
The Empire District Electric Company, a Kansas Corporation, and Westar Generating Inc., a Kansas Corporation v. John Thomas Scorse, as Trustee under that Certain Trust Agreement Dated November 17, 1976, and its Unknown Successors and Assigns, and John Thomas Scorse, Individually, and His Unknown Heirs and Assigns
Newton County
Title to disputed property
This case involves the title to a tract of approximately 15 acres of rocky, hilly land in Newton County and whether it was owned by the Elkan family or Scorse family, each of which operated a ranch on their respective properties adjoining the disputed property. The title history shows the Elkan family acquired most of the disputed property in 1957; in 1999, they filed an affidavit with the Newton County recorder warranting that they owned all of the disputed property. In June 1975, John Scorse’s parents purchased three farms immediately west of the disputed property, two of which adjoin the disputed property’s western boundary. In 1999, The Empire District Electric Company and Westar Generating Inc. (collectively, the utilities) purchased from the Elkans 200 acres of land, purportedly including the disputed property. Scorse learned his family did not own record title to the disputed property after the utilities bulldozed part of a fence in 2008. In November 2015, the utilities petitioned the circuit court to quiet title (give them clear title) to the disputed property. Scorse denied the utilities’ claims and filed a counterclaim asserting ownership by adverse possession. Scorse stated he and his father believed the disputed property was included with the farms because they walked the disputed property before the purchase. The Scorse family also maintained fencing that enclosed the disputed property along with the property the Scorse family purchased. Scorse’s back yard is contiguous to the disputed property. Scorse said, since 1975, his family members have used the disputed property to explore caves, fish, irrigate, landscape and hunt deer. Scorse said the Elkans never objected to any of these activities. The utilities presented evidence the Elkans allowed other individuals to use the disputed property for similar purposes. Following trial, the circuit court entered its judgment quieting title to the disputed land in favor of the utilities and denying Scorse’s counterclaim for adverse possession. Scorse appeals.

This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court misapplied the law in denying Scorse’s claim of adverse possession. Related issues include the extent to which the circuit court failed to take as true the facts it found were uncontested in this case; whether certain occasional uses of the land were occasional trespasses or could establish “actual” use and possession of uncultivatable wild land; whether the disputed land was enclosed so as to establish the “actual” and “open and notorious” elements of adverse possession; and whether Scorse’s actions in excluding others from the disputed land, putting up “no trespassing” signs without objection and fencing off the land from that of the Elkans legally divested the Elkans of the disputed land’s ownership before 1999.

SC98380_Scorse_brief 
SC98380_Empire_and_Westar_brief 

 


Scheduled for noon – SC98353
In re: Syreeta L. McNeal
Boone County
Attorney discipline
Columbia attorney Syreeta McNeal has operated her own practice since 2012, focusing mostly on bankruptcy and tax matters. She previously was admonished for improperly communicating with a party represented by counsel and for failing to provide a former client with the client’s entire file upon request. The chief disciplinary counsel instituted new disciplinary proceedings against McNeal for her conduct relating to three clients during 2018. McNeal and the chief disciplinary counsel entered into a joint stipulation as to facts, proposed conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline. In the stipulation, McNeal admitted she violated various rules of professional responsibility. Specifically, she admits she called a couple she had represented in a bankruptcy case late at night and was verbally abusive toward them in an attempt to collect legal fees. McNeal also admits she threatened one former client with revealing alleged illegal acts if the client did not settle the remaining claim in a lawsuit for fees McNeal had filed against her former client. McNeal then reported to the Internal Revenue Service that her former client and family members had not filed tax returns for several years, apparently unaware the returns had been filed prior to McNeal’s report. The former client ultimately agreed to pay McNeal’s $6,000 demand to avoid incurring additional attorney fees to defend the lawsuit. McNeal believed, without foundation, that another former client had lied to her and threatened she would reveal these lies if he did not pay her $350, which he eventually did. In the joint stipulation, the parties agree McNeal is remorseful, did not handle her client relationships appropriately, should not should not have attempted to collect fees to which she was not entitled, and should not have revealed or threatened to reveal client confidences. An independent psychiatrist who examined McNeal pursuant to Rule 5.28 opined McNeal has certain mental disorders that substantially contributed to her misconduct but that are treatable through therapy and medication; the psychiatrist opined, with treatment and education about her wrongdoing, it is unlikely McNeal will engage in similar conduct. The parties jointly recommend that this Court suspend McNeal with no leave to apply for reinstatement for one year, stay the suspension and place McNeal on probation for three years with specific terms of probation.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether McNeal violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

SC98353_chief_disciplinary_counsel_brief
SC98353_McNeal_brief